(PC) Smith v. Tuolumne County Jail

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJuly 8, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00359
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Smith v. Tuolumne County Jail ((PC) Smith v. Tuolumne County Jail) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Smith v. Tuolumne County Jail, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATHANIEL LEE SMITH, Case No. 1:25-cv-00359-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VOID ORDERS1 13 v. (Doc. No. 11) 14 TUOLUMNE COUNTY JAIL, TUOLUMNE COUNTY DA, 15 TUOLUMNE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, AND SGT. N. ROHR, 16 Defendants. 17 18 Plaintiff Nathaniel Smith—a pretrial detainee—has filed a civil rights complaint pursuant 19 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is currently pending before the Court. (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”). 20 Plaintiff seeks to proceed in this action in forma pauperis. 21 On March 31, 2025, the former magistrate judge entered an order vacating in part its 22 March 28, 2025 Order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, but only to the limited extent 23 that it granted Plaintiff sixty (60) days in which to file his six-month inmate trust fund account 24 statement; and required Plaintiff instead to file the six-month statement in thirty (30) days. (Doc. 25 No. 5). On April 24, 2025, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the March 31, 26 2025 order and directed Plaintiff to submit a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 28 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 1 for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint, as required by 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). (Doc. No. 10). 3 On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion objecting to both the previous 4 magistrate judge’s March 31, 2025 order and the undersigned’s April 24, 2025 order. (Doc. No. 5 11). Plaintiff seeks to “void” both orders on the basis that the magistrate judges have “no 6 jurisdiction” in his case because he did not consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (Id. at 2). 7 Plaintiff further avers that the court “is required to waive the filing fee.” (Id. at 4). The Court 8 denies the motion for the reasons explained below. 9 “Congress intended magistrate to play an integral and important role in the federal judicial 10 system” and enacted the Federal Magistrate Judges Act to improve the effective administration of 11 justice. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991). The Federal Magistrate Act, 28 12 U.S.C. §§ 631-39, governs magistrate judges’ jurisdiction and authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. 13 The Act provides that specific matters—for example, non-dispositive pretrial matters—may be 14 referred to a magistrate judge for decision. Id., § 636(b)(1)(A). In contrast, certain other 15 matters—such as case-dispositive motions (including motions for injunctive relief, summary 16 judgment, or failure to state a claim) and petitions for writs of habeas corpus—may be referred 17 only for evidentiary hearings and for proposed findings and recommendations. Id., § 18 636(b)(1)(A), (B). The Act also permits magistrate judges to be “assigned such additional duties 19 as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id., § 636(b)(3). And 20 “[e]ach district court shall establish rules pursuant to which the magistrate judges shall discharge 21 their duties.” Id., § 636(b)(4). This Court’s Local Rules 300 through 399 govern the discharge of 22 duties by magistrate judges. Local Rule 300 (E.D. Cal. 2025). Specifically, Local Rule 23 302(c)(17) refers all actions brought by a person in custody to magistrate judges. 24 Plaintiff is correct that he did not consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Nonetheless, 25 the former magistrate judge’s March 31, 2025 order and the undersigned’s April 24, 2025 order 26 concern pretrial, non-dispositive matters and are therefore appropriately addressed by the 27 assigned magistrate judge. Neither order is dispositive of any matter before the Court and each 28 simply seeks to obtain additional information necessary to determine whether Plaintiff is to be 1 assessed an initial filing fee based on deposits to his inmate trust account. Only upon receipt of 2 this information would the dispositive nature of Plaintiff’s application be implicated. In other 3 words, if, upon receipt of the additional information from Plaintiff, the undersigned determines 4 that Plaintiff is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis, the undersigned would then issue the 5 appropriate findings and recommendations to vacate Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status for 6 consideration by the assigned district judge. Simply put, each order is a non-dispositive pretrial 7 order because neither seeks to adjudicate or otherwise dispose of Plaintiff’s claims. Thus, the 8 orders are not void and are within this Court’s jurisdiction to issue. 9 Additionally, Plaintiff's contention that the Court is required to waive the filing fee is 10 incorrect. To the contrary, Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code—the Prison 11 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)—applies here and states that “any court of the United States 12 may authorize the commencement . . . of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or 13 appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an 14 affidavit.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, the statute provides that a “prisoner seeking to 15 bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding without prepayment of 16 fees or security therefor, in addition to filing the affidavit filed under paragraph (1), shall submit a 17 certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for 18 the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal, 19 obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was 20 confined.” Id., § 1915(a)(2). Further, the statute provides: “Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a 21 prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to 22 pay the full amount of a filing fee.” Id., § 1915(b)(1). Thus, while a prisoner-plaintiff may 23 commence an action without prepayment of the filing fee, the prisoner-plaintiff remains obligated 24 to pay the full filing fee over time. 25 Indeed, proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right. Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 26 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 27 1999) (stating “IFP status is not a constitutional right”). Moreover, partial filing fees have been 28 consistently upheld on the grounds that reasonable costs may be imposed on persons who want to 1 sue in federal court. Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the 2 imposition of partial filing fees on IFP plaintiffs). The PLRA provision requiring a prisoner to 3 pay twenty percent of his monthly income toward filing fees does not impose an unreasonable 4 burden on a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts. Hendon v. Ramsey, 478 5 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1219-20 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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(PC) Smith v. Tuolumne County Jail, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-smith-v-tuolumne-county-jail-caed-2025.