(PC) Stanford v. Stashyn

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 17, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-02125
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERRELL CORDARRYL STANFORD, Case No. 2:23-cv-02125-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 14 DONNA STASHYN, et al., DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT 15 Defendants. JUDGE TO THIS MATTER 16 ECF No. 2 17 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 THAT PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT 19 LEAVE TO AMEND FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 20 ECF No. 8 21 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 22 DAYS 23 24 Plaintiff Terrell Cordarryl Stanford, a state inmate, alleges in his amended complaint that 25 defendants Judge Donna Stashyn, defense attorney Peter Firpo, and deputy district attorney 26 Melissa Marshall violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff has failed to cure the 27 deficiencies noted in the court’s prior screening order. I will grant plaintiff’s application to 28 proceed in forma pauperis, which makes the required showing. Accordingly, I will recommend 1 that this action be dismissed. 2 Screening and Pleading Requirements 3 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 4 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 5 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 6 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 7 relief. Id. 8 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 10 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 11 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 13 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 14 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 15 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 16 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 17 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 20 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 21 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 23 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 24 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 25 Analysis 26 The amended complaint’s allegations are similar to those in the original complaint. In 27 September 2010, defendant-attorney Peter Firpo convinced plaintiff to fraudulently sign a plea 28 agreement while defendants Judge Stashyn and District Attorney Marshall watched without 1 intervening. ECF No. 8 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants exhibited deliberate 2 indifference towards plaintiff during the plea hearing. The complaint also alleges that in August 3 2008, Firpo and Marshall did not intervene when Judge Stashyn failed to read plaintiff his “pre 4 [bargain] dialect.”1 Id. at 4. 5 Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies noted in the court’s prior order. See ECF No. 7. 6 Thus, for the same reasons noted therein, the court will recommend that plaintiff’s first amended 7 complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 8 The allegation that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights in connection with 9 his plea deal sounds in habeas corpus and is not appropriate in this § 1983 action. See Badea v. 10 Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a habeas corpus petition is the proper vehicle 11 for challenging the “legality or duration” of confinement). Further, no claim for civil damages is 12 cognizable unless and until plaintiff’s criminal conviction is invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 13 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his criminal conviction is invalid. 14 Moreover, defendants are immune to plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims against Judge 15 Stashyn are foreclosed by judicial immunity. “[J]udges are absolutely immune from civil liability 16 for damages for their judicial acts.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Crt. for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 17 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). And criminal defense lawyers, like defendant Firpo, are not subject 18 to liability under § 1983 for their handling of criminal cases. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 19 312, 325 (1982) (public defenders do not act under color of law for purposes of § 1983 liability); 20 Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1977) (privately retained attorneys do not act 21 under color of law for purposes of § 1983 liability). Finally, defendant Marshall is immune as a 22 prosecutor. A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for 23 damages “when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 24 U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Imbler v. 25 Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). 26 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 27 1 The court understands this as a reference the colloquy between the trial court and a 28 criminal defendant relating to the waiver of the criminal defendant’s rights. 1 1. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is granted. 2 2. The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this action. 3 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without leave to amend. 4 I submit these findings and recommendations to the district judge under 28 U.S.C. 5 | § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, 6 | Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of the service of the findings and 7 | recommendations, any party may file written objections to the findings and recommendations 8 | with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document should be captioned “Objections to 9 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the findings 10 | and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the 11 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. See Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 12 | 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 13 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 ( 1 ow — Dated: _ January 16, 2024 q———_ 16 JEREMY D. PETERSON 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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