1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 GARY P., Case No.: 3:23-cv-00563-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 14 MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of AND EXPENSES Social Security, 15 [ECF No. 16] Defendant. 16 17 18 19
20 Before the Court is Plaintiff Gary P.’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for attorney fees. ECF 21 No. 16. Plaintiff seeks a Court award of attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal 22 Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Id. For the reasons set forth below, 23 the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion. 25 The underlying action involves Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of his supplemental 26 social security income benefits. On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the 27 acting Commissioner of Social Security. ECF No. 1. Defendant filed the administrative 28 record in lieu of an answer. ECF No. 9. The Court set a scheduling order, requiring formal 1 settlement discussions, a Joint Status Report be filed by July 28, 2023, and a Joint Motion 2 for Judicial Review of Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Joint 3 Motion for Judicial Review”) be filed by October 27, 2023. ECF No. 10. On 4 October 25, 2023, the parties timely filed their Joint Motion for Judicial Review, which 5 identified two disputed issues—whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s testimony 6 and whether the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion of Plaintiff’s chiropractor. ECF No. 7 13. On March 29, 2024, the Court issued its Order, reversing the Commissioner’s decision 8 pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remanding for calculation and award 9 of benefits to Plaintiff. ECF No. 14. A Clerk’s Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor was entered 10 the same date. ECF No. 15. The instant motion follows. 11 Plaintiff requests that Plaintiff’s counsel receive compensation for 23.75 hours of 12 work, at $244.62 per hour,1 and counsel’s paralegals receive compensation for 3.2 hours 13 of work, at $179.00 per hour, with the total request as $6,382.53. ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2. 14 Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s attorney fee or paralegal fee requests. ECF No. 17. 16 According to the EAJA, an application for fees must be filed “within thirty days of 17 final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). A final judgment is “a judgment that is final 18 and not appealable . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). The Ninth Circuit has held that the 19 EAJA’s 30-day filing period does not begin to run until after the 60-day appeal period in 20
21 1 The Court notes that, elsewhere in the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel requests a lower hourly 22 rate of $231.49. See ECF No. 16-1 at 5 (“the court should compensate attorney fees at the 23 rates up to $231.49 per hour for attorney time”); id. (“Counsel requests an adjustment of the attorney fee rate up to $231.49 based upon the cost of living”); id. (“Compensation of 24 23.75 hours of attorney time at up to $231.49 per hour for current work is reasonable and 25 appropriate.”). However, the total dollar figure repeatedly requested by Plaintiff’s counsel, 6,382.53, indicates a reliance on the $244.62 hourly rate set forth elsewhere in the motion 26 and in counsel’s itemized billing statement. See ECF No. 16-2 ($244.62); ECF No. 16-1 at 27 2 (“seeks attorney fees in the amount of $6,382.53 based upon a maximum hourly rate of $244.62 per hour for lawyer [] and $179.00 per hour for paralegal time”); id. at 11 28 1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 612 2 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 Here, Plaintiff filed his motion for EAJA fees on June 27, 2024, 90 days after 4 judgment was entered on January 3, 2023. The motion was filed 30 days after the 60-day 5 period expired and falls within the 30-day filing period. Accordingly, the motion is timely. 7 Under the EAJA, a litigant is entitled to attorney fees and costs if: “(1) he is the 8 prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially 9 justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees and 10 costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005). See also 28 11 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (d). The Court will address these elements in turn. 12 A. Prevailing party 13 A plaintiff is a prevailing party if he “has ‘succeeded on any significant issue in 14 litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit.’” Ulugalu v. 15 Berryhill, No. 17cv1087-GPC-JLB, 2018 WL 2012330, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) 16 (quoting Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing 17 party because the Court reversed the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits and 18 remanded the case to the ALJ for the calculation and award of benefits. ECF No. 14; see 19 Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An applicant for disability 20 benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her 21 benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are 22 awarded”); Beatriz B. v. Saul, No. 19cv785-AHG, 2020 WL 5203371, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 23 Sept. 1, 2020) (finding that plaintiff was prevailing party when court reversed the 24
