Pena-Sanchez v. New York City

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 11, 2023·No. 1:22-cv-04942·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AUGUSTIN PENA-SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, 22-CV-4942 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO NEW YORK CITY; DEPARTMENT OF REPLEAD CORRECTION, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP). Plaintiff filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated July 26, 2022, the Court: (1) severed and transferred claims arising outside of this District; and (2) directed Plaintiff to amend his complaint to address deficiencies in his original pleading with respect to claims arising within this District. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 15, 2022, and the Court has reviewed it. The action is dismissed for the reasons set forth below, but the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead some of his claims. BACKGROUND In the original complaint, which names as Defendants the City of New York and the New York City Department of Correction (DOC), Plaintiff makes the following assertions: (1) on May 20, 2022, correction officers in the Queens County Supreme Court assaulted him and used racial slurs against him; (2) correction officers at Rikers Island denied Plaintiff access to the law library and his mail; and (2) another Rikers Island detainee, Andre Antrobus, had experiences similar to his. (ECF 2 ¶ V.) By order dated July 26, 2022, the Court: (1) severed and transferred Plaintiff’s claims arising from the alleged assault in the Queens County courthouse; and (2) directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint regarding his claims allegedly occurring at Rikers. In that order, the Court: (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against DOC because it is not a suable entity;

(2) instructed Plaintiff to provide facts in support of a municipal liability claim against the City of New York, or to name individuals and provide facts showing their personal involvement in what occurred; (3) dismissed any claims arising from the alleged destruction of property; and (4) directed Plaintiff to provide facts stating a First Amendment with respect to his law library and mail access. (ECF 5.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 15, 2022, in which he again names the City of New York and DOC, and reiterates that he was assaulted in a Queens courthouse. (ECF 6.) With respect to matters occurring at Rikers, Plaintiff alleges that he and Antrobus have both experienced “block[ed]” access to the telephone, courts, and mail; and that corrections officers seized “favorable exonerating evidence” from them, and permitted gang members to assault

them. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Previously Asserted Claims Plaintiff’s amended complaint names the same defendants, and is substantially similar to the original complaint with respect to the First Amendment and deprivation of property claims. For the reasons set forth in the July 26, 2022 order, Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with respect to the previously asserted First Amendment and property claims. B. Newly Asserted Claim Plaintiff asserts for the first time that corrections officers enabled gang members to assault him and Antrobus. 1. Claims on behalf of Andre Antrobus The provision governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows two types of representation: “that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.” Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to him.” Jannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that he is an attorney. He cannot, therefore, assert any claims on behalf of Antrobus, and the Court dismisses any claims Plaintiff asserts on behalf of that individual. 2. Excessive Force Claim The Court construes Plaintiff's claim of excessive force as arising under Section 1983, which requires a plaintiff to allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Moreover, a plaintiff proceeding under Section 1983 must also allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of

respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official . . . .” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff does not provide facts explaining exactly what occurred, or name any individual

Defendants or provide facts showing how they were personally involved in the events giving rise to this matter. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead his assault claim. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (cautioning that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff is granted leave to replead only his assault claim on his own behalf. Plaintiff must submit the second amended complaint to this Court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of

the date of this order, caption the document as a “Second Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-4942 (LTS). A Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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Pena-Sanchez v. New York City, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal
926 F.2d 1305 (Second Circuit, 1991)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)