(PC) Taylor v. Diaz

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 24, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-00225
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Taylor v. Diaz ((PC) Taylor v. Diaz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Taylor v. Diaz, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 JAMES RAY TAYLOR, ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-00225-SAB (PC) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 13 v. ) RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION 14 RALPH DIAZ, et.al., ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 15 Defendants. ) RECOMMENDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR 16 ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BE DENIED ) 17 ) [ECF No. 3] ) 18

Plaintiff James Ray Taylor is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order or 21 preliminary injunction, filed February 13, 2020. 22 I. 23 DISCUSSION 24 The purpose of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction is to preserve the 25 status quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to 26 intervene to secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined. University of 27 Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction [or 28 1 temporary restraining order] must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely 2 to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 3 favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 4 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 5 “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 6 granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 7 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A party 8 seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion 9 is unsupported by evidence. 10 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for preliminary 11 injunctive relief, the Court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it have before it an 12 actual case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Valley Forge 13 Christian Coll. V. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). If 14 the Court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power to hear the matter in 15 question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 16 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, 17 extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive 18 means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 19 A federal court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has personal jurisdiction over 20 the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 21 Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one “becomes a party officially, and is required 22 to take action in that capacity, only upon service of summons or other authority-asserting measure stating 23 the time within which the party served must appear to defend.”). The Court may not attempt to 24 determine the rights of persons not before it. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 25 234-35 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1983). 26 “Plaintiff alleges that by merging the Sensitive Needs prisoners with the General Population 27 prisoners at the institution he is confined is a ‘failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks 28 by other inmates’ and from ‘dangerous conditions’ which is a clear violation of the Eighth 1 Amendment.” (Mot. at 5, ECF No. 3.)1 Plaintiff contends a temporary restraining order and 2 preliminary injunction are necessary to prevent irreparable injury. Plaintiff’s request for a temporary 3 restraining order and preliminary injunction should be denied. 4 As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that CDCR’s Inmate Locator 5 system located at http://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov reflects that Plaintiff is now housed at California 6 City Correctional Facility.2 Therefore, since Plaintiff is no longer housed at Avenal State Prison, and 7 there is no evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of returning to Avenal 8 State Prison, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot in light of his transfer. Johnson v. Moore, 9 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 10 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 11 Further, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a specific threat of harm to him. Plaintiff declares that 12 he is a general population inmate and does not want to put himself in a situation where he may have to 13 defend himself. Plaintiff further declares that on January 7, 2019 and March 25, 2019, he received a 14 rules violation report because he refused to be assigned to a merged yard, which implies that Plaintiff 15 has not been housed in the yards subject to the merger. Plaintiff also submits the declaration of Kim 16 McGill, Organizer of the Youth Justice Coalition, who declares that the merging of the sensitive needs 17 yards and general population will (1) increase “incidents of violence and conflict”; (2) “[j]eopardizes 18 the milestones and growth people have worked so diligently to obtain”; (3) [w]ill lead to longer 19 sentences and increased incarceration costs, thus contributing to overcrowding that a federal law suit, 20 AB 109 realignment and other changes in law and policies were intended to address”; and (4) 21 “[u]ndermines efforts made through changes in state law to reduce overcrowding, increase fairness in 22 sentencing, and reduce violence through greater access to rehabilitative programming and increased 23 hope for release….” (Mot. at 14, ECF No. 3.) However, Plaintiff fails to present specific factual 24

25 1 All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the CM/ECF electronic court docketing system. 26 2 The Court may take judicial notice of public information stored on the CDCR inmate locator website. See In re Yahoo 27 Mail Litig., 7 F.Supp.3d 1016, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (court may take judicial notice of information on “publicly accessible websites” not subject to reasonable dispute); Louis v. McCormick & Schmick Restaurant Corp., 460 F.Supp.2d 28 1 || details to demonstrate that there is a particular threat to him by the merger.

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Related

Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell
245 U.S. 229 (Supreme Court, 1916)
University of Texas v. Camenisch
451 U.S. 390 (Supreme Court, 1981)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
461 U.S. 95 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Mazurek v. Armstrong
520 U.S. 968 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Gipson v. Wells Fargo N.A.
460 F. Supp. 2d 15 (District of Columbia, 2006)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
In re Yahoo Mail Litigation
7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. California, 2014)

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(PC) Taylor v. Diaz, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-taylor-v-diaz-caed-2020.