25 2 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a “notice of appeal may be filed 26 by any party within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” if one of 27 the parties is the United States or a United States officer sued in an official capacity. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). 28 1 Commissioner’s decision and remanded for calculation and award of benefits). 2 B. Substantial justification 3 The government bears the burden of proving that its position, both in the underlying 4 administrative proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was substantially justified 5 under 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, 6 Defendant “has given substantive consideration to the merits of Plaintiff’s request and 7 found no basis to object. Therefore, Defendant has no objection to this request[.]” ECF 8 No. 17. Although Defendant’s stipulation does not constitute an admission of liability on 9 its part, the compromise nature of the request is sufficient to find the second element met, 10 given that “Defendant … does not argue that the prevailing party’s position was 11 substantially unjustified.” Krebs v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-3096-JLS-BGS, 2018 WL 12 3064346, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 21, 2018); see also Black v. Berryhill, No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 GARY P., Case No.: 3:23-cv-00563-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 14 MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of AND EXPENSES Social Security, 15 [ECF No. 16] Defendant. 16 17 18 19
20 Before the Court is Plaintiff Gary P.’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for attorney fees. ECF 21 No. 16. Plaintiff seeks a Court award of attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal 22 Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Id. For the reasons set forth below, 23 the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion. 25 The underlying action involves Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of his supplemental 26 social security income benefits. On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the 27 acting Commissioner of Social Security. ECF No. 1. Defendant filed the administrative 28 record in lieu of an answer. ECF No. 9. The Court set a scheduling order, requiring formal 1 settlement discussions, a Joint Status Report be filed by July 28, 2023, and a Joint Motion 2 for Judicial Review of Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Joint 3 Motion for Judicial Review”) be filed by October 27, 2023. ECF No. 10. On 4 October 25, 2023, the parties timely filed their Joint Motion for Judicial Review, which 5 identified two disputed issues—whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s testimony 6 and whether the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion of Plaintiff’s chiropractor. ECF No. 7 13. On March 29, 2024, the Court issued its Order, reversing the Commissioner’s decision 8 pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remanding for calculation and award 9 of benefits to Plaintiff. ECF No. 14. A Clerk’s Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor was entered 10 the same date. ECF No. 15. The instant motion follows. 11 Plaintiff requests that Plaintiff’s counsel receive compensation for 23.75 hours of 12 work, at $244.62 per hour,1 and counsel’s paralegals receive compensation for 3.2 hours 13 of work, at $179.00 per hour, with the total request as $6,382.53. ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2. 14 Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s attorney fee or paralegal fee requests. ECF No. 17. 16 According to the EAJA, an application for fees must be filed “within thirty days of 17 final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). A final judgment is “a judgment that is final 18 and not appealable . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). The Ninth Circuit has held that the 19 EAJA’s 30-day filing period does not begin to run until after the 60-day appeal period in 20
21 1 The Court notes that, elsewhere in the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel requests a lower hourly 22 rate of $231.49. See ECF No. 16-1 at 5 (“the court should compensate attorney fees at the 23 rates up to $231.49 per hour for attorney time”); id. (“Counsel requests an adjustment of the attorney fee rate up to $231.49 based upon the cost of living”); id. (“Compensation of 24 23.75 hours of attorney time at up to $231.49 per hour for current work is reasonable and 25 appropriate.”). However, the total dollar figure repeatedly requested by Plaintiff’s counsel, 6,382.53, indicates a reliance on the $244.62 hourly rate set forth elsewhere in the motion 26 and in counsel’s itemized billing statement. See ECF No. 16-2 ($244.62); ECF No. 16-1 at 27 2 (“seeks attorney fees in the amount of $6,382.53 based upon a maximum hourly rate of $244.62 per hour for lawyer [] and $179.00 per hour for paralegal time”); id. at 11 28 1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 612 2 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 Here, Plaintiff filed his motion for EAJA fees on June 27, 2024, 90 days after 4 judgment was entered on January 3, 2023. The motion was filed 30 days after the 60-day 5 period expired and falls within the 30-day filing period. Accordingly, the motion is timely. 7 Under the EAJA, a litigant is entitled to attorney fees and costs if: “(1) he is the 8 prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially 9 justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees and 10 costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005). See also 28 11 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (d). The Court will address these elements in turn. 12 A. Prevailing party 13 A plaintiff is a prevailing party if he “has ‘succeeded on any significant issue in 14 litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit.’” Ulugalu v. 15 Berryhill, No. 17cv1087-GPC-JLB, 2018 WL 2012330, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) 16 (quoting Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing 17 party because the Court reversed the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits and 18 remanded the case to the ALJ for the calculation and award of benefits. ECF No. 14; see 19 Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An applicant for disability 20 benefits becomes a prevailing party for the purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her 21 benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of whether disability benefits ultimately are 22 awarded”); Beatriz B. v. Saul, No. 19cv785-AHG, 2020 WL 5203371, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 23 Sept. 1, 2020) (finding that plaintiff was prevailing party when court reversed the 24
