Pedro Medina v. Markwayne Mullin, et al.

District Court, W.D. Oklahoma·Decided August 28, 2026·No. 5:26-cv-01541·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA PEDRO MEDINA, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1541-R ) MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., ) ) Respondents. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner Pedro Medina, a noncitizen1 and Mexican national proceeding with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). United States District Judge David L. Russell referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Because Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody and this Court can grant no relief to him, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the Petition as moot. I. Background On June 24, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition alleging, among other things, that ICE violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and his rights to due process with his continued detention in immigration custody without a bond hearing. Doc. 1 at 13-19. When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at the Cimarron Correctional Facility in

1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)). Cushing, Oklahoma. Id. at 5. The Court ordered Respondents to respond, Doc. 6, and Respondents timely filed a Response, Doc. 9.

On July 30, 2026, counsel for Petitioner advised the Court that Petitioner had been granted bond in the amount of $3,000.00 by an Immigration Judge on July 30, 2026. Doc. 12 at 1. Petitioner’s counsel further indicated “it remains uncertain at this time whether” ICE would appeal or “Petitioner will ultimately be released upon posting bond.” Id. at 2 (citation modified). On August 19, 2026, the undersigned ordered the parties to “provide

a status report as to Petitioner’s custody status.” Doc. 13. On August 26, 2026, counsel for Respondents advised “Petitioner was released from custody on August 7, 2026, after posting bond.” Doc. 14. II. Standard of Review To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)). “Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of

Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996). “Because mootness is a matter of jurisdiction, a court may raise the issue sua sponte.” Id. III. Analysis Petitioner properly filed his Petition in this district because he was detained here at the time of filing. Doc. 1 at 5; see also Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir.

1996) (noting a § 2241 petition “must be filed in the district where the prisoner is confined”). Petitioner satisfied the “in custody” requirement under § 2241 “at the time the petition was filed.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); see also Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that petitioner met the “in custody” requirement of § 2241 because he was “in custody at the time of filing” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241)).

“The more substantial question, however, is whether petitioner’s subsequent release caused the petition to be moot because it no longer presented a case or controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. “Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016) (quoting U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2). “In order to invoke federal-court jurisdiction, a [petitioner] must demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or personal stake, in the outcome of the action.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013) (citation modified). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the [petitioner] of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer

proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Id. at 72 (citation modified). “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (citation modified). Here, Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody and has been released after posting the bond ordered by the Immigration Judge. Doc. 14. Though jurisdiction attached in this

district when Petitioner filed his Petition, his subsequent release from ICE custody may render his Petition moot. The Petition does not become moot, however, merely because Petitioner has been released from ICE custody. If a petitioner “has been released from custody while his or her habeas petition is pending, a court’s jurisdiction depends upon the existence of ‘collateral consequences . . . adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact

requirement.’” King v. Ciolli, No. 23-1201, 2024 WL 1179908, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14). To overcome mootness after release from custody, a petitioner must show “some concrete and continuing injury” “if the suit is to be maintained.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. Petitioner challenges in his Petition his detention in ICE custody and Respondents’ failure to provide a bond hearing. See generally Doc. 1 at 13-19. In similar circumstances,

courts have concluded a petitioner’s release from immigration custody mooted his habeas challenge to the legality of his detention, where the only possible “continuing injury” or collateral consequence “stems from his removal order, not his detention.” Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006). Further, any determination now as to whether Petitioner’s detention violated his due process rights would amount to an advisory

opinion that this Court cannot issue. Id. (declining “to issue an advisory opinion regarding [petitioner’s] entitlement to a bond hearing because a declaratory judgment on that question would have no meaningful effect on the [immigration officials’] future conduct” with him). Petitioner is no longer in ICE custody, and the relief he requests is no longer available and cannot be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. The undersigned is not

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Pedro Medina v. Markwayne Mullin, et al., (W.D. Okla. 2026).

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Related

Spencer v. Kemna
523 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Bradshaw v. Story
86 F.3d 164 (Tenth Circuit, 1996)
McClendon v. City of Albuquerque
100 F.3d 863 (Tenth Circuit, 1996)
Riley v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
310 F.3d 1253 (Tenth Circuit, 2002)
Suarez-Tejeda v. United States
85 F. App'x 711 (Tenth Circuit, 2004)
Ferry v. Ashcroft
457 F.3d 1117 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Dennis Wayne Moore v. United States
950 F.2d 656 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk
133 S. Ct. 1523 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Zadvydas v. Davis
533 U.S. 678 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez
577 U.S. 153 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Nasrallah v. Barr
590 U.S. 573 (Supreme Court, 2020)