(PC)Richard A. Evans v. Shittu

District Court, E.D. California·Decided October 28, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-01317·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 RICHARD A. EVANS, ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-01317-DAD-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 13 v. ) RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELEASE BE DENIED 14 ADEKUNIE SHITTU, et al., ) ) (ECF No. 16) 15 Defendants. ) ) 16 ) ) 17 )

18 Plaintiff Richard A. Evans is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 19 § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for compassionate release, filed October 27, 21 2020. The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as a request for preliminary injunction. 22 I. 23 LEGAL STANDARD 24 The purpose of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is to preserve the 25 status quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to 26 intervene to secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of 27 Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction [or 28 temporary restraining order] must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely 1 to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 2 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 3 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 4 “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 5 granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 6 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A party 7 seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion 8 is unsupported by evidence. 9 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for preliminary 10 injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an 11 actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge 12 Christian Coll. V. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If 13 the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in 14 question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 15 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, 16 extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive 17 means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 A federal court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal jurisdiction over 19 the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 20 Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a party officially, and is required 21 to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating 22 the time within which the party served must appear to defend.”). The Court may not attempt to 23 determine the rights of persons not before it. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 24 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 25 II. 26 DISCUSSION 27 Plaintiff’s seeks release from state custody pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 15, 28 section 3076 and California Penal Code section 1170(d). 1 The pendency of this action does not give the Court jurisdiction over prison officials in 2 general. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 491–93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 3 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir.2010). The Court's jurisdiction is limited to the parties in this action and to 4 the viable legal claims upon which this action is proceeding. Summers, 555 U.S. at 491–93; Mayfield, 5 599 F.3d at 969. The undersigned has recommended that the Court deny in forma pauperis status 6 because Plaintiff has suffered three or more strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and Plaintiff pay the 7 $400.00 filing fee in full before this case proceed. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over prison 8 officials not parties to a civil action. 9 Furthermore, this Court has no authority to order that an inmate be released as requested. State 10 prisoners may not attack the fact or length of their confinement in a § 1983 action and “habeas corpus 11 is the appropriate remedy” for such claims. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); see also 12 Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that habeas corpus is “available only 13 for state prisoner claims that lie at the core of habeas (and is the exclusive remedy for such claims), 14 while § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for state prisoner claims that do not lie at the core of habeas”). 15 Here, plaintiff requests that this Court order his compassionate release. However, such a claim lies 16 directly within the core of habeas corpus because a plaintiff is challenging the validity of his continued 17 confinement and a favorable determination would result in his immediate release. 18 As another magistrate judge in this district has opined: 19 A plea for compassionate release is not one which federal courts, sitting in habeas, or any other situation, are entitled to act upon. “There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted 20 person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 21 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). “[N]either § 2241 nor § 2254 vest this Court with habeas corpus 22 jurisdiction to order a compassionate release.” Fox v. Warden Ross Correctional Inst., 2012 WL 3878143, *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep.6, 2012). California's law authorizing a court to recall a 23 sentence is not mandatory, but only permissive, and contains no language permitting, let alone mandating, a compassionate release. Gonzales v. Marshall, 2008 WL 5115882, *5 (C.D. Cal. 24 Dec.4, 2008), citing Cal. Penal Code § 1170(d). 25 Tucker v. Department of Corrections, 2:13-cv-0293 GGH P, 2013 WL 1091282, *1 (E. D. Cal. Mar. 26 15, 2013).

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Related

Mayfield v. United States
599 F.3d 964 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell
245 U.S. 229 (Supreme Court, 1916)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
University of Texas v. Camenisch
451 U.S. 390 (Supreme Court, 1981)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
461 U.S. 95 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Summers v. Earth Island Institute
555 U.S. 488 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Mazurek v. Armstrong
520 U.S. 968 (Supreme Court, 1997)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Damous Nettles v. Randy Grounds
830 F.3d 922 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Ransom v. Adams
313 F. App'x 948 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)