Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. M. Swift & Sons, Inc.

65 F. Supp. 819, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 30, 1945
StatusPublished

This text of 65 F. Supp. 819 (Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. M. Swift & Sons, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. M. Swift & Sons, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 819, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).

Opinion

NEVIN, District Judge (Sitting by Designation).

This is a suit arising under the patent laws of the United States. The patent in suit is No. 1,731,415, granted on October 15, 1929, to William F. Grupe, who assigned the entire right, title and interest to Peerless Roll Leaf Co., Inc., plaintiff herein. The patent is entitled “Production of Electrolytically-Deposited Gold in Film or Leaf Form.”

Plaintiff, Peerless Roll Leaf Co., Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, having an office located in Union City, New Jersey. Defendant, M. Swift & Sons, Inc., is a Connecticut corporation. Its manufacturing plant is located at Hartford, Connecticut, but it has an office and established place of business in New York City, N. Y.

Plaintiff filed its complaint on November 19, 1942. On January 9, 1943, defendant filed an answer and on May 12, 1943, an amended answer, asserting therein that the patent is invalid and void and alleging non-infringement. The ownership of the patent by plaintiff is not in dispute.

The cause originally came on for trial before Honorable John M. Woolsey, on November 3 and 4, 1943. This trial was discontinued owing to the illness of Judge Woolsey, since deceased. Subsequently, the cause came on for hearing de novo, resulting in the present record.

The patent contains ten claims. Of these, Claims 2, 6 and 7 only are in issue. Claim 2 is a Product Qaim. Claims 6 and 7, Process or Method Claims.

These claims read as follows:

“2. A heat releasable transfer strip comprising a strip of inert material serving as a carrier, a layer of heat releasable medium on one face of the same and a layer of continuously integral gold deposited on said layer of heat releasable material, said layer of gold being substantially of uniform thickness throughout the length of the strip, said layer of gold having a length materially greater than that of beaten gold.”

“6. The method of forming a strip of gold supported by a strip of inert material which comprises subjecting a strip of metal as a cathode to an electrolytic bath containing gold, to thereby deposit directly upon such strip of metal a layer of gold, applying the derived composite strip to a strip of inert material serving as a supporting strip by the use of a heat releasable medium, and dissolving the metal strip while the gold layer is supported by the strip of inert material and at a temperature lower than the heat releasing temperature of the heat releasable medium.”

“7. The method of forming a strip of gold supported by a strip of inert material which comprises subjecting a strip of metal as a cathode to an electrolytic bath containing gold to thereby deposit directly upon such strip of metal a layer of gold, applying the derived composite strip to a strip of inert material serving as a supporting strip by the use of a heat releasable medium, and dissolving the metal strip, while the gold layer is supported by the strip of inert material by the use of a solvent capable of dissolving the metal cathode strip and incapable of dissolving the gold layer and the heat releasable medium.”

Defendant concedes infringement of Claim 2, if that claim is valid. As to this, the record (Tr. Pp. 34, 55) shows the following :

“Mr. Lucke: (Of counsel for Plaintiff) Now as to the defendant, * * *. The [821]*821■defendant concedes that if the claim 2 is valid the defendant infringes. I think I am correct in stating that.

“Mr. Groner: (Of counsel for Defendant) Absolutely correct. * * * The product claim, the single one in issue, is infringed in just exactly the same way as all of the prior art have over 50 years, an infringement of claim 2 here in issue.”

During the progress of the trial, counsel for plaintiff made a motion to strike out certain testimony. The Court reserved decision on this motion. The following appears in the record (Tr. Pp. 722, 725.) :

“Mr. Lucke: Your Honor, * * * for the purpose of preserving the plaintiff’s rights, I feel that I must at this stage make the motion to strike certain questions and answers of defendant’s counsel during the cross-examination of the witness Dr. Man-tell, upon the grounds, and as appears in the record, (Pp. 593, 595, 596, 598, 599, 600) that these questions are not competent or relevant. * * *

“The Court: Let the record show that the Court will take this motion under consideration; * * * I will leave the motion pend in the record and dispose of it at the time I dispose of the matter on the merits.

“Mr Lucke: That is agreeable to me.

“The Court: Is that course agreeable to counsel, the latter course?

“Mr. Groner: Certainly.

“The Court: Very well.”

The Court here and now sustains plaintiff’s motion, and in arriving at its decision and conclusions, has not taken the evidence above referred to into consideration.

Defendant challenges the validity of the patent and particularly of Claims 2, 6 and 7 thereof, upon a number of grounds. As to those chiefly relied upon, defendant’s counsel made the following statement (Rec. Tr. Pp. 1124-1125): “Mr. Groner: The ■defendant here raises against the validity of the Grupe patent in suit the following defenses: First, that the patent fails to comply with the provisions of Section 4888 of the Revised Statutes. (Par. 8-C, Amended Answer, Rec. P. 180.) Second, claim 2, which is the single product claim here in issue, is invalid because anticipated. Third, claim 2 also is invalid because it does not represent invention over the art. Fourth, claims 6 and 7, which are the method claims here in issue, are invalid because not supported by the disclosure of the patent. And claims 6 and 7 additionally, are invalid because not representing invention in view of the prior art.”

While numerous authorities are cited by counsel in their briefs and arguments in support of their respective contentions, the Court is of opinion, in view of its conclusion, that no useful purpose would be served in a discussion of them here. Sufficient reference, too, is made to the prior art and to Swift Patent No. 2,354,073 (issued on July 18, 1944) in the Findings and Conclusions hereinafter set forth and made a part hereof.

In a recent decision (May 21, 1945) the Supreme Court in the case of Sinclair & Carroll Co., Inc., v. Interchemical Corporation, 325 U.S. 327, at page 330, 65 S. Ct. 1143, 1145, 89 L.Ed. 1644 say: “A long line of cases has held it to be an essential requirement for the validity of a patent that the subject-matter display ‘invention,’ ‘more ingenuity * * * than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art.’ Hicks v. Kelsey, 18 Wall. 670, '21 L.Ed. 852; Slawson v. Grand Street, [P. P. & F.] R. Co., 107 U.S. 649, 2 S.Ct. 663, 27 L.Ed. 576; Phillips v. [City of] Detroit, 111 U.S. 604, 4 S.Ct. 580, 28 L.Ed. 532; Morris v. McMillin, 112 U.S. 244, 5 S.Ct. 218, 28 L.Ed. 702; Saranac Automatic Machine Corporation v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 282 U.S. 704, 51 S.Ct. 232, 75 L.Ed. 634; Honolulu Oil Corporation v.

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Related

Hicks v. Kelsey
85 U.S. 670 (Supreme Court, 1874)
Slawson v. Grand Street Railroad
107 U.S. 649 (Supreme Court, 1883)
Phillips v. Detroit
111 U.S. 604 (Supreme Court, 1884)
Morris v. McMillin
112 U.S. 244 (Supreme Court, 1884)
Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Halliburton
306 U.S. 550 (Supreme Court, 1939)
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.
314 U.S. 84 (Supreme Court, 1942)
Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.
325 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1945)
Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Lange
20 F.2d 801 (Third Circuit, 1927)

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65 F. Supp. 819, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 306, 1945 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/peerless-roll-leaf-co-v-m-swift-sons-inc-nysd-1945.