25 2 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a “notice of appeal may be filed 26 by any party within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” if one of 27 the parties is the United States or a United States officer sued in an official capacity. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). 28 1 Commissioner’s decision and remanded for calculation and award of benefits). 2 B. Substantial justification 3 The government bears the burden of proving that its position, both in the underlying 4 administrative proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was substantially justified 5 under 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, 6 Defendant “has given substantive consideration to the merits of Plaintiff’s request and 7 found no basis to object. Therefore, Defendant has no objection to this request[.]” ECF 8 No. 17. Although Defendant’s stipulation does not constitute an admission of liability on 9 its part, the compromise nature of the request is sufficient to find the second element met, 10 given that “Defendant … does not argue that the prevailing party’s position was 11 substantially unjustified.” Krebs v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-3096-JLS-BGS, 2018 WL 12 3064346, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 21, 2018); see also Black v. Berryhill, No. 18-cv-1673-JM- 13 LL, 2019 WL 2436393, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2019). Accordingly, the Court finds no 14 basis to deny the EAJA fee request pursuant to § 2412(d)(1)(A). 15 C. Reasonableness of Hours 16 “A court has wide latitude in determining the number of hours reasonably expended 17 and may reduce the hours if the time claimed is excessive, redundant, or otherwise 18 unnecessary. [] Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client are not properly billed to 19 one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.” Lang v. Saul, No. 1:18cv1605-SKO, 2020 20 WL 4339496, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks 21 omitted). 22 Plaintiff seeks a fee award for 23.75 hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel and 3.2 hours 23 billed by Plaintiff’s counsel’s paralegals. ECF Nos. 16-1, 16-2. The Court finds the hours 24 billed by Plaintiff’s counsel and her paralegals are reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); 25 Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 918 (9th Cir. 2009) (a prevailing party may recover 26 reasonable paralegal fees); see also Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 27 (9th Cir. 2012) (reiterating the Ninth Circuit’s previous position that “‘lawyers are not 28 likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their 1 fees’ because ‘the payoff is too uncertain.’ [] As a result, courts should generally defer to 2 the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend 3 on the case.’”) (quoting Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 4 2008)); see, e.g., Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136 (noting “[m]any district courts have noted that 5 twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested and granted in social security 6 cases”); Daniel M. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20cv1021-AHG, 2021 WL 3929681, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 7 Sept. 2, 2021) (finding that 22.1 hours billed by plaintiff’s counsel a reasonable number of 8 hours when the parties filed joint motion for voluntary remand instead of a Joint Motion 9 for Judicial Review); Henderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-0562-JLT, 2021 WL 10 2457540, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) (finding that 26 hours billed by plaintiff’s counsel 11 and 5.4 hours billed by paralegals a reasonable number of hours); Krebs, 2018 WL 12 3064346, at *2 (finding that 21.7 hours billed by plaintiff’s counsel and 3.5 hours billed by 13 a paralegal a reasonable number of hours). 14 D. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate 15 The EAJA provides that the Court may award reasonable attorney fees “based upon 16 prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,” but “attorney 17 fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an 18 increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified 19 attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 20 As noted, the statutory maximum EAJA rate for work performed in 2023 in the Ninth 21 Circuit, factoring in increases in the cost of living, was $244.62. See United States Courts 22 for the Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 23 https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited Aug. 8, 24 2024); see also Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2005) (“EAJA 25 provides for an upward adjustment of the $125 rate contained in the statute, based on cost- 26 of-living increases”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)); see, e.g., Black, 2019 WL 27 2436393, at *1 (considering the Ninth Circuit’s hourly EAJA rate a reasonable rate). 28 Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s hourly EAJA rates, Plaintiff’s counsel billed at a rate 1 of $244.62 for work performed in 2023. ECF No. 16-2 at 1–2. As such, the Court finds that 2 the hourly rate billed by counsel is reasonable. 3 The Court finds, however, that Plaintiff’s paralegal rate is not reasonable. Plaintiff 4 assigns an hourly rate of $179.00 for paralegal work. ECF No. 16-2. “District Courts in the 5 Southern District of California have found an hourly rate of $143.00 reasonable for 6 paralegals’ work and have reduced paralegal rates that are even slightly above that.” 7 Deshawantha J. v. O’Malley, No. 24cv301-JLB, 2024 WL 3330602, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 8 8, 2024) (reducing the requested paralegal rate from $179.00 per hour to $143.00 per hour, 9 for work performed in 2024 by paralegal Enedina Perez, the same paralegal in the instant 10 case); see, e.g., Victoria C. v. Kijakazi, No. 23-cv-01030-JLB, 2023 WL 5737788 at *3 11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2023) (reducing the requested paralegal rate of $160.00 per hour to 12 $143.00 per hour, for work performed in 2023 by paralegal Enedina Perez, the same 13 paralegal