Pederson v. Preston

250 F.R.D. 61, 70 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1271, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45038, 2008 WL 2358589
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 11, 2008
DocketCiv. No. 06-1418 (RCL)
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 250 F.R.D. 61 (Pederson v. Preston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pederson v. Preston, 250 F.R.D. 61, 70 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1271, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45038, 2008 WL 2358589 (D.D.C. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the plaintiffs Motion [24] to Compel Discovery. Upon consideration of plaintiffs motion, defendant’s response [26] thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court finds that the motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion will be GRANTED with respect to Interrogatories Nos. 8-9, 13, 15-18, and 23 and Requests for Production Nos. 3^4, 7, 12, 14 and 19. Defendant shall respond to these interrogatories fully and unambiguously and produce all requested documents. The motion will be DENIED with respect to Interrogatories Nos. 5, 10, 19-21, and 24-25 and Requests for Production Nos. 15-18. The motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part with respect to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 22. The Court’s reasoning is set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Mr. Pederson, comes before this Court seeking an order to compel discovery from defendant, Mr. Preston, administrator of the Small Business Association (SBA). In the underlying case before the Court, plaintiff alleges violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for age, race, and sex discrimination. In 2002, plaintiff, a four-year employee of SBA, applied for a GS-14 Examiner position and was refused the promotion. Plaintiff asserts that Selec-tee, a Hispanic female twelve years his junior, was a “less qualified but younger person” whose selection “was consistent with statements of [SBA’s] intentions to hire young examiners.” (Compl. IT 9.)

Plaintiff filed his Motion to Compel Discovery on February 27, 2008, seeking an order from this Court: (1) directing defendant to respond in full to plaintiffs Interrogatories Nos. 2, 5, 8, 9-10,13,15-25; and (2) directing defendant to produce all documents as requested including, but not limited to, plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 3-4, 7,12,14-19.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Trial courts have considerable discretion when handling discovery matters. Food Lion Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Brune v. Internal Rev[64]*64enue Serv., 861 F.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C.Cir. 1988)). The scope of discovery in civil actions is broad, allowing for discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a claim or defense. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). The term “relevance” at the discovery stage is broadly construed to include information which is not admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See id. All discovery is subject, however, to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(c). See id. Furthermore, discovery of matters not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” are not within the scope of discovery. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978) (internal citation omitted).

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a “[o]n notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1).

B. Defendant’s General Objections to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel

Prior to filing this motion to compel, plaintiff attempted to contact defendant on four (4) occasions between February 15, 2008 and February 21, 2008, twice by phone and twice by email. (Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 4.) Defendant asserts that, pursuant to Rule 37(a), plaintiff prematurely filed his motion by failing to identify specific objections to particular responses in any of his messages. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1); (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 1.) Defendant further asserts that his counsel was away from the office on medical leave through February 19, 2008 and had two pressing deadlines within a week of his return; as such, defendant argues that plaintiffs filing five (5) business days after leaving his first telephone message did not provide defendant with reasonable or adequate time to respond. Id. at 3-4. The Court overrules defendant’s objection of insufficient notice. Plaintiffs messages clearly sought to initiate a discussion rather than demand an immediate formal reply. (See Email from Pederson to Interrante (Feb. 21, 2008), Ex. C to Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 1.) The Court is satisfied that plaintiff, in allowing five (5) business to pass before filing a motion to compel, provided defendant with sufficient notice and ample time to respond to plaintiff either by phone or email.

Defendant then attacks plaintiffs suggestion that defendant did not make a good faith effort to fully respond to discovery requests. (Def.’s Resp. at 4.) Plaintiff bases this accusation on the inconsistency between defendant’s multiple time extensions and subsequent responses, most of which plaintiff deems “non-responsive or inadequate.” (Pl.’s Mot. to. Compel at 3.) Plaintiff further points to defendant’s request that plaintiff sign a Protective Order despite producing no documents that require this shield. (Id.) The Court is not satisfied that either of these claims support an allegation of bad faith against defendant. Without some further evidence in support of this claim, defendant shall be afforded a presumption of good faith.

C. Sufficiency of Defendant’s Responses to Plaintiffs Interrogatories

Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may serve on any other party interrogatories related to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(3). Plaintiff claims that defendant’s responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 5, 8, 9-10, 13, and 15-25 are particularly deficient and asks this Court, pursuant to Rule 37, to require defendant to provide full and complete responses.

1. Interrogatory No. 2

Plaintiffs Interrogatory No.

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Bluebook (online)
250 F.R.D. 61, 70 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1271, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45038, 2008 WL 2358589, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pederson-v-preston-dcd-2008.