1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT EUGENE ROJAS, No. 2:21-cv-00968-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALIFORNIA MEDICAL FACILITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Screening Requirement 2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 26 II. Allegations in the Complaint 27 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at San 28 Quentin State Prison. Plaintiff alleges that the California Medical Facility “and others” have used 1 excessive force against him on two separate occasions by punching, kicking, kneeling, and 2 strangling him to the point where he lost consciousness. The complaint does not provide any 3 further details about these two incidents. Plaintiff also alleges that on two separate occasions, he 4 was involuntarily medicated and that he suffered an allergic reaction to the medication. By way 5 of relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 6 III. Legal Standards 7 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as 8 well as the nature of the allegations in his complaint. 9 A. Linkage 10 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 11 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 12 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 13 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 14 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 15 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 16 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 17 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 18 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 19 plaintiff's federal rights. 20 B. Excessive Force 21 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 22 punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 23 pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused 24 of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 25 core judicial inquiry is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 26 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 27 (1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s 28 injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of 1 force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to 2 temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and 3 citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment 4 inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT EUGENE ROJAS, No. 2:21-cv-00968-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALIFORNIA MEDICAL FACILITY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 18 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a 21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the 24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Screening Requirement 2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 26 II. Allegations in the Complaint 27 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at San 28 Quentin State Prison. Plaintiff alleges that the California Medical Facility “and others” have used 1 excessive force against him on two separate occasions by punching, kicking, kneeling, and 2 strangling him to the point where he lost consciousness. The complaint does not provide any 3 further details about these two incidents. Plaintiff also alleges that on two separate occasions, he 4 was involuntarily medicated and that he suffered an allergic reaction to the medication. By way 5 of relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 6 III. Legal Standards 7 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as 8 well as the nature of the allegations in his complaint. 9 A. Linkage 10 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 11 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 12 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 13 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 14 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 15 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 16 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 17 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 18 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 19 plaintiff's federal rights. 20 B. Excessive Force 21 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 22 punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 23 pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused 24 of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 25 core judicial inquiry is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 26 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 27 (1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s 28 injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of 1 force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to 2 temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and 3 citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment 4 inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to 5 cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency in violation of the Eighth 6 Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. 7 C. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need 8 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 9 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 10 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 11 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 12 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 13 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 15 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 16 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 17 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 18 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 19 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 20 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 21 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 22 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 23 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 24 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 25 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 26 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 27 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 28 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 1 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 2 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 3 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 4 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 5 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 6 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 7 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 8 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 9 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 10 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 11 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 12 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 13 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 14 D. Joinder of Claims and Parties 15 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant in a civil action. 16 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where 17 “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to 18 or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and 19 “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 20(a)(2). However, unrelated claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate 21 lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only 22 to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to 23 ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 24 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 25 required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. 26 IV. Analysis 27 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 28 which relief can be granted under federal law. Plaintiff has not identified any proper defendant in 1 this civil action. The California Medical Facility is not a person under the federal civil rights 2 statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nor has plaintiff identified any of the other individuals involved 3 by name. With respect to the factual allegations in the complaint, they are entirely conclusory 4 and do not state any claim for relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 5 For all these reasons, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant 6 leave to file an amended complaint. 7 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 8 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 9 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 10 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 11 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 12 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 13 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 14 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 15 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 16 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 17 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 18 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 19 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 20 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 21 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 22 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 23 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 24 intended as legal advice. 25 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not 26 state any claim against the defendant. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 27 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 28 //// ] Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 2 || days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 3 || attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 4 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 5 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 6 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 7 || shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 8 | Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 9 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 10 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 11 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 12 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 13 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 14 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 15 || be dismissed. 16 | Dated: August 9, 2021 / ae □□ / a Ly a "7 CAROLYNK.DELANEY 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 12/roja0967.14.docx 25 26 27 28