Pease v. Whitney

5 Mass. 380
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1809
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 5 Mass. 380 (Pease v. Whitney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pease v. Whitney, 5 Mass. 380 (Mass. 1809).

Opinion

The action stood continued nisi for advisement, and at the following March term, in Suffolk, the opinion of the Court was delivered by

Parsons, C. J.

[After stating the case.] The plaintiff, to establish the illegality of the assessment, relies on the second section of the statute of 1799, c. 66.

By the provisions of this section it is manifest that the plaintiff was taxable for all his lands in the town, in his own occupation, for the use of the district in which he lived; but that his lands in the occupation of his tenant should be taxed for the use of the district in which the lands were included. And if these provisions are not controlled by any subsequent statute, it is very clear that the verdict must be set aside.

The defendants contend that these provisions are in fact controlled by the general tax-act, passed in February, 1804; that by this act the assessors have a discretion to tax the owner for lands in the occupation of the tenant, or to tax the tenant himself; and that this discretion extends as well to county and town taxes as to state taxes ; and by the act first cited, the school-district taxes are to be assessed in the same manner as town taxes.

To this reasoning the plaintiff has replied, that this provision in the general tax-act does not extend to vest in the assessors this discretion in assessing school-district taxes. And the merits of the case, as it is reserved, must depend on the resolution of this point.

* A subsequent statute generally will control the pro- [* 382 ] visions of former statutes, which are repugnant to it, according to its strict letter. But there are exceptions to this rule, depending on the construction of the last statute, agreeably to the in tention of the legislature.

[298]*298Thus in the case of Capen vs. Glover & al.

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Bluebook (online)
5 Mass. 380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pease-v-whitney-mass-1809.