Penifold v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.

621 P.2d 646, 49 Or. App. 1015
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedDecember 29, 1980
Docket78-9826, CA 18124
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 621 P.2d 646 (Penifold v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Penifold v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp., 621 P.2d 646, 49 Or. App. 1015 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

*1017 RICHARDSON, P.J.

In this workers’ compensation case claimant sought benefits under ORS 656.245(1) 1 for the "aggravation” of her accepted compensable occupational disease claim, penalties and attorney’s fees 2 for the failure of the State Accident Insurance Fund (SAIF) to accept or deny her claim within the period allowed by statute, 3 and an extent of disability determination. The referee found that she had established a compensable claim, was entitled to additional medical benefits under ORS 656.245(1), penalties and attorney’s fees, and a permanent partial disability award. The Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), after de novo review, reversed the referee’s order in its entirety.

Claimant twice petitioned the Board for reconsideration. Both times she requested that the Board either allow introduction of previously unobtained medical evidence directly bearing on the cause of her disability or remand the matter to the referee for his further consideration in light of the additional medical evidence. The *1018 Board denied claimant’s requests in all respects, 4 and affirmed its order.

The sole question on appeal is whether we should reverse the Board’s order and remand the matter to the referee pursuant to ORS 656.298(6) for further consideration in light of claimant’s additional medical evidence.

Claimant commenced working for employer in 1969. In October, 1976, she was employed as a nurse’s aide, which required her to bathe patients on a regular basis. As a part of this job, she wore rubber gloves and came in contact with detergent solutions and, in particular, a substance known as Septisoft. In late October, 1976, she developed a rash on both her hands and forearms. Her physician, Dr. Koch, diagnosed the condition as contact dermatitis. He opined that the condition arose from her duties at work. Claimant testified that Dr. Koch told her that contact with Septisoft was the specific cause. Dr. Koch, however, did not perform any tests, included in the record, that document the cause of her condition. Dr. Koch prescribed medication, and claimant remained away from work for one day. Claimant immediately filed a claim for compensation which was accepted by SAIF. In February, 1977, Dr. Koch concluded that she was medically stationary and would not suffer permanent disability. He did state, however, that the problem could reoccur. Thereafter, SAIF closed her claim with payment of one day’s time loss.

Claimant continued to have problems and sought additional treatment. In April, 1977, she saw a dermatologist, Dr. Moyer, who diagnosed her symptoms as a form of *1019 dyshydrosis and chemical irritation. Dr. Moyer noted that the condition improved when claimant was away from work and worsened while she was at work. In September, 1978, the condition reoccurred and claimant again saw Dr. Moyer, who prescribed further medication but did not conduct any specific tests to determine the cause of the condition. 5 In November, 1978, claimant’s employment was terminated due to the skin irritation. She subsequently gave SAIF notice of her "aggravation” claim and her claim for additional medical services. SAIF denied the claims by conduct, i.e., a de facto denial by failure to accept or deny the claims within the statutory time period.

In late February, 1979, claimant saw still another dermatologist, Dr. Rollins. He performed a series of patch tests which showed claimant’s sensitivity to substances often found in cosmetics and handcreames as well as substances commonly found in rubber gloves. He did not perform a test with regard to claimant’s sensitivity to Sep-tisoft. Dr. Rollins diagnosed claimant’s condition as chronic contact dermatitis with a secondary neurodermatitis. He felt the problem was aggravated by claimant’s work activities as well as by contacts in her home. He later suggested claimant could return to work if she wore plastic gloves with cotton liners and avoided the allergens to which she was sensitive. Claimant did not return to her former employment and remained unemployed up to the time of the hearing.

The referee’s decision was appealed to the Board by SAIF. After both parties had submitted briefs to the Board, SAIF referred claimant to Dr. Storrs, a dermatologist associated with the University of Oregon Health Sciences Center. Claimant saw Dr. Storrs on several occasions in late February and early March, 1980. In a letter dated April 4, 1980, Dr. Storrs opined that claimant had allergic contact dermatitis. She was patch tested on the substances previously tested by Dr. Rollins and, for the first time, on Septisoft. She had the same positive reactions as before *1020 and, in addition, a positive reaction to Septisoft. Dr. Storr’s impression was that claimant was probably allergic to rubber gloves and the Septisoft antiseptic. She concluded there was a high likelihood that claimant’s condition was work related but intended to test claimant further for reaction to specific Septisoft ingredients before reaching a final diagnosis. A copy of this letter was sent to SAIF. This report was not made available to either claimant’s counsel or to the Board prior to the Board’s order on review which was issued May 16, 1980. 6 The record indicates claimant first received a copy of the report on June 10, 1980, and brought the report to the Board’s attention in her request for reconsideration dated June 18, 1980.

Dr. Storrs retested claimant on April 29, 1980, for sensitivity to the specific Septisoft ingredients. On May 9, 1980, she made the following remarks in a letter:

"There is now no doubt in our minds that Mrs. Penifold’s acute dermatitis, which occurred during the time that she was working at the Eugene Hospitals and Clinic as a nurse’s aide, was directly associated with her use of rubber gloves and Septisoft liquid soap. We do, however, appreciate that she is basically an atopic person and expect that her hand dermatitis is long-lasting, largely because of this.”

This letter report was sent to claimant’s counsel but was not received until after the Board’s order. Claimant included the report in her motion for reconsideration but, as noted previously, the Board denied her request.

ORS 656.298(6) sets forth this court’s de novo review powers in workers’ compensation cases. That subsection provides:

"The review by the Court of Appeals shall be on the entire record forwarded by the board.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kienow's Food Stores, Inc. v. Lyster
719 P.2d 890 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1986)
Bailey v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
672 P.2d 333 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1983)
Penifold v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
654 P.2d 1142 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1982)
Muffett v. State Accident Insurance Fund
650 P.2d 139 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1982)
Matter of Compensation of Gallea
643 P.2d 390 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1982)
Brown v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
625 P.2d 1351 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
621 P.2d 646, 49 Or. App. 1015, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/penifold-v-state-accident-insurance-fund-corp-orctapp-1980.