Pedro Montenegro v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided July 8, 2026·No. PH-0752-24-0419-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PEDRO MONTENEGRO, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-24-0419-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: July 8, 2026 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Pedro Montenegro , Cranston, Rhode Island, pro se.

Diane Tardiff and Edward Carney , Esquire, Bedford, Massachusetts, for the agency.

Michael Potter , Esquire, Providence, Rhode Island, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant did not prove or even nonfrivolously allege that he was an “employee” with the right to appeal an adverse action to the Board pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. Initial Appeal File, Tab 12, Initial Decision at 4-5. For an individual in the excepted service who is not preference eligible, such as the appellant, an “employee” is defined as an individual “who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service” or an individual “who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less.” 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C); see Ellefson v. Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶¶ 7-8 (2005). By all indications, the appellant does not meet this definition. He has presented no substantive argument to the contrary. On petition for review, the appellant continues to argue the merits of his termination instead. He also presents several arguments for the first time, including assertions that he feels “discriminated against [as] a person related to a veteran,” that the agency violated collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provisions, and that he is an employee as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2105. Petition For 3

Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The appellant has not explained why his new arguments could not have been raised before the administrative judge, and thus the Board need not consider them. See, e.g., Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016); Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). In any event, these arguments provide no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s determination to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Whether the appellant meets the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a) does not change the disposition of this appeal. The relevant definition for purposes of determining whether an individual has the right to appeal an adverse action to the Board pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 is set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7513(d); Ellefson, 98 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 8. Further, the appellant’s arguments regarding the merits of his termination and his claim that the agency violated the terms of the CBA are not relevant to the threshold issue of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Morrison v. Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 11 (2015). To the extent that the appellant alleges that his termination constituted discrimination based on his relation to a veteran, the appellant may be attempting to allege that the agency violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA), which generally prohibits employment discrimination against a person on the basis of his performance of duty or obligation to perform duty in a uniformed service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; see 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a); Searcy v. Department of Agriculture, 115 M.S.P.R. 260, ¶¶ 6-7 (2010); cf. Lourens v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 193 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a spouse of a military service member was not entitled to the protections 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) when she herself had not performed service in a uniformed service). An appellant may file a USERRA appeal directly with the Board or may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor under 38 U.S.C. § 4322. 5 C.F.R. § 1208.11. Although there is no time limit for filing a USERRA appeal with the 4

Board, the Board encourages appellants to file a USERRA appeal as soon as possible after the date of the alleged violation or, if a complaint is filed with the Secretary of Labor, as soon as possible after receiving notice from the Secretary in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 4322(e) that the Secretary’s efforts have not resolved the complaint, or, if the Secretary has referred the complaint to the Special Counsel and the Special Counsel does not agree to represent the appellant, as soon as possible after receiving the Special Counsel’s notice. 5 C.F.R.

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Pedro Montenegro v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2026).

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