Peng v. Microsoft Corporation

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 25, 2019
• Docket: 2:19-cv-00639
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 YUZHOU PENG, 9

Plaintiff, 10 Case No. 2:19-cv-639- RAJ v. 11 ORDER

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and 12 LENOVO GROUP, 13 Defendant. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This matter is before the Court sua sponte. For the reasons that follow, the Court 17 DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend and denies the pending motions for 18 default judgment as moot. 19 II. BACKGROUND 20 On November 2, 2018, Yuzhou Peng filed the Complaint in the federal district court 21 for the Southern District of New York. Dkt. # 2. The Complaint appears to allege 22 Defendants Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and Lenovo Group (“Lenovo”) infringed 23 Peng’s rights in a particular Chinese patent for a keyboard layout. Id. After Peng filed six 24 amended complaints and a request to proceed in forma pauperis, the New York court sua 25 sponte transferred the lawsuit to this district. Dkt. # 12. Magistrate Judge Theiler 26 recommended that the Court deny Peng in forma pauperis status and screen the lawsuit 27 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dkt. # 22. Peng paid the filing fee and filed another 1 complaint June 17, 2019. Dkt. # 25. On June 24, 2019, Peng filed a “Proof of Summons 2 Service,” explaining he had “served” Microsoft at the email address msft@microsoft.com 3 and Lenovo at ir@lenovo.com. Dkt. # 29. Peng moved for default judgment claiming 4 that he also mailed a copy of the complaint and summons to the Defendants which he 5 claimed was received by each on July 8, 2019. Dkt. ## 31, 35. Peng claims that Microsoft 6 and Lenovo are infringing on several of his Chinese patents for computer keyboards. Dkt. 7 # 25. 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 The Court’s authority to grant in forma pauperis status derives from 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1915. The Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis plaintiff’s case if the Court 11 determines that “the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on 12 which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 13 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also See Lopez v. Smith, 203 14 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis 15 complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.”). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks a basis 16 in law or fact. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). A complaint fails 17 to state a claim if it does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 18 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). 19 “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels that used when ruling on dismissal under Federal Rule 21 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Day v. Florida, No. 14-378-RSM, 2014 WL 1412302, at *4 22 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2014) (citing Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129). Rule 12(b)(6) permits a 23 court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim. The rule requires the court to 24 assume the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences 25 arising from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). The 26 plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 27 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). Where a plaintiff proceeds 1 pro se, the court must construe the plaintiff’s complaint liberally. Johnson v. Lucent Techs. 2 Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th 3 Cir. 2010)). 4 Even though a Plaintiff pays the filing fee, the Court may consider an action for 5 dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. As is clear from the complaint, Peng fails to allege 6 sufficient facts upon which relief could be granted. None of the treaties to which the United 7 States is a party contemplate or allow U.S. courts to adjudicate the patents of a foreign 8 country. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[A] patent right 9 to exclude only arises from the legal right granted and recognized by the sovereign within 10 whose territory the right is located”). Peng also fails to state facts sufficient to demonstrate 11 any cause of action under U.S. patent or copyright law. Because leave to amend must be 12 granted with extreme liberality, Peng shall have fourteen days to amend. 13 IV. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons stated above, the Court DISMISSES the complaint with leave to 15 amend and denies the pending motions for default judgment as moot. Dkt. ## 31, 35. 16 17 DATED this 25th day of November, 2019. 18 A 19

20 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27