Pena, Individually, and As next best friend of A.P. v. Starr County, Texas

District Court, S.D. Texas·Decided June 27, 2023·No. 7:22-cv-00276·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT June 27, 2023 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk MCALLEN DIVISION

MARTINA PENA, individually and as next § best friend of A.P., and ARISTEDES § PENA, individually, and on behalf of the § estate of ALBERTO PENA, § § Plaintiffs, § § CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:22-cv-00276 VS. § § STARR COUNTY, TEXAS, EVELARIO § GARZA, and UBALDO SUAREZ, § § Defendant. §

OPINION AND SECOND AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER

The Court now considers Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint,1 Defendants’ response,2 and Plaintiffs’ reply.3 After considering the arguments and relevant authorities, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs’ original complaint4 alleges that constitutional violations resulted in Alberto Pena’s death in 2020 in a Starr County jail. The original complaint’s factual allegations are detailed at length in this Court’s November 8, 2022, Order and Opinion5 denying all Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

1 Dkt. No. 27. 2 Dkt. No. 28. 3 Dkt. No. 31. 4 Dkt. No. 1. 5 Dkt. No. 23. Plaintiffs now move to amend their original complaint, which would reshape several aspects of the lawsuit. It would add claims against Starr County sheriff’s deputies Chester Cervantes, Erasmo Rios Jr., and Daniel Garcia (“Transport Defendants”) for deliberate indifference to Alberto’s medical needs during his transport to the jail.6 The amendment would also add deliberate indifference claims against Starr County jail staff Hector Lopez III, Javier

Gonzalez, Joel Garza, Emilio Garza, Jesus Barrera Jr., and Cesar Juarez Jr7 (along with Ubaldo Suarez, “Jailer Defendants”). Furthermore, although it would retain the supervisory claim against Evelario Garza,8 the amendment would drop the deliberate indifference claim against him. II. LEGAL STANDARD After the deadline to amend a pleading as a matter of course,9 “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely grant leave when justice so requires.”10 In exercising its discretion to grant or deny leave, the Court is guided by the following factors which often counsel against granting leave: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory

motive; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) futility of the amendment.11 However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 is biased toward the granting of amendments12 and the Court must possess a “substantial reason to deny a party’s request for leave to amend.”13

6 Dkt. No. 27-1 at 37-41. 7 Id. at 41-51. 8 Id. at 51-53. 9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1). 10 Id. 15(a)(2). 11 SGK Props., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 881 F.3d 933, 944 (5th Cir.) (quoting Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 274 (2018). 12 See Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). 13 Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). III. ANALYSIS Defendants make no argument that Plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies, and the remaining factors will be considered in the order they are addressed in Defendants’ response.14

A. Time bar As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs seek to add claims against the new defendants “solely on behalf of minor child, A.P., whose date of birth is 12/24/2016, and whose statute of limitations does not run until 12/24/2036,”15 as opposed to relating the amendment back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c). Defendants’ respond that they “do not necessarily agree [that the statute of limitations is tolled for the minor] but point to this issue for purposes of showing Plaintiff’s undue delay and futility of the overall Complaint.”16 Under Texas law, the time of minority generally tolls the limitations period.17 Without vigorous argumentation from Defendants to the contrary, the Court does not find that the new

claims are time barred as to the minor Plaintiff, and therefore will not consider the statute of limitations in its analysis of futility. B. Undue delay Defendants point out that they produced “all jail videos of this incident; all investigative documents of this incident; all reports from this incident; all jail intake documents from this incident; jail logs during decedent’s incarceration; dash and body cam videos from the arresting officers for this incident; and autopsy and toxicology reports of the decedent” on November 23,

14 Dkt. No. 28. 15 Dkt. No. 27-1 at 1, n. 1. 16 Dkt. No. 28 at 1, n. 1. 17 CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.001. 2023 (six months before Plaintiffs filed the instant motion).18 In the meantime, Plaintiffs joined in a motion to amend19 the Court’s scheduling order and did not mention seeking an amendment in connection with that motion. The Court agrees that a six-month delay is not insignificant and that it would have been appropriate to address the need to amend amidst the scheduling discussion. However, Defendants

concede20 that amendment at that time would not have obviated the need to amend again now; the identities and roles of Emilio Garza, Jesus Barrera Jr., and Cesar Juarez Jr. were only discovered in the recent deposition of Ubaldo Suarez.21 Therefore, insofar as the amendment “will re-start the clock,”22 the same would be true if Plaintiffs had amended before. The Court does not find that further addition of the Transport Defendants and certain Jailer Defendants at this stage will cause undue delay in this case, even if they could have been added several months prior. C. Futility In arguing that amendment would be futile, Defendants conflate the elements of a Monell

claim with those of a deliberate indifference claim. Their response states that “[t]here are absolutely no facts or allegations pled regarding prior patterns; practices or policies of a failure . . . that would constitute deliberate indifference.”23 The Court encourages counsel to review its prior Order and Opinion24 and the cited case law25 before lodging further attacks against the pleadings on Plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims.

18 Dkt. No. 28 at 2, ¶ 6. 19 Dkt. No. 25. 20 Dkt. No. 28 at 3, ¶ 7. 21 Dkt. No. 27 at 5-6, ¶ 32. The Court does not find the deposition timing inappropriately late. 22 Dkt. No. 28 at 3, ¶ 8. 23 Id. at 4, ¶ 10. 24 Dkt. No. 23. 25 See Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001)) (“To succeed on a deliberate-indifference claim, plaintiffs must show that (1) the D. Undue prejudice Defendants argue amendment “would constitute undue prejudice to them, particularly in mushrooming the number of depositions; discovery; and motions necessary to get an adequate resolution” and by “balloon[ing] this lawsuit further” which could confuse a jury.26 That is not undue prejudice. The Fifth Circuit has found undue prejudice where a plaintiff’s

amendment would reopen discovery and force the defendant to prepare a new defense just two days before trial.27 But amendment that increases the complexity of a case within the discovery period is typical.

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Pena, Individually, and As next best friend of A.P. v. Starr County, Texas, (S.D. Tex. 2023).

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