Pem-Air Turbine Engine Services LLC v. Gupta

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedFebruary 22, 2024
Docket3:21-cv-00180
StatusUnknown

This text of Pem-Air Turbine Engine Services LLC v. Gupta (Pem-Air Turbine Engine Services LLC v. Gupta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pem-Air Turbine Engine Services LLC v. Gupta, (N.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION PEM-AIR TURBINE ENGINE § SERVICES LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:21-cv-180-L-BN § NAYVUG GUPTA AND PRENEET § HOLDINGS INC., § § Defendants. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1 This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay. See Dkt. No. 111. Plaintiff Pem-Air Turbine Engine Services LLC, on November 28, 2023, filed Motion to Strike Untimely Discovery Responses served on November 3, 2023 by Defendants Navyug Gupta and Preneet Holdings, Inc. See Dkt. No. 95. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff Pem-Air Turbine Engine Services LLC’s Motion to Strike Untimely Discovery Responses Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Motion to Compel and for Sanctions [Dkt. No. 95] for the reasons and to the extent explained 1 Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the definition of Awritten opinion@ adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, this is a Awritten opinion[] issued by the court@ because it Asets forth a reasoned explanation for [the] court’s decision.@ It has been written, however, primarily for the parties, to decide issues presented in this case, and not for publication in an official reporter, and should be understood accordingly. -1- below. When first responding to or answering discovery requests or requests for admission, “[t]he Federal Rules provide that parties can agree to – or file a motion to

ask the court for an order to – allow the responding party to serve written objections, responses, or answers and produce responsive materials in a period longer than 30 days,” as provided for in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 29, 33(b)(2), 34(b)(1), 34(b)(2)(A), and 36(a)(3). Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 582 (N.D. Tex. 2018). And Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1) provides that “[a] party ... who has responded to an interrogatory, [or] request for production ... must supplement or

correct its ... response: (A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the ... response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or (B) as ordered by the court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1); accord Hernandez v. Results Staffing, Inc., 907 F.3d 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(1), “a party

making a disclosure under, inter alia, a request for production, ‘must supplement or correct its disclosure or response ... in a timely manner if the party learns that in some way the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing’”). Under Rule 26(e)(1), “[s]upplementation or correction must be done ‘in a -2- timely manner’ upon learning that the [response or answer] is incomplete or incorrect.” Fuller v. CIG Fin., LLC, No. 3:22-cv-1289-D, 2023 WL 8482889, at *2-*3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2023) (cleaned up). “Generally, supplementation ‘should be made

at appropriate intervals during the discovery period, and with special promptness as the trial date approaches.’ Rule 26 advisory committee’s note (1993).” Id. at *3 (cleaned up). Courts “have cautioned that problems can arise when they allow supplementation too close to the date of trial.” Everett Fin., Inc. v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-1028-D, 2017 WL 784766, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2017). But, even in advance of a trial setting, “[w]hile courts have occasionally held

that supplemental disclosures [or responses or answers] made at or past the discovery deadline are timely, that is generally only when the producing party has shown that it produced the information promptly after learning of it.” Id. at *3 (cleaned up). That is, while, under Rule 26(e)(1), “the rules governing discovery impose a duty to supplement disclosures and responses that continues beyond the discovery closing date,” the responding or answering party must do so “in a timely

manner after receiving” the information or materials requiring supplementation or correction. Aikens v. Cent. Oregon Truck Co., Inc., No. 4:20-CV-00567, 2021 WL 4312712, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2021) (cleaned up). Doing so timely is “precisely what the rules of discovery require.” Id. A court could set a deadline in its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) scheduling order for Rule 26(e)(1) supplementation or correction, and, if it did so, a -3- party seeking to supplement or correct after the deadline would be required to show good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) to serve those supplemental or corrected disclosures, responses, or answers, where a scheduling order “may be modified only for good

cause and with the judge’s consent.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). But, absent such a court-imposed deadline, the Court cannot accept Pem-Air’s argument that Rule 26(e)(1)’s “in a timely manner” requirement dictates that, if the party produces a supplement after one of the other deadlines in the case’s scheduling order, including the discovery cut-off, the producing party must demonstrate good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) and obtain the Court’s permission to use the supplement as an exhibit at trial (or elsewhere). See Dkt. No. 110 at 1-2 (relying on and quoting

Bowman v. R.L. Young, Inc., No. CV 21-1071, 2022 WL 3998641, at *3-*6 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2022)). Rather, “Rule 26(e) places no other deadlines on supplementation of nonexpert disclosures,” but “supplementation is subject to reasonable limits to ensure that it does not become a subterfuge for untimely disclosures.” Everett Fin., 2017 WL 784766, at *2. And, so, as other judges in this district have explained, absent a

stated deadline for Rule 26(e)(1) supplementation, supplementation after a scheduling order’s discovery cut-off may generally be considered untimely under Rule 26(e)(1) unless “the producing party has shown that it produced the information promptly after learning of it.” Fuller, 2023 WL 8482889, at *3 (citing cases). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), in turn, provides that, “[i]f a party fails to provide information ... as required by ... [Rule 26(e)(1)], the party is not -4- allowed to use that information ... to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless,” and that, “[i]n addition to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an

opportunity to be heard: (A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure; (B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and (C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); accord Olivarez v.

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Pem-Air Turbine Engine Services LLC v. Gupta, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pem-air-turbine-engine-services-llc-v-gupta-txnd-2024.