Penn Virginia Oil & Gas GP, LLC and Penn Virginia Oil & Gas L.P. v. Alfredo De La Garza, Individually and as Next Friend for I. D. L. G. and K. D. L. G., Minors, and John Paul Adame, Individually and A/N/F for C.A.A., J.P.A., Jr., and J.N.A.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 23, 2015·No. 01-15-00867-CV·Published

Opinion

I I ,·.

of the derivative nature of their claims. In re Labatt Food Service, L.P., 279 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS S.W. 3d 640 (Tex. HOUSTON, TEXAS

I 2009), 52 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 352. In Labatt, the Court recognized that the

J

10/23/2015 Wrongful10:38:05 Death Act CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE PM

creates an entirely derivative cause of action for the beneficiaries of the Clerk thus binding

I the beneficiaries (the parents and children of decedent) to an arbitration agreement executed by

I the decedent. /d. The Texas Supreme Court bas recognized six general theories that potentially

can bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement: (1) incorporation by reference; (2)

I assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel; and (6} third-party beneficiary. ld

I (referencing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005)). The federal

common law also recognizes these theories to bind non-signatories to contracts as well. See

I Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Bridas

I S.A.P.IC. v. Gov 't ofTurkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2003)).

15. Recently, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the WTongful

I death claims of the surviving spouse, mother, and children of decedent were subject to arbitration

I under federal common law. Graves v. BP America, lnc.,568 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009). In Graves,

the plaintiffs sought recovery under the wrongful death and survival statutes and the defendants

I sought to enforce an arbitration provision in the decedent's employment contract. The district

I court ordered arbitration for the survival claim of the estate, but denied the motion to compel

arbitration of the vvrongful death claims. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling on the

I wrongful death claims and held that the wrongful death claims are derivative of the decedent's

I claim even though they are for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries. Jd at 223.

16. In Shanks v. Swift Transportation Co .• Inc., 2008 WL 2513056 (S.D. Tex 2008),

I the Court held that the wrongful death and survival claims brought by the spouse and children of

I (.

an employee killed in an work-related incident were subject to arbitration. The Court noted that

I I

I I although the spouse and children were non-signatories to the decedent's employment agreement,

I they were bound to the agreement based on equitable estoppel and third-party. beneficiary

theories. Id at *4-S. The Court held all claims were subject to the arbitration agreement because I the wrongful death claims (which were not bound by the agreement) were so "factually

I intertwined" with arbitrable claims. !d. at •1 0-11.

17. In determining which "Company" the DRP applies to, the DRP provides that it I applies to all subsidiaries of the Sponsor (Nabors Industries, Inc.), as well as any "Electing

I Entities. 16 The DRP also provides a description of the types of disputes to which it applies,

· including personal injury that occurs at the workplace or while the employee is in the course and I scope of his employment. 17 Here, Nabors Wel1 Services is a subsidiary of Nabors Industries,

I Inc. and, accordingly, the DRP is applicable to Nabors Well Services and its employees,

including Aviles. 18 Moreover, Bu:ffco became an Electing Entity, electing to be bound by the

terms of the DRP in. April, 2007 when it entered into a drilling contract with Nabors Well

I Services. 19

I I 16 "Company" means· Sponsor and every direct or lndinct subsldlaf')' (whether 11 corporation, limited liability company, company partnership or other legal entity) of Sponsor, any Electing Entity, any entity or person alleged I to have joint and several liability concerning any Dispute, and all of their directors, officers, employees, and agents, every plan of benefits, whether or not tax-exempt, established or maintained by any such entity, the fiduciaries, agent and employees of such plans, and the successors and assignees of such entities. plans or persons; provided,

I however, that In the case of an Electing Entlly, "Companf" shall lncludt! thl! Eluting Errtlty only to tile wmt provided In the Eledlng Entity's lllftmtent to bt bound by the Program. (emphasis added). See Exhibit 1, Attachment I at 1 2(D). 17 "Dispute" means all legal and equitable c1aims., demand and controversies, of whatever nature or kind, whether in

I contract, tort, under statute or regulation, or some other law, between persons bound by the Program or by an agreement to resolve Disputes under the Program, or between a person bound by the Program and a person or entity otherwise entitled to its benefits, including, but not limited to. any matters with respect to ... 6. any personal Injury allegedly Incurred In or about a Company Workplace or In the course and scope of an Employee's employment I (emphasis added) See Exhibit 1, Attachment 1 at 1 2(E).

