Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc.

243 So. 2d 112, 1971 La. App. LEXIS 6336
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 15, 1971
Docket3278
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 243 So. 2d 112 (Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc., 243 So. 2d 112, 1971 La. App. LEXIS 6336 (La. Ct. App. 1971).

Opinion

243 So.2d 112 (1971)

Godfrey PELTIER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SEABIRD INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 3278.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

January 15, 1971.

Pugh & Boudreaux by Nick Gachassin, Jr., Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.

Caffery, Duhe & Davis by Jerry A. Oubre, New Iberia, Durrett, Hardin, Hunter, Dameron & Fritchie by Wallace A. Hunter, Baton Rouge, Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe by J. J. Davidson, Lafayette, for defendants-appellees.

Before FRUGE, CULPEPPER and MILLER, JJ.

FRUGE, Judge.

This suit comes to us from a judgment sustaining an exception of prescription, to *113 a portion of a plaintiff's suit based on redhibition. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.

On November 16, 1967, Edward A. Dauterive sold to Godfrey Peltier a Seabird Motor boat, manufactured by Seabird Industries, Inc. Shortly after the sale, Mr. Peltier returned the boat to Mr. Dauterive for additional work. At that time, the bow rail was installed and the sending unit on the gasoline gauge was replaced, and the fuel line on the fuel pump to the carburator was replaced.

On March 15, 1968, in preparation for a fishing trip, Mr. Peltier filled his gas tank and tried to start his engine. An explosion occurred and the ensuing fire destroyed the boat. On March 13, 1969, Mr. Peltier filed a suit against Mr. Dauterive and the manufacturer for the loss of the boat. Mr. Dauterive filed an exception of prescription. Mr. Dauterive was the only witness to testify at the trial of the exception of prescription.

Mr. Dauterive was in the boating business but did not manufacture the boat. He sold the boat to Mr. Peltier on November 16, 1967. The boat was returned to his shop in January, 1968, while he was away. He checked into the boat and found that it had a defective gas line and the gas gauge did not work. These things were corrected along with some other minor repair work and the boat was returned to Mr. Peltier in January or February, 1968. Mr. Dauterive was certain the boat was not returned in March, 1968. Mr. Peltier did not present any evidence to indicate the date the boat was returned to him.

The plaintiff contends that since the suit was brought within one year of the accident which destroyed the boat, the plea of prescription cannot be maintained. He insists that the fire and explosion resulted from the defective condition of the boat; hence, that date is the last date at which the defect appeared and prescription did not begin until this defect reappeared. This suit is controlled by Civil Code Article 2534, which provides:

"The redhibitory action must be instituted within a year, at the farthest, commencing from the date of the sale.
This limitation does not apply were the seller had knowledge of the vice and neglected to declare it to the purchaser.
Nor where the seller, not being domiciliated in the State, shall have absented himself before the expiration of the year following the sale; in which case the prescription remains suspended during his absence."

Mr. Dauterive testified that he had no knowledge of defect in the boat at the time of the sale, and Mr. Peltier offered no evidence at the trial suggesting that Mr. Dauterive did in fact have knowledge of any defects in the boat.

The seller, who is not the manufacturer of the product involved, is not presumed to have knowledge of the vice or defect in the product itself. Boyd v. J. C. Penny Co., 195 So. 87 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1940). In this case, prescription began at the date of the sale. Mr. Dauterive was not the manufacturer of the boat nor had any knowledge of the defects at the date of the sale. This suit is prescribed under Civil Code Article 2534 having been instituted more than one year after the sale, unless it comes within an exception recognized by the jurisprudence.

In arguing that this case comes within such an exception, the appellant cites the cases of Hermeling v. Whitmore, 140 So. 2d 257 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1961); Brown v. Dauzat, 157 So.2d 570 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963); Motorola Aviation Electronics, Inc. v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 172 So.2d 118 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1965); Prather v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 232 So.2d 80 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1970). There is no merit to the appellant's argument, however. The first two cases cited are cases which *114 involved sellers who were also builders who had participated in the construction of the thing which had the redhibitory defect. The Motorola Aviation case involved a suit against the manufacturer who attempted to repair the thing. The last case, Prather v. Massey-Ferguson was a case which recognized an exception where the vendor delayed in delivery of the object but that is not the case here. The plea of prescription was properly maintained, this case not having fallen under an exception recognized by the jurisprudence.

For the foregoing reason, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The plaintiff-appellant to pay the cost of this appeal.

Affirmed.

MILLER, Judge (dissenting).

I would dismiss the appeal. Alternatively, I would reform the trial court judgment.

As I understand this decision, we hold that plaintiff's claim for a money judgment is presently before the trial court on the tort claim, but prescription bars plaintiff from recovering the amount sued for insofar as the claim is based on a redhibitory action.

I would dismiss the appeal as premature. The claim for the same money judgment is still before the trial court.

Paragraph 2 of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1841 provides that:

"A judgment that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment."

The trial court's judgment does not determine the merits of plaintiff's claim. Therefore, it is an interlocutory judgment. It is not an interlocutory judgment which may cause irreparable injury. Even though the exception of prescription was sustained, the case must be tried on the merits.

As noted in the official comments following LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2083:

"In many cases it is not easy to distinguish between which judgments are interlocutory and which are final."

To prevent piecemeal appeals and the resulting delays which prejudice all parties, I would dismiss this and similar appeals which affect only a part of the claim. The holding that a preliminary ruling dismissing one basis for a claim is a final judgment interrupts orderly proceedings in the trial court.

I cannot match the briefs filed by the parties (and the majority opinion) with plaintiff's allegations and the ruling of the trial court. The petition, the exception and the Trial Court judgment appear in full in an attached appendix.

Plaintiff did not seek restitution of the purchase price. He did not seek to rescind the sale alleging redhibition. The word "redhibition" first appears in the exception. The word does not appear in the trial court judgment.

Plaintiff sued in tort. He specifically pled "res ipsa loquitur". Alternatively he pled that "defendants breached the legal implied and contractual warranty they owed to petitioner." (Article X).

The judgment appealed does not state that petitioner's rehibitory action is dismissed. It sustained the "exception of prescription and strik(es) from plaintiff's petition all predicates for exceptors' liability except that set forth in Article 9 of said petition which sets forth the alleged negligence of exceptor, E. A.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Morvant v. Himel Marine, Inc.
520 So. 2d 1194 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1988)
Cox v. Lanier Business Products, Inc.
423 So. 2d 690 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1982)
Jones v. St. Charles Steel Fabricators, Inc.
422 So. 2d 448 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1982)
Rider v. LeCompte
398 So. 2d 114 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1981)
Jones v. Menard
559 F.2d 1282 (Fifth Circuit, 1977)
Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc.
309 So. 2d 343 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1975)
Peltier v. Seabird Industries, Inc.
304 So. 2d 695 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1974)
Horil v. Napko Paint Co.
270 So. 2d 261 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
243 So. 2d 112, 1971 La. App. LEXIS 6336, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peltier-v-seabird-industries-inc-lactapp-1971.