1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANKIE WEISNER, No. 2:21-cv-01957-KJM-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 ALLISON NOBERT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has paid the fees for this civil action. This proceeding was referred to 19 this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 I. Screening Requirement 21 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 23 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 24 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 26 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 27 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 28 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 1 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 2 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 3 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 4 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 5 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 6 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 7 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 8 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 9 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 10 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 11 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 12 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 14 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 15 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 16 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 17 II. Allegations in the Complaint 18 In this civil action, plaintiff is suing his San Joaquin County Public Defender, the District 19 Attorney who prosecuted his criminal case, and the San Joaquin County Superior Court Judge 20 who sentenced him. Plaintiff alleges that his criminal defense attorney denied him his 21 constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the prosecutor withheld 22 evidence from him. ECF No. 1 at 3. The complaint does not specify how plaintiff was denied his 23 right to the assistance of counsel nor what evidence was withheld. In a single sentence, plaintiff 24 further contends that “[d]efendant Ronald [N]orthrup deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional 25 rights on November 17, 2017.” ECF No. 1 at 3. No other details are provided. By way of relief, 26 plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Id. Although he does not specify 27 what type of injunctive relief he is seeking, the court presumes that it is related to his release from 28 confinement for his San Joaquin County conviction. 1 III. Legal Standards 2 While not entirely clear, it appears plaintiff believes he should be released from prison. 3 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is the 4 determination of his entitlement to an earlier or immediate release, his sole federal remedy is a 5 writ of habeas corpus which plaintiff would seek under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 6 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Also, to the extent plaintiff seeks damages, plaintiff is informed he 7 cannot proceed on a §1983 claim for damages if the claim implies the invalidity of his conviction 8 or sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 9 The Supreme Court has held that judges acting within the course and scope of their 10 judicial duties are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 11 386 U.S. 547 (1967). A judge is “subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence 12 of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-7 (1978), quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872). A judge’s jurisdiction is quite broad. The two-part test of Stump v. 14 Sparkman determines its scope: 15 The relevant cases demonstrates that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act 16 itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and to the expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the 17 judge in his judicial capacity. 18 Id. at 361. 19 Prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under § 1983 which 20 challenge activities related to the initiation and presentation of criminal prosecutions. Imbler v. 21 Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Determining whether a prosecutor’s actions are immunized 22 requires a functional analysis. The classification of the challenged acts, not the motivation 23 underlying them, determines whether absolute immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 24 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The prosecutor’s quasi-judicial functions, rather than 25 administrative or investigative functions, are absolutely immune. Thus, even charges of 26 malicious prosecution, falsification of evidence, coercion of perjured testimony and concealment 27 of exculpatory evidence will be dismissed on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. See Stevens v. 28 Rifkin, 608 F. Supp. 710, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 1 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by 2 the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 3 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) 4 (citations omitted).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FRANKIE WEISNER, No. 2:21-cv-01957-KJM-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 ALLISON NOBERT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has paid the fees for this civil action. This proceeding was referred to 19 this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 I. Screening Requirement 21 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 23 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 24 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 26 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 27 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 28 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 1 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 2 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 3 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 4 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 5 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 6 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 7 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 8 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 9 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 10 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 11 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 12 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 14 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 15 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 16 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 17 II. Allegations in the Complaint 18 In this civil action, plaintiff is suing his San Joaquin County Public Defender, the District 19 Attorney who prosecuted his criminal case, and the San Joaquin County Superior Court Judge 20 who sentenced him. Plaintiff alleges that his criminal defense attorney denied him his 21 constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the prosecutor withheld 22 evidence from him. ECF No. 1 at 3. The complaint does not specify how plaintiff was denied his 23 right to the assistance of counsel nor what evidence was withheld. In a single sentence, plaintiff 24 further contends that “[d]efendant Ronald [N]orthrup deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional 25 rights on November 17, 2017.” ECF No. 1 at 3. No other details are provided. By way of relief, 26 plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Id. Although he does not specify 27 what type of injunctive relief he is seeking, the court presumes that it is related to his release from 28 confinement for his San Joaquin County conviction. 1 III. Legal Standards 2 While not entirely clear, it appears plaintiff believes he should be released from prison. 3 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is the 4 determination of his entitlement to an earlier or immediate release, his sole federal remedy is a 5 writ of habeas corpus which plaintiff would seek under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 6 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Also, to the extent plaintiff seeks damages, plaintiff is informed he 7 cannot proceed on a §1983 claim for damages if the claim implies the invalidity of his conviction 8 or sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 9 The Supreme Court has held that judges acting within the course and scope of their 10 judicial duties are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 11 386 U.S. 547 (1967). A judge is “subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence 12 of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-7 (1978), quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872). A judge’s jurisdiction is quite broad. The two-part test of Stump v. 14 Sparkman determines its scope: 15 The relevant cases demonstrates that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of the act 16 itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and to the expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the 17 judge in his judicial capacity. 18 Id. at 361. 19 Prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under § 1983 which 20 challenge activities related to the initiation and presentation of criminal prosecutions. Imbler v. 21 Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Determining whether a prosecutor’s actions are immunized 22 requires a functional analysis. The classification of the challenged acts, not the motivation 23 underlying them, determines whether absolute immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 24 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The prosecutor’s quasi-judicial functions, rather than 25 administrative or investigative functions, are absolutely immune. Thus, even charges of 26 malicious prosecution, falsification of evidence, coercion of perjured testimony and concealment 27 of exculpatory evidence will be dismissed on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. See Stevens v. 28 Rifkin, 608 F. Supp. 710, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 1 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by 2 the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 3 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) 4 (citations omitted). However, “a public defender does not act under color of state law when 5 performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” 6 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). This means that plaintiff cannot bring a claim 7 against them under § 1983. Furthermore, any potential claims for legal malpractice do not come 8 within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 9 1981). 10 IV. Analysis 11 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 12 which relief can be granted under federal law. The complaint's vague allegations fail to give fair 13 notice of any cognizable claims and the grounds on which they rest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 14 Additionally, it appears to the court that defendant Nobert was not acting under color of state law 15 when representing plaintiff in criminal proceedings. Third, Heck prevents plaintiff from bringing 16 any claim that would imply the invalidity of his conviction unless he can first demonstrate that 17 the conviction has already been invalidated. For all these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint must be 18 dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint. 19 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 20 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 21 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 22 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 23 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 24 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 25 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 26 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 27 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 28 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 1 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 2 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 3 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 4 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 5 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 6 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 7 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 8 intended as legal advice. 9 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not 10 state any claim against the defendants. If you are trying to challenge your criminal conviction 11 from state court, the appropriate procedural mechanism is a federal habeas corpus petition and not 12 a civil rights complaint. Your civil rights complaint is being dismissed which does not prevent 13 you from filing a separate habeas corpus petition after you have exhausted your state court 14 remedies. If you are not challenging your criminal conviction, you have been provided with the 15 appropriate legal standards governing your claims against the defendants. Your complaint is 16 being dismissed with leave to amend which means that you are being given the chance to fix the 17 problems identified in this screening order. 18 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 19 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 20 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 21 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 22 1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 23 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 24 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 25 of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// ] the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure 2 to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 3 recommendation that this action be dismissed. 4 | Dated: April 27, 2022 Card ke Lg a 5 CAROLYN K DELANEY? 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 12/weis1957.14 feepaid.docx 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28