(PC) Villery v. Jones

District Court, E.D. California·Decided October 28, 2020·No. 1:15-cv-01360·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JARED M. VILLERY, No. 1:15-cv-01360-DAD-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 14 JAY JONES, et al., THE ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S MARCH 18, 2020 ORDER 15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 82) 16 17 Plaintiff Jared M. Villery is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 18 this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United 19 States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 20 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s request for limited reconsideration of the 21 assigned magistrate judge’s order of March 18, 2020 ruling on plaintiff’s motion to compel 22 discovery responses from defendants. (Doc. No. 82.) For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s 23 request for reconsideration will be granted. 24 BACKGROUND 25 On May 29, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery responses from defendants. 26 (Doc. No. 57.) On March 18, 2020, the assigned magistrate judge issued an order granting in part 27 and denying in part plaintiff’s motion to compel. (Doc. No. 81.) On April 6, 2020, plaintiff filed 28 the pending request for limited reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s March 18, 2020 order. 1 (Doc. No. 82.) Therein, plaintiff argues that: (1) “[t]he Court’s conclusion that Defendants Jones 2 and Escarcega do not have constructive possession, custody, or control over specific [California 3 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)] Internal Affairs records is clearly 4 erroneous and contrary to law,” and (2) “[t]he Court clearly erred when finding that Defendant 5 Jones’s response to Request for Production No. 6 was adequate.” (Id. at 5.)1 6 Pursuant to Local Rule 303(d), defendants’ opposition, if any, needed to be filed by April 7 14, 2020. However, defendants have not filed an opposition to the pending request for 8 reconsideration and the time in which to do so has long since passed. 9 LEGAL STANDARD 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that non-dispositive pretrial matters may 11 be referred to and decided by a magistrate judge, subject to review by the assigned district judge. 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also L.R. 303(c). The district judge shall modify or set aside any part of 13 the magistrate judge’s order which is “found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” L.R. 14 303(f); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Discovery motions are non-dispositive pretrial 15 motions which come within the scope of Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Thus, the 16 orders of a magistrate judge addressing discovery motions are subject to the “clearly erroneous or 17 contrary to law” standard of review. Rockwell Int’l, Inc. v. Pos-A-Traction Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 18 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983). The magistrate judge’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear 19 error, while legal conclusions are reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to law. United 20 States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 21 Estate of Merchant v. CIR, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991). “A magistrate judge’s decision is 22 ‘contrary to law’ if it applies an incorrect legal standard, fails to consider an element of [the] 23 applicable standard, or fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of 24 procedure.” Martin v. Loadholt, No. 1:10-cv-00156-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 3563312, at *1 (E.D.

25 1 In the pending request for reconsideration, plaintiff also argues that “[t]he Court committed clear error when failing to reopen discovery and reset the Discovery cut-off deadline,” as 26 previously requested by plaintiff. (Doc. No. 82 at 5; see also Doc. No. 58.) That basis for 27 reconsideration, however, has been rendered moot by the magistrate judge’s September 1, 2020 order reopening discovery for ninety days and continuing the dispositive motion deadline for an 28 additional sixty days thereafter. (Doc. No. 98.) 1 Cal. July 18, 2014). “[R]eview under the clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, 2 requiring a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & 3 Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (internal 4 quotation marks omitted); see also Sec. Farms v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th 5 Cir. 1997). 6 DISCUSSION 7 In denying plaintiff’s motion to compel defendants Escarcega and Jones to produce the 8 documents requested by him, the magistrate judge ruled that: 9 Rule 34(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to serve discovery request for certain relevant items “in the 10 responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” “[F]ederal courts have consistently held that documents are deemed to be within 11 the ‘possession, custody or control’ for purposes of Rule 34 if the party has actual possession, custody or control, or has the legal right 12 to obtain the documents on demand.” In re Bankers Tr. Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. International 13 Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.[]1989) (“Control is defined as the legal right to obtain 14 documents upon demand.”). Here, plaintiff has failed to show that defendants have the legal right to obtain more documents. The court 15 finds that defendants’ responses are adequate and denies plaintiff’s request for more. 16 17 (Doc. No. 81 at 4.) 18 Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erroneously concluded that defendant Escarcega 19 and Jones did not have possession, custody, or control over CDCR Internal Affairs documents 20 that he had requested from them in his Requests for Production Number 18 and 24, respectively. 21 (Doc. No. 82 at 4). The magistrate judge did not address plaintiff’s contention that defendants 22 Escarcega and Jones have constructive control of the requested documents by virtue of their 23 employment with CDCR and the fact that they are both represented in this action by the 24 California Attorney General’s Office. (Doc. No. 57 at 31; Doc. No. 82 at 7–8). Indeed, judges of 25 this district have often compelled defendants to produce CDCR documents that they have 26 constructive control over. See Mundo v. Carmona, No. 1:16-cv-01687-AWI-MJS, 2018 WL 27 1083889, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2018) (noting that in the court’s experience “individual 28 defendants who are employed by CDCR and/or the Attorney General can generally obtain 1 documents . . . from CDCR by requesting them,” and ruling that defendant had control over 2 requested documents and had to produce them because he was employed by non-party CDCR and 3 was represented by the Attorney General’s Office); Mitchell v. Adams, No.

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