Pendleton Construction Corp. v. Rockbridge County

837 F.2d 178
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 27, 1988
DocketNo. 87-2009
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 837 F.2d 178 (Pendleton Construction Corp. v. Rockbridge County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pendleton Construction Corp. v. Rockbridge County, 837 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1988).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This case involves an antitrust suit brought by Pendleton Construction Corporation (Pendleton) against two groups of defendants. The controversy concerns Pendleton’s unsuccessful applications to obtain, under Virginia zoning law, certain conditional use permits which would allow it to engage in blasting to obtain rock for a construction project. Pendleton alleges that the group of private defendants, Charles W. Barger, III, Matthew R. Beebe, and Charles W. Barger & Son Construction Company, monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market for certain types of rock in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. Pendleton also claims that the private defendants conspired with the group of municipal defendants, Rockbridge County, its Board of Supervisors, and the individual board members, to prevent Pendleton from competing with Barger Construction Company in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Finally, Pendleton asserts that it was denied due process of law by the municipal defendants’ actions and inactions.

In the district court, the plaintiff and defendants, after pre-trial discovery, made cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motions. Pendleton Construction Corp. v. Rockbridge County, 652 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.Va.1987). In reaching its decision, the court below decided that the governmental defendants were immune from antitrust liability under the [179]*179state action immunity doctrine1; that the private defendants were immune from antitrust liability pursuant to the Noerr — Pennington immunity doctrine2 and that their activities did not fall within that doctrine's sham exception3, 652 F.Supp. at 319-21; that the individual members of the Board of Supervisors enjoyed public official immunity as to their actions in denying Pen-dleton’s permit application, 652 F.Supp. 323-25; that Pendleton received all the process it was due in that it was given adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, 652 F.Supp. at 323; and that any alleged anticompetitive conduct on the part of the private defendants not involving the municipal defendants was not of the kind forbidden to a monopolist or would-be monopolist, with a possible exception not warranting relief,4 652 F.Supp. at 322.

We have considered the briefs and the record, and, following oral argument, we are convinced that the district court’s conclusions are unassailable. We affirm on the opinion of the district court, 652 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.Va.1987).

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Pinehurst Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of Southern Pines
690 F. Supp. 444 (M.D. North Carolina, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
837 F.2d 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pendleton-construction-corp-v-rockbridge-county-ca4-1988.