(PC) Turner v. Singh

District Court, E.D. California·Decided October 4, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-00954·Unknown

Opinion

LAFONZO R. TURNER, No. 2:23-cv-0954 KJM SCR P Plaintiff, v. ORDER SINGH, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Before the court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint for screening, plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file the first amended complaint, and plaintiff’s motions for return of his legal property. For the reasons set forth below, this court finds plaintiff has stated some cognizable claims for relief and has failed to state others. Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed on the claims found cognizable or file a second amended complaint. This court further grants plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time and denies plaintiff’s motions for return of his legal property without prejudice. I. Legal Standards As described in the court’s prior screening order, the court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners to determine whether they sufficiently state claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The prisoner must plead an arguable legal and factual basis for each claim in order to survive dismissal. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). In addition, the prisoner must demonstrate a link between the actions of each defendant and the deprivation of his rights. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant’s “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). II. Discussion A. Allegations in the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 24) Plaintiff is incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). He complains of conduct that occurred in 2019 when he was incarcerated at the California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”). Plaintiff identifies three defendants: (1) Associate Warden V. Singh; (2) Sergeant C. Willis; and (3) Dr. G. Williams. Plaintiff alleges the following. In 2018, plaintiff suffered from foot drop. As part of a settlement of a §1983 action in the Northern District of California, plaintiff was given a medical chrono permitting him to have his medically prescribed shoes and braces. He received a receipt identifying the items as durable medical equipment (“DME”). Through several prison transfers, he was permitted to have the items. In 2019, plaintiff was transferred to CHCF. Defendant Singh informed plaintiff that he would not be permitted to have the shoes. Plaintiff then submitted a Reasonable Accommodation Request. In response to the request, on August 15, 2019, defendants Singh and Willis told plaintiff they knew about his other lawsuits and he wasn’t going to “manipulate” CHCF by filing appeals. They continued to refuse to allow plaintiff to keep the shoes after plaintiff showed them the settlement agreement, medical chrono, and receipt identifying the shoes as DME. The following day, Willis took plaintiff’s shoes on Singh’s order. On August 18 and September 14, 2019, plaintiff fell, injuring himself. Without his shoes, plaintiff was forced to use a wheelchair and was unable to participate in physical therapy or prison programs. Defendants were aware of these limitations. On September 19, 2019, defendant Williams tried to evaluate plaintiff’s foot drop despite the fact plaintiff’s medical chrono specified that his need for the shoes and braces would not be re-evaluated. Williams told plaintiff he was re-evaluating him at the behest of Singh and because of the lawsuits plaintiff had filed. On October 10, plaintiff fell again. On October 20, 2019, Williams and Singh told plaintiff he would be seen by an orthopedic foot doctor so that new shoes could be ordered. Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages. B. Does Plaintiff State Claims Cognizable under §1983? 1. Retaliation “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote and citations omitted). As he did previously, plaintiff has stated cognizable claims for retaliation against defendants Singh and Willis. With respect to defendant Williams, plaintiff alleges Williams sought to have plaintiff re- evaluated for special shoes because plaintiff had filed lawsuits. Whether or not plaintiff’s medical chrono permitted Williams to conduct a re-evaluation, and whether not Williams’ motive was retaliatory, plaintiff fails to allege the re-evaluation was an “adverse” action. Rather, plaintiff’s allegations show that Williams felt plaintiff did require special shoes and sent plaintiff to an orthopedic foot doctor so that new shoes could be ordered. This court finds plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for retaliation against Williams. 2. Eighth Amendment Medical Claim To state a claim that a defendant violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights to medical care, plaintiff must allege facts showing he has a serious medical need and that defendants responded to that need with deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference is shown when a prison official knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 847. “Deliberate indifference is a ‘high legal standard’ beyond malpractice or gross negligence.” Balla v. Idaho, 29 F.4th 1019, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff alleges all three defendants knew he had a medical chrono permitting him to have the special shoes and that they were identified as DME by the prison. However, plaintiff does not show that the defendants were aware he might fall without the shoes, that he had, in fact, fallen, or that they were aware of any other substantial risk of serious harm. Moreover, plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that the falls were the result of not having his special shoes. Plaintiff’s allegations also show that defendants were aware plaintiff had use of a wheelchair. These allegations pertain most clearly to Plaintiff’s disability law claim, which is discussed below. But the fact that plaintiff had use of a wheelchair is insufficient to show that defendants knew plaintiff faced a “substantial risk of serious harm” without the shoes. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state Eighth Amendment claims against any of the defendants. 3. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) To state a claim that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the

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