Pearce v. DRLLOYDER Enterprises "LLC"

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided December 3, 2024·No. 6:24-cv-01417·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

ROBERT PEARCE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:24-cv-1417-WWB-LHP

DRLLOYDER ENTERPRISES “LLC” and DAVID LLOYD,

Defendants

ORDER This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein: MOTION: MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW (Doc. No. 15) FILED: November 14, 2024

THEREON it is ORDERED that the motion is DENIED without prejudice. On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff Robert Pearce filed a complaint against Defendants DRLLOYDER Enterprises “LLC” and David Lloyd, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”) for failure to pay overtime wages and breach of an oral contract for failure to pay all wages due. Doc. No. 1. According to the complaint, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a cook at a restaurant location in Daytona Beach Shores, Florida from July 17, 2022

to April 7, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 11. Plaintiff alleges that during his employment, his hourly rate was $20.00 per hour, he worked 322.57 unpaid overtime hours for which he was not paid, and he was also not compensated for 200 hours of regular hours worked. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. So Plaintiff brings a contract claim to recover his regular

rate of $20.00 per hour for the 200 unpaid hours, and an FLSA overtime claim for the 322.57 overtime hours worked. Id. at 4–6. Plaintiff filed proof of service on both Defendants, Doc. Nos. 8–9, but

Defendants did not timely appear or respond to the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). On Plaintiff’s motion, Clerk’s default was entered. Doc. Nos. 12– 14. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against both Defendants. Doc. No. 15. Upon review, and for the reasons discussed below, the

motion (Doc. No. 15) will be denied without prejudice. Defendants are subject to Clerk’s default. See Doc. Nos. 12–14. However, “a defendant’s default does not in itself warrant the court in entering a default

judgment.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).1 A court may enter a default judgment only if the factual allegations of the complaint, which are assumed to be true, provide a sufficient legal basis for such entry. See id. (“The defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded

or to admit conclusions of law.”). Therefore, in considering a motion for default judgment, a court must “examine the sufficiency of plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to” a default judgment. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Williams, 699 F. Supp. 897, 899 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

The Supreme Court has explained that a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’

or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). This analysis applies equally in the context of motions for default judgment. De Lotta v. Dezenzo’s Italian Rest., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-2033-Orl-22KRS, 2009

WL 4349806, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009) (citations omitted). If the plaintiff seeks damages, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to recover the amount of damages sought in the motion for default

1 The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). judgment. Wallace v. The Kiwi Grp., Inc., 247 F.R.D. 679, 681 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Unlike well pleaded allegations of fact, allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the court must determine

both the amount and character of damages to be awarded. Id. (citing Miller v. Paradise of Port Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999)). On review of Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. No. 15), there are several deficiencies preventing the undersigned from recommending that default judgment be entered

in Plaintiff’s favor. First, the motion does not set forth the elements of Plaintiff’s claims, nor does it demonstrate how the well pleaded allegations of the complaint establish each of those elements. Instead, Plaintiff just baldly asserts that the

allegations of the complaint are enough to establish enterprise coverage under the FLSA and that Plaintiff’s damages are “finite and calculable.” Doc. No. 15, at 1–2. Thus, the motion is not sufficient to establish that Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment on either the FLSA overtime claim or the contract claim as alleged in the

complaint. See, e.g., Estes Express Lines v. Coverlex, Inc., No. 8:19-cv-467-T-36AEP, 2019 WL 13183880, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2019) (denying two-page motion for default which “merely points out that the Clerk entered default, cites Rule 55(b)(1),

and refers to the attached affidavit” and which otherwise did not include a legal memorandum as required by Local Rule 3.01(a)); McCraken v. Bubba’s World, LLC, No. 6:09-cv-1954-Orl-28DAB, 2010 WL 3463280, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2010) (recommending denial of motion for default judgment where, among other things, “Plaintiff cites no cases, undertakes no analysis, and fails to even mention the Act except in a passing reference . . .”), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL

3463277 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2010). Second, and relatedly, Plaintiff’s motion does not provide legal authority for the breach of oral contract claim or establish that the Court could properly award the relief sought. Doc. No. 15.

Third, Plaintiff has not established that the complaint sufficiently alleges coverage under the FLSA to support the FLSA overtime claim. In order to be eligible for relief, an employee must demonstrate that he or she is covered by the

FLSA. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). An employee may establish coverage by demonstrating: (1) that he or she was engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce (i.e., individual coverage); or (2) that the employer was engaged in commerce or in the

production of goods for commerce (i.e., enterprise coverage). 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1298–99. For an employee to demonstrate that he or she was “engaged in commerce”

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Pearce v. DRLLOYDER Enterprises "LLC", (M.D. Fla. 2024).

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