(PC) Spence v. Kaur

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedAugust 15, 2019
Docket2:16-cv-01828
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Spence v. Kaur ((PC) Spence v. Kaur) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Spence v. Kaur, (E.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 GERALD SPENCE, No. 2:16-cv-1828 TLN KJN P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 G. KAUR, 15 Defendant. 16

17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se. This action proceeds on plaintiff’s

18 retaliation claim against defendant Kaur. Plaintiff’s first motion to compel discovery and for

19 sanctions,1 and defendant’s motion to compel discovery are before the court. As discussed below,

20 the undersigned partially grants the discovery motions, and denies plaintiff’s motion for sanctions

21 and request for judicial notice.

22 I. Plaintiff’s Allegations

23 In his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that in 2016, while he was housed at

24 California State Prison-Solano, defendant Kaur, Sr. Librarian, retaliated against plaintiff for filing

25 a form 22 against Kaur, by issuing a 128-B and then a CDCR-115 (“RVR”) on the same false

26 charges. (ECF No. 23.) Although the RVR was subsequently reversed, plaintiff lost 30 days

28 1 Plaintiff’s second motion to compel discovery will be addressed by separate order. 1 1 yard, resulting in the loss of law library access. Plaintiff seeks unspecified injunctive relief and

2 monetary damages.

3 II. Elements of a Retaliation Claim

4 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

5 basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

6 because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s

7 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

8 correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

9 III. Discovery Motions

10 A. Governing Legal Standards

11 Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party seeking discovery may

12 move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

13 37(a)(3)(B). Such “motion may be made if: (i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked under

14 Rule 30 or 31; (ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or

15 31(a)(4); (iii) a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33; or (iv) a party fails

16 to produce documents or fails to respond that inspection will be permitted -- or fails to permit

17 inspection -- as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). An “evasive or

18 incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or

19 respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “District courts have ‘broad discretion to manage discovery

20 and to control the course of litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.’” Hunt v. Cnty. 21 of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust,

22 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011)). Similarly, district courts have broad discretion to determine

23 relevance for discovery purposes, see Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002), and

24 to limit discovery where the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can

25 be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”

26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). Limits should be imposed where the burden or expense outweighs 27 the likely benefits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (C)(iii). Indeed, “[t]he 2015 amendments to Rule

28 26(b)(1) emphasize the need to impose ‘reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance 2 1 on the common-sense concept of proportionality.’” Roberts v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 312

2 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016).

3 The moving party bears the burden of informing the court (1) which discovery requests

4 are the subject of his motion to compel, (2) which of the responses are disputed, (3) why he

5 believes the response is deficient, (4) why defendant’s objections are not justified, and (5) why

6 the information he seeks through discovery is relevant to the prosecution of this action. McCoy

7 v. Ramirez, 2016 WL 3196738 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2016); Ellis v. Cambra, 2008 WL 860523, at *4

8 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiff must inform the court which discovery requests are the subject of his

9 motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, inform the court why the information sought

10 is relevant and why defendant’s objections are not justified.”).

11 The purpose of discovery is to “remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can

12 obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” U.S. ex rel. O’Connell v.

13 Chapman University, 245 F.R.D. 646, 648 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted).

14 Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers guidance on the scope of discovery

15 permitted:

16 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 17 needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access 18 to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense 19 of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to 20 be discoverable. 21 Id. “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies

22 the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the

23 burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying,

24 explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, 2009 WL 1390794 at *1 (S.D. Cal.

25 May 14, 2009) (internal citation omitted).

26 Interrogatories 27 With respect to interrogatories, a party may propound interrogatories related to any matter

28 that may be inquired into under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). 3 1 An interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that

2 relates to fact or the application of law to fact. Id.

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