in the instant case). Plaintiff’s only argument for the Court’s deviation from this 14 rate is that “United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report [], exhibit 2, 15 establishes the average market rate for paralegals in California through 2023 as $179 per 16 hour. [] The USAO 2015-2021 fee matrix supports a paralegal and law clerk rate of $180 17 and the 2021 Laffey Matrix supports a rate of $208.” ECF No. 16-1 at 6. However, the U.S. 18 Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report attached to Plaintiff’s motion as exhibit 2 lists 19 the average billable paralegal rate in California as $143, and the average billable paralegal 20 rate in San Diego as $147. ECF No. 16-3 at 20, 34. The Court thoroughly examined the 21 entirety of the report provided, and it does not mention $179 being an average paralegal 22 rate in any California jurisdiction. As for the USAO fee matrix and Laffey Matrix, attached 23 to Plaintiff’s motion as part of exhibit 2, the Court finds them unpersuasive. “The USAO 24 matrix calculates appropriate hourly rates for attorneys based on data regarding billing rates 25 for all types of lawyers in the DC Metro Area, covering urban, suburban and rural areas of 26 Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. … The Laffey Matrix is based on rates for 27 attorneys practicing federal litigation in the District of Columbia.” Case Law, LAFFEY 28 MATRIX, https://www.laffeymatrix.com/caselaw.html (last visited on Aug. 9, 2024). As 1 such, these rates are not persuasive indicators of market rates in San Diego or the Ninth 2 Circuit. Therefore, the Court will not deviate from the accepted local rate and accordingly 3 reduces the paralegal rate to $143.00 per hour. See, e.g., Deshawantha J., 2024 WL 4 3330602, at *2 (collecting cases that recently reduced the paralegal rate to $143.00 per 5 hour); Jacqueline K. v. Kijakazi, No. 21cv405-AHG, 2022 WL 17884451, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 6 Dec. 23, 2022) (reducing requested paralegal rate from $150.00 to $143.00 per hour); Lisa 7 M. v. Kijakazi, No. 21cv1501-JLB, 2022 WL 17069826, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2022) 8 (finding an hourly rate of $143.00 for work done by a paralegal to be reasonable). 9 E. Assignment of Rights to Counsel 10 Plaintiff requests that, if the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff 11 does not owe a federal debt, the government will pay such fees directly to Plaintiff’s 12 attorney, pursuant to the waiver executed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 16 at 3; ECF No. 16-1 at 13 11; see also ECF No. 16-4 at 1 (“Social Security Representation Agreement” signed by 14 Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff “shall endorse such documents as are needed to pay Attorney 15 any amounts under the EAJA and assigns such fee awards to Attorney”). 16 The Supreme Court has held that “a § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigant 17 and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant 18 owes the United States.” Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 588–89 (2010). Nonetheless, 19 “district courts have recognized that Ratliff does not prevent payment of a fee award 20 directly to the attorney where there has been a valid assignment and the plaintiff does not 21 owe a debt to the government.” Ulugalu, 2018 WL 2012330, at *4–5 (reviewing Plaintiff’s 22 assignment agreement and ordering that the EAJA fees be paid to plaintiff’s counsel, 23 subject to any administrative offset due to outstanding federal debt); Bell v. Berryhill, No. 24 16cv809-MMC, 2018 WL 452110, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (same); Blackwell v. 25 Astrue, No. CIV-08-1454-EFB, 2011 WL 1077765, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) 26 (same); see also Calderon v. Astrue, No. 08cv1015-GSA, 2010 WL 4295583, at *8 (E.D. 27 Cal. Oct. 21, 2010) (“Plaintiff, as the prevailing litigant, would normally be awarded the 28 fees described above, subject to any offset for applicable government debts. Defendant, 1 || however, seems to be content to permit payment to Plaintiff's counsel if Plaintiff does not 2 ||have any qualifying government debt . . . . This Court finds the government’s position to 3 reasonable and will therefore permit payment to Plaintiff's counsel provided Plaintiff 4 no government debt that requires offset’). 5 Here, Plaintiff assigned his right to EAJA fees to his attorney at the Law Offices of 6 || Lawrence D. Rohlfing. ECF No. 16-4. Accordingly, if Plaintiff has no federal debt that is 7 || subject to offset, the award of fees and costs may be paid directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, 8 ||Monica Perales of the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing pursuant to the assignment 9 || and in accordance with Plaintiff's Motion. 11 The Court finds that a reduction of Plaintiff’s counsel’s paralegals is warranted. The 12 || remainder of Plaintiffs fee request is reasonable. As such, the total fee amount is calculated 13 |/as follows: 23.75 hours of attorney work at a rate of $244.62 per hour, for a product of 14 || $5,809.73; and 3.2 hours of paralegal work at a rate of $143.00 per hour, for a product of 15 || $457.60. This amounts to a total of $6,267.33. 16 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 17 1. Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses Pursuant to the EAJA 18 || (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; 19 2. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees under the EAJA in the amount of $6,267.33; 20 || and 21 3. Pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 588-89 (2010), any payment shall 22 ||be made payable to Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff's counsel, unless Plaintiff does not 23 || owe a federal debt. If the United States Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff 24 || does not owe a federal debt, the government shall accept Plaintiff's assignment of EAJA 25 || fees and pay fees directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, 28 ||Dated: August 9, 2024 FA able Allison H. Goddard United States Magistrate Judge