Peirce Appeal

119 A.2d 506, 384 Pa. 100, 1956 Pa. LEXIS 533
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 13, 1956
DocketAppeal, 127
StatusPublished
Cited by64 cases

This text of 119 A.2d 506 (Peirce Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peirce Appeal, 119 A.2d 506, 384 Pa. 100, 1956 Pa. LEXIS 533 (Pa. 1956).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Jones,

This appeal is from an order of the court below affirming the action of a zoning board of adjustment in sustaining the zoning officer’s refusal of a permit for the extension of a building to accommodate the normal business expansion of a nonconforming .use. The applicant brought this appeal.

In 1945 the appellant became the owner of a lot of ground in the Borough of Beaver located at the corner of Fifth and Navigation Streets. The lot fronted 41.74 feet on Fifth Street and ran back along Navigation Street, preserving a substantially even width throughout, for a distance of one hundred and fifty feet to a twenty-foot alley. It was improved with a dwelling located on the Fifth Street end of the lot, and, at the rear, there was erected thereon a double, one-story, frame garage. By 1949 the owner had established in the garage an iron working, welding and automobile repair business. By March 1, 1951, he had enlarged the garage building for his business purposes to its present size of twenty feet by forty feet; and a portion of the lot to the extent of approximately six hundred square feet, between the garage building and the residence, was used by the owner as an open storage and work area in the furtherance of his business. In addition to that, an open frame lean-to, attached to the garage and *102 covering approximately one hundred and twenty-five square feet, was also used for storage of tools, equipment and spare parts necessary in the business.

The Borough of Beaver enacted its zoning ordinance on March 13, 1951. The ordinance zoned as commercial practically the entire length of Third (or Main) Street of the borough and two lots directly back of the court house yard and a public square, both of the latter abutting on Third Street. All other property in the borough was zoned residential. Consequently, the appellant’s established business located at Fifth and Navigation Streets became, with the adoption of the ordinance, a nonconforming use.

Because of the growth of the appellant’s business, he applied on March 30, 1953, to the zoning officer for a permit for the construction of a concrete block addition to his garage building, thirty feet by forty feet in size. A permit was refused by the administrative officer and, on appeal, the board of adjustment affirmed the refusal. The owner’s appeal to the court below resulted in the record and order which we now have for review.

Two somewhat similar prior applications for a permit had likewise been refused and, although extensive testimony had been taken at hearings before the board of adjustment upon the appeals to that body, the matter never reached the court below until the appeal from the board’s affirmance of the administrative officer’s denial of the third application. Upon certifying the record to the Court of Common Pleas, the board of adjustment so condensed the testimony that the court was unable to determine the facts upon which the board had based its findings or the reasons for its conclusions. In that situation, the court remanded the record to the board of adjustment with directions that it institute such further proceedings as were necessary to complete the record and, particularly, that it answer *103 nine specific questions. However, no additional testimony was adduced before tbe board. At tbe hearing on tbe third application, counsel for all parties bad agreed that tbe board might also consider tbe testimony taken at tbe two earlier bearings. From tbe notes of testimony taken at tbe three bearings, tbe board answered tbe questions propounded by tbe court and made findings of fact to which tbe applicant excepted. After argument before tbe court on tbe returned record as thus revised, tbe court entered tbe ultimate order affirming tbe board’s refusal of a permit. Tbe court based its decision on tbe restriction in tbe ordinance against tbe extension by way of structural alterations of a building bousing a nonconforming use, noting that tbe constitutionality of such a restriction or limitation upon a permissible nonconforming use has never been passed upon 'by this court.

However, in tbe view we take of tbe case, it is unnecessary for us to consider tbe constitutionality of tbe restriction. Tbe question here involved is one of law as to tbe meaning and scope of tbe provisions of tbe zoning ordinance with respect to permissible nonconforming uses. Tbe material facts are not in dispute although we may point out that tbe board’s findings in several instances are plainly irrelevant. Thus, tbe board found that tbe appellant’s present business interferes with bis neighbors’ enjoyment of their residential properties through tbe congestion of traffic on the streets and bright flashes from welding at night and that the attendant noise and racket annoyed tbe neighbors. There was no question before tbe board as to whether tbe appellant’s operation of bis lawfully existing nonconforming use should be abated; nor could there have been. Jurisdiction of such a problem is in another forum. Likewise, tbe finding that tbe granting *104 of the permit would adversely affect the value of the neighboring residential properties where many new homes had been built in recent years introduced elements of private personal considerations which should have no part in an exercise of the police power for the promotion of the health, welfare, safety and morals of the public generally; and the new homes must have been built with knowledge of the appellant’s existing nonconforming use.

Material portions of Article V of the ordinance, which deal with nonconforming uses, are as follows: “Section 1 (a) The lawful use of land existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance, although such use does not conform to the provisions hereof, may be continued .... (b) The lawful use of a building, existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance may be continued, although such use does not conform to the provisions hereof, and such use may be extended throughout the building provided no structural alterations are made other than those ordered by an authorized public officer . . . .”

If the magnitude of the property devoted to the appellant’s nonconforming business use at the time of the adoption of the ordinance had consisted in its entirety of the twenty feet by forty feet garage building and the lean-to attached, then the restriction on the extension of the use by structural alteration of the building, which the learned court below deemed controlling, would become pertinent. However, such is not the situation which this record presents.

Adjacent to the garage there is an area of seven hundred and twenty-five square feet of the appellant’s yard (including the space covered by the lean-to) which Avas as much devoted to the appellant’s business use at the time of the adoption of the ordinance as was the *105 garage itself. The continued use of that land by the appellant in the operation of his business is expressly authorized by the above-quoted provision of Section 1 of Article Y of the ordinance; and nowhere in the ordinance is there an inhibition on the owner’s enclosing with a building the land so lawfully employed as a nonconforming use. The clear implication of our decision in Humphreys v. Stuart Realty Corporation, 364 Pa. 616, 621, 73 A.

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Bluebook (online)
119 A.2d 506, 384 Pa. 100, 1956 Pa. LEXIS 533, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peirce-appeal-pa-1956.