1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GUARY L. SHUFORD, No. 2:22-CV-1490-DAD-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 D. BAKER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1. Also before the 19 Court is Plaintiff’s request, ECF No. 8, to correct the name of the lead defendant to “D. Baker” 20 from “B. Baker.” 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 22 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 24 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 25 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 26 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 27 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 1 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 2 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 3 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 5 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 6 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 7 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 8 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 9 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 10 11 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 12 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) D. Baker, (2) A. Gonzales; (3) M. 13 Saetenurn; and (4) J. Lebeck. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. All defendants are alleged to be correctional 14 staff at California State Prison – Sacramento. See id. In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges 15 that Defendant Baker violated his First Amendment rights by confiscating items sent to him by 16 his wife. See id. at 3. Plaintiff also claims this resulted in a violation of his rights to freedom of 17 religious expression as he worships his wife and considers items sent to him from her as religious 18 gifts. See id. In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Baker physically 19 attacked him, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 4. 20 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive 23 force claim against Defendant Baker. Plaintiff has not, however, stated any cognizable claims 24 against Defendant Baker under the First Amendment, nor has Plaintiff stated any claims against 25 any other named defendants. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff will be provided an 26 opportunity to amend. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Causal Link 2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 3 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 4 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 5 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 6 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 7 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 8 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 9 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 10 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 11 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 12 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 In addition to Baker, Plaintiff names A. Gonzales, M. Saetenurn, and J. Lebeck. 14 Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any facts as to Gonzales, Saetenurn, or Lebeck. All of 15 Plaintiff’s factual allegations concern Defendant Baker. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity 16 to explain how Gonzales, Saetenurn, and Lebeck participated in a violation of Plaintiff’s 17 constitutional rights. 18 B. First Amendment 19 1. Confiscation of Items 20 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Baker improperly confiscated items sent through 21 the mail by his wife. Prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See 22 Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Prison officials may intercept 23 and censor outgoing mail concerning escape plans, proposed criminal activity, or encoded 24 messages. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see also Witherow, 52 F.3d at 25 266. Based on security concerns, officials may also prohibit correspondence between inmates. 26 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Here, while Plaintiff might have a plausible claim, he does not currently state 2 sufficient facts for the Court to so find. Plaintiff has not, for example, alleged what items were 3 sent, which were confiscated, and why. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to 4 allege additional facts which might shed light on the dimensions of Plaintiff’s claim relating to 5 items sent to him in the mail. 6 2. Freedom of Religion 7 The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First 8 Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of 9 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus, 10 for example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good 11 health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GUARY L. SHUFORD, No. 2:22-CV-1490-DAD-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 D. BAKER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1. Also before the 19 Court is Plaintiff’s request, ECF No. 8, to correct the name of the lead defendant to “D. Baker” 20 from “B. Baker.” 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 22 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 24 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 25 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 26 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 27 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 1 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 2 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 3 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 5 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 6 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 7 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 8 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 9 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 10 11 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 12 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) D. Baker, (2) A. Gonzales; (3) M. 13 Saetenurn; and (4) J. Lebeck. See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. All defendants are alleged to be correctional 14 staff at California State Prison – Sacramento. See id. In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges 15 that Defendant Baker violated his First Amendment rights by confiscating items sent to him by 16 his wife. See id. at 3. Plaintiff also claims this resulted in a violation of his rights to freedom of 17 religious expression as he worships his wife and considers items sent to him from her as religious 18 gifts. See id. In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Baker physically 19 attacked him, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 4. 20 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive 23 force claim against Defendant Baker. Plaintiff has not, however, stated any cognizable claims 24 against Defendant Baker under the First Amendment, nor has Plaintiff stated any claims against 25 any other named defendants. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff will be provided an 26 opportunity to amend. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Causal Link 2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 3 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 4 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 5 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 6 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 7 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 8 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 9 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 10 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 11 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 12 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 In addition to Baker, Plaintiff names A. Gonzales, M. Saetenurn, and J. Lebeck. 14 Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any facts as to Gonzales, Saetenurn, or Lebeck. All of 15 Plaintiff’s factual allegations concern Defendant Baker. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity 16 to explain how Gonzales, Saetenurn, and Lebeck participated in a violation of Plaintiff’s 17 constitutional rights. 18 B. First Amendment 19 1. Confiscation of Items 20 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Baker improperly confiscated items sent through 21 the mail by his wife. Prisoners have a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See 22 Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Prison officials may intercept 23 and censor outgoing mail concerning escape plans, proposed criminal activity, or encoded 24 messages. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see also Witherow, 52 F.3d at 25 266. Based on security concerns, officials may also prohibit correspondence between inmates. 26 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Here, while Plaintiff might have a plausible claim, he does not currently state 2 sufficient facts for the Court to so find. Plaintiff has not, for example, alleged what items were 3 sent, which were confiscated, and why. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to 4 allege additional facts which might shed light on the dimensions of Plaintiff’s claim relating to 5 items sent to him in the mail. 6 2. Freedom of Religion 7 The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First 8 Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of 9 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus, 10 for example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good 11 health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 12 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, prison officials are required to provide prisoners facilities 13 where they can worship and access to clergy or spiritual leaders. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 14 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). Officials are not, however, required to supply clergy at state expense. 15 See id. Inmates also must be given a “reasonable opportunity” to pursue their faith comparable to 16 that afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts. See Cruz v. Beto, 17 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 18 However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free 19 exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives. See 20 McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197. For instance, under the First Amendment, the penological interest in a 21 simplified food service has been held sufficient to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish 22 inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 23 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in getting 24 inmates to their work and educational assignments. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 25 38 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing Muslim inmates’ First Amendment challenge to prison work rule). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 While free exercise of religion claims originally arose under the First Amendment, 2 Congress has enacted various statutes in an effort to provide prisoners with heightened religious 3 protection. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). Prior to these 4 congressional efforts, prison free exercise claims were analyzed under the “reasonableness test” 5 set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); see e.g. O’Lone, 382 U.S. at 349. The 6 first effort to provide heightened protection was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 7 of 1993. However, the Supreme Court invalidated that act and restored the “reasonableness test.” 8 See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 9 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of 10 Boerne invalidated RFRA and restored the “reasonableness test” as the applicable standard in free 11 exercise challenges brought by prison inmates). 12 Congress then enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 13 (RLUIPA) in 2000 “. . . in response to the constitutional flaws with RFRA identified in City of 14 Boerne.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 15 2006). Under RLUIPA, prison officials are prohibited from imposing “substantial burdens” on 16 religious exercise unless there exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the 17 least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. See id. at 986. RLUIPA has been upheld by the 18 Supreme Court, which held that RLUIPA’s “institutionalized-persons provision was compatible 19 with the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA ‘alleviates 20 exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.’” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 21 994 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005)). Congress achieved this goal by 22 replacing the “reasonableness test” articulated in Turner with the “compelling government 23 interest” test codified in RLUIPA at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See id. 24 It is not clear whether a prisoner must specifically raise RLUIPA in order to have 25 his claim analyzed under the statute’s heightened standard. In Alvarez v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit 26 held that, if a complaint contains “factual allegations establishing a ‘plausible” entitlement to 27 relief under RLUIPA, [plaintiff has] satisfied the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); but see 1 Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to express any opinion 2 about whether plaintiff could prevail under RLUIPA because plaintiff brought his claim under the 3 First Amendment only). Therefore, it is possible for a prisoner’s complaint to raise both a First 4 Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim based on the same factual allegations. In other words, 5 even if the plaintiff does not specifically invoke the heightened protections of RLUIPA, he may 6 nonetheless be entitled to them. Under Henderson, however, the plaintiff’s claim may be limited 7 to the less stringent Turner “reasonableness test” if the plaintiff specifically brings the claim 8 under the First Amendment only. 9 Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial 10 burden of establishing that the defendants substantially burdened the practice of his religion by 11 preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. See Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 12 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing claim under First Amendment); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d 13 at 994-95 (analyzing claim under RLUIPA). While RLUIPA does not define what constitutes a 14 “substantial burden,” pre-RLUIPA cases are instructive. See id. at 995 (discussing cases defining 15 “substantial burden” in the First Amendment context). To show a substantial burden on the 16 practice of religion, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials’ conduct “. . . burdens 17 the adherent’s practice of his or her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden 18 by the religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious 19 experience which the faith mandates.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 20 1987). The burden must be more than a mere inconvenience. See id. at 851. In the context of 21 claims based on religious diets, a plaintiff must prove that prison officials refused to provide a 22 diet which satisfies his religious dietary laws or that the available prison menu prevented him 23 from adhering to the religious dietary laws mandated by his faith. See Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 24 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 Under the First Amendment “reasonableness test,” where the inmate shows a 26 substantial burden the prison regulation or restriction at issue is nonetheless valid if it is 27 reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 28 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). In applying this test, the court must weight four 1 factors: (1) whether there is a rational connection between the regulation or restriction and the 2 government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are available alternative means of 3 exercising the right; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted religious right will have a 4 detrimental impact on prison guards, other inmates, or the allocation of limited prison resources; 5 and (4) whether there exist ready alternatives to the regulation or restriction. See id.; see also 6 Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 Under RLUIPA, the government is required to “. . . meet the much stricter burden 8 of showing that the burden it imposes on religious exercise is ‘in furtherance of a compelling 9 government interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 10 interest.’” Green v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 992, 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. 11 § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) and 2(b)); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994-95. Prison security is an 12 example of a compelling governmental interest. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Cutter, 125 13 S.Ct. at 2113 n.13). In establishing that the regulation or restriction is the least restrictive means 14 to achieve a compelling governmental interest, prison officials must show that they actually 15 considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive means before adopting the challenged 16 practice. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999). 17 Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to show what religious faith he practices or 18 how his practice of that faith was substantially burdened by not being allowed to have various 19 items sent to his by his wife as “religious gifts.” Again, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity 20 to amend. 21 22 III. CONCLUSION 23 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 24 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 25 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 26 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 27 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 28 prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 1 | amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 2 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 3 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 4 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 5 || each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 6 || between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 7 || 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 8 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state a cognizable Eighth Amendment 9 || excessive force claim against Defendant Baker, if no amended complaint is filed within the time 10 || allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and recommendations that the claims identified 11 || herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such further orders as are necessary for service of 12 || process as to the cognizable claims. 13 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 14 1. Plaintiff's request, ECF No. 8, to correct is granted; and 15 2. Plaintiff may file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 16 || service of this order. 17 18 | Dated: January 27, 2023 Co 19 DENNIS M. COTA 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28