11 19 See Affidavit of Laura Doerre, attached as Exhibit 4. See Contract, Ex. 2 at "Exhibit C" at 1 J7; See also. Exhibit 3.

JSJ

18. As noted several times herein, whether Plaintiffs are non-signatories to the DRP is

without consequence given the language of the DRP (i.e., contractually extending to heirs and

beneficiaries), the applicable case law (i.e., Graves. LaBat! and Shanks) extending applicability

I to non-signatories), and the evidence presented herein (i.e., establishing Nabors and Buffco as

I well as Plaintiffs as subject to the DRP).

The DRP Does Not Exclude the Minor's Claims

I 19. Plaintiffs argue that the DRP is inapplicable to the minor's claims because they

I are brought in a representative capacity. Plaintiffs' reference to section 4(B) of the DRP as the

basis for this assertion is clearly misguided. A simple reading of section 4(B) reveals only that

I that the DRP contemplates arbitrating each on an individual basis, rather than in a

I class action setting. Such provision obviously does not preclude arbitrating the minor's dispute

simply because it is brought by her mother.

I The Wor.kers Compensation Exclusion in the DRP is Not Applicable to Plaintiffs' Claims

I 20. The DRP excludes from· its purview all claims for workers compensation.

Workers Compensation benefits are not involved in this lawsuit.20 Plaintiffs' claims against

I Nabors are not created or enumerated in, and do not derive from the Texas Workers

I Compensation Act. Rather, the gross negligence claims provided by statute or common law are

merely preserved by the TWCA, while claims for general negligence are barred by the TWCA.21

I As such, Plaintiffs' claims against Nabors are not workers compensation claims, and are not

I excluded from the applicability of the DRP.

I I ( 20 21 See Exhibit 1, Attachment I 3(D) See Texas Labor Code§ 408.001

I 3S4 I

I I The DRP Is Not lllusory, Unconscionable, or Lacking Mutual Assent

I 21. Any contention that the DRP is illusory or unconscionable flies in the face of the

contractual language within the DRP and the acknowledgements and notices that Decedent I executed. Specifically, Nabors would again point out that the DRP expressly extends to the heirs

I and beneficiaries ofNabors' employees. 22 Additionally, the Nabors DRP has been upheld as not

illusory, and valid and enforceable. Nabors Drilling USA, LP v. Carpenter, 198 S. W.3d 240, I 249 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, orig. proceeding).

I 22. Moreover, any assertion that the DRP fails to make provision for notifications of

amendments to the DRP is completely wrong. Section 6(B) of the DRP- "[The DRP] may be I amended by [Nabors Industries, Inc.] by giving at least 10 days' notice to current Employees."

I Thus, it cannot be said that Nabors keeps its employees in the dark when amendments are made

to the DRP as any amendments to the DRP were conditioned upon notice to the employees.

I 23. Finally, whether an entity becomes or drops out as an "Electing Entity't subject to

I the DRP is inelevant in relation to the forum in which an employee's claim (or

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Penn Virginia Oil & Gas GP, LLC and Penn Virginia Oil & Gas L.P. v. Alfredo De La Garza, Individually and as Next Friend for I. D. L. G. and K. D. L. G., Minors, and John Paul Adame, Individually and A/N/F for C.A.A., J.P.A., Jr., and J.N.A., (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Penn Virginia Oil & Gas GP, LLC and Penn Virginia Oil & Gas L.P. v. Alfredo De La Garza, Individually and as Next Friend for I. D. L. G. and K. D. L. G., Minors, and John Paul Adame, Individually and A/N/F for C.A.A., J.P.A., Jr., and J.N.A. (Penn Virginia Oil & Gas GP, LLC and Penn Virginia Oil & Gas L.P. v. Alfredo De La Garza, Individually and as Next Friend for I. D. L. G. and K. D. L. G., Minors, and John Paul Adame, Individually and A/N/F for C.A.A., J.P.A., Jr., and J.N.A.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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