21-3150 Peets v. Kijakazi
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of December, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT: Susan L. Carney, Steven J. Menashi, Beth Robinson, Circuit Judges. ____________________________________________
KAREN PEETS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 21-3150
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: MARK SCHNEIDER, Plattsburgh, NY.
For Defendant-Appellee: MOLLY E. CARTER (Michael J. Pelgro, Regional Chief Counsel, James J. Nagelberg, on the brief), Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Boston, MA, for Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Hurd, J.).
Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Karen Peets appeals from a district court decision upholding the Social
Security Administration’s denial of her application for supplemental security
income (“SSI”) disability benefits. Peets argues that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) who adjudicated her case erred in three ways. First, she claims that the
ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to the findings and opinions of the treating
sources and examining consultants. Second, she contends that the ALJ erred by
not crediting Peets’s own testimony about her impairments and limitations. Third,
2 she urges that the ALJ erred by not determining that her combination of ailments
rendered her disabled. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
“On an appeal from the denial of disability benefits, we focus on the
administrative ruling rather than the district court’s opinion.” Estrella v. Berryhill,
925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The substantial evidence
standard is highly deferential. “‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence that amounts to
‘more than a mere scintilla,’ and has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” McIntyre v.
Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971)).
Under this deferential standard, we conclude that the ALJ’s findings must
be upheld. The ALJ appropriately weighed the findings and opinions of the
treating sources and examining consultants. Moreover, the ALJ fairly took Peets’s
testimony into account in reaching his conclusion. Substantial evidence supported
3 the ALJ’s ultimate finding that Peets was not disabled from the application date of
January 3, 2018 through the date of the ALJ’s decision.
I
Peets begins by disputing the weight that the ALJ gave the findings and
opinions of the treating sources and the examining consultants. The weight that
Social Security Administration ALJs assign to treating physicians has recently
been the subject of regulatory change. In January 2017, the Social Security
Administration repealed the “treating physician rule,” which required that an ALJ
defer to the opinion of a treating physician when adjudicating an application for
SSI disability benefits. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical
Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). Now, the regulations instruct ALJs
not to “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
to any medical opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). That an ALJ does not give
controlling weight to a particular medical opinion is not a basis for second-
guessing the ALJ’s conclusions.
Here, the ALJ evaluated the various medical opinions before the agency in
light of the full record. Regarding Peets’s mental health, the ALJ determined that
“when looking to the majority of the relevant time period, a finding of non-severe
4 mental impairments is established and is supported by the overall totality of the
documented medical evidence.” Special App’x 10. This finding was based in part
on medical opinions; the ALJ noted that “significance is provided to persuasive
opinions of the State Agency psychiatric consultant, Dr. Momot-Baker[,] as well as
the examining psychiatric consultant, Dr. Hartman.” Id. And when considering
these opinions alongside Peets’s reported activities and the rest of the record, the
ALJ reasonably found that Peets had “a non-severe mental impairment.” Id.
As to Peets’s physical impairments, the ALJ considered a significant amount
of medical testimony as part of his overall evaluation. The ALJ noted and
discussed the conclusions of Dr. Wasseff—the consultative examiner—and Dr.
Sharif-Najafi—the non-examining State Agency medical consultant. Moreover, the
ALJ took into account the statements of Ms. Steele-Goodwin, the treating
physician assistant. In certain instances, the ALJ found that the record, including
“the claimant’s own reported activities,” conflicted with the statement of a medical
expert and thereby “tend[ed] to lessen the persuasiveness” of the expert’s
statements. Id. at 13. But those conclusions were grounded in record evidence and
therefore were supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision evinces
consideration of the findings and opinions of the treating sources and the
5 examining consultants ahead of a conclusion that the ALJ supported with
substantial evidence.
II
Peets also contends that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit Peets’s testimony
about her impairments and limitations. However, “[a]n individual’s statement as
to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability” in
an SSI disability benefits adjudication. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(5)(A). We have also said
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21-3150 Peets v. Kijakazi
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of December, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT: Susan L. Carney, Steven J. Menashi, Beth Robinson, Circuit Judges. ____________________________________________
KAREN PEETS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 21-3150
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: MARK SCHNEIDER, Plattsburgh, NY.
For Defendant-Appellee: MOLLY E. CARTER (Michael J. Pelgro, Regional Chief Counsel, James J. Nagelberg, on the brief), Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Boston, MA, for Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Hurd, J.).
Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Karen Peets appeals from a district court decision upholding the Social
Security Administration’s denial of her application for supplemental security
income (“SSI”) disability benefits. Peets argues that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) who adjudicated her case erred in three ways. First, she claims that the
ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to the findings and opinions of the treating
sources and examining consultants. Second, she contends that the ALJ erred by
not crediting Peets’s own testimony about her impairments and limitations. Third,
2 she urges that the ALJ erred by not determining that her combination of ailments
rendered her disabled. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
“On an appeal from the denial of disability benefits, we focus on the
administrative ruling rather than the district court’s opinion.” Estrella v. Berryhill,
925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The substantial evidence
standard is highly deferential. “‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence that amounts to
‘more than a mere scintilla,’ and has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” McIntyre v.
Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971)).
Under this deferential standard, we conclude that the ALJ’s findings must
be upheld. The ALJ appropriately weighed the findings and opinions of the
treating sources and examining consultants. Moreover, the ALJ fairly took Peets’s
testimony into account in reaching his conclusion. Substantial evidence supported
3 the ALJ’s ultimate finding that Peets was not disabled from the application date of
January 3, 2018 through the date of the ALJ’s decision.
I
Peets begins by disputing the weight that the ALJ gave the findings and
opinions of the treating sources and the examining consultants. The weight that
Social Security Administration ALJs assign to treating physicians has recently
been the subject of regulatory change. In January 2017, the Social Security
Administration repealed the “treating physician rule,” which required that an ALJ
defer to the opinion of a treating physician when adjudicating an application for
SSI disability benefits. See Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical
Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5853 (Jan. 18, 2017). Now, the regulations instruct ALJs
not to “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
to any medical opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). That an ALJ does not give
controlling weight to a particular medical opinion is not a basis for second-
guessing the ALJ’s conclusions.
Here, the ALJ evaluated the various medical opinions before the agency in
light of the full record. Regarding Peets’s mental health, the ALJ determined that
“when looking to the majority of the relevant time period, a finding of non-severe
4 mental impairments is established and is supported by the overall totality of the
documented medical evidence.” Special App’x 10. This finding was based in part
on medical opinions; the ALJ noted that “significance is provided to persuasive
opinions of the State Agency psychiatric consultant, Dr. Momot-Baker[,] as well as
the examining psychiatric consultant, Dr. Hartman.” Id. And when considering
these opinions alongside Peets’s reported activities and the rest of the record, the
ALJ reasonably found that Peets had “a non-severe mental impairment.” Id.
As to Peets’s physical impairments, the ALJ considered a significant amount
of medical testimony as part of his overall evaluation. The ALJ noted and
discussed the conclusions of Dr. Wasseff—the consultative examiner—and Dr.
Sharif-Najafi—the non-examining State Agency medical consultant. Moreover, the
ALJ took into account the statements of Ms. Steele-Goodwin, the treating
physician assistant. In certain instances, the ALJ found that the record, including
“the claimant’s own reported activities,” conflicted with the statement of a medical
expert and thereby “tend[ed] to lessen the persuasiveness” of the expert’s
statements. Id. at 13. But those conclusions were grounded in record evidence and
therefore were supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s decision evinces
consideration of the findings and opinions of the treating sources and the
5 examining consultants ahead of a conclusion that the ALJ supported with
substantial evidence.
II
Peets also contends that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit Peets’s testimony
about her impairments and limitations. However, “[a]n individual’s statement as
to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability” in
an SSI disability benefits adjudication. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(5)(A). We have also said
that an agency “need not enumerate and evaluate on the record each piece of
evidence, item by item,” in an adjudication. Xiao Ji Chen v. United States, 471 F.3d
315, 341 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ explicitly noted that “full consideration has
been provided to the claimant’s allegations regarding the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms.” Special App’x 14. The fact that the
ALJ found some of Peets’s testimony consistent with the record and other parts of
her testimony inconsistent with the record—and, thus, less persuasive—is not a
basis for setting aside the ALJ’s decision.
Peets also claims that the ALJ mischaracterized certain of her reported
activities, overstating the extent to which she was “playing basketball” when she
sustained an injury to her hand and mistakenly reporting that she still goes
6 bowling. We conclude that these minor errors were harmless. In support of his
decision, the ALJ pointed to a significant amount of evidence, including many
other reported activities that Peets does not dispute, that was independent of the
basketball and bowling examples. Thus, the decision was supported by substantial
evidence, even putting aside the evidence that Peets claims was misconstrued.
III
Peets’s final argument is that, in light of Peets’s many impairments, the ALJ
was wrong to conclude that Peets was not disabled. For the reasons already stated,
we must conclude that the ALJ’s finding of non-disability was supported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ weighed the testimony of the various medical
experts, while also taking into account other evidence in the record. That evidence
included Peets’s reported activities—which included “handl[ing] money,”
“bak[ing] cookies,” “do[ing] jigsaw puzzles,” “us[ing] public transportation,
do[ing] household chores,” and “routinely attend[ing] and participat[ing] in
church activities,” Special App’x 10—and the body of medical evidence before
him. A reasonable mind could accept this evidence as adequate to support the
ALJ’s conclusion that Peets was not disabled under the meaning of the Social
Security Act. Under the substantial evidence standard, our inquiry stops there.
7 * * *
We have considered Peets’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court