(PC) Robinson v. Curry

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJanuary 5, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-01452
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Robinson v. Curry ((PC) Robinson v. Curry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Robinson v. Curry, (E.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

2 3

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 MARVIN HARRIS, et al., 1:21-cv-01452-GSA-PC

12 ORDER FOR CLERK TO RANDOMLY Plaintiff, ASSIGN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT 13 JUDGE TO THIS CASE vs. 14 AND CURRY, et al., 15 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Defendants. RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF 16 MARVIN HARRIS’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS BE 17 DENIED UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) AND THAT PLAINTIFF BE REQUIRED TO PAY 18 THE $402.00 FILING FEE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS 19 (ECF No. 2.) 20 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN 14 DAYS 21 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Marvin Harris (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights 24 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 29, 2021, Plaintiff and two Co-Plaintiffs 25 filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On September 29, 2021, Plaintiff 26 Harris filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(g). (ECF No. 27 2.) Plaintiff names as defendants Correctional Officer Curry, Correctional Officer Sanchize, and 28 Theresa Cisneros (Warden). 1 II. THREE-STRIKES PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 2 28 U.S.C. § 1915 governs proceedings in forma pauperis. Section 1915(g) provides that 3 “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 4 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal 5 in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, 6 or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 7 danger of serious physical injury.” 8 “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.” Andrews v. King, 9 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “Andrews”). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a 10 prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 11 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA,1 “[p]risoners who 12 have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three 13 strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing 14 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 15 1997). 16 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were 17 dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” Andrews, 18 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles such dismissal 19 as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing 20 fee,” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated 21 three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal 22 court unless he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 23 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP 24 complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of 25 serious physical injury’ at the time of filing”). 26 /// 27

28 1 Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 1 While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his 2 request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket 3 records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under 4 § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 5 however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and 6 other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was 7 frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike 8 under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121. 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 The Court finds that prior to this date Plaintiff Harris had at least five cases dismissed 11 that count as “strikes.” The Court takes judicial notice of: 1) Harris v. Pliler, Case No. 2:01-cv- 12 01125-WBS-DAD (E.D. Cal.), ECF Nos. 20 & 22 (dismissed for failure to state a claim on Mar. 13 15, 2002); 2) Harris v. Edmonds, Case No. 1:00-cv-05857-OWW-LJO (E.D. Cal.), ECF Nos. 18 14 & 21 (dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on Nov. 27, 2000); 3) Harris v. 15 Edmonds, Case No. 1:00-cv-07160 REC-SMS (E.D. Cal.), ECF Nos. 17 & 19 (dismissed for 16 failure to state a claim on May 24, 2002); 4) Harris v. Glass, Case No. 2:00-cv-00937-DFL-DAD 17 (E.D. Cal.), ECF Nos. 15 & 16 (dismissed for failure to state a claim on Aug. 17, 2000); and 5) 18 Harris v. Harris, Case No. 2:14-cv-00977-KLM-KJN (E.D. Cal.), ECF Nos. 6 & 10 (dismissed 19 as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on July 31, 2014). 20 A review of the actions filed by Plaintiff reveals that Plaintiff is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915(g) and is precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis unless Plaintiff was, at the time the 22 Complaint was filed, under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 23 The court has examined the orders dismissing the five cases cited above and finds that 24 each of the cases was dismissed for failure to state a claim and/ or as frivolous, and none of the 25 district court’s decisions were reversed on appeal at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 26 The availability of the imminent danger exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced 27 at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 28 1053. “[A]ssertions of imminent danger of less obviously injurious practices may be rejected as 1 overly speculative or fanciful.” Id. at 1057 n.11. Imminent danger of serious physical injury 2 must be a real, present threat, not merely speculative or hypothetical. To meet his burden under 3 § 1915(g), an inmate must provide “specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, 4 or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” 5 Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). “Vague and utterly conclusory 6 assertions” of harm are insufficient. White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 7 1998). That is, the “imminent danger” exception is available “for genuine emergencies,” where 8 “time is pressing” and “a threat . . . is real and proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 9 (7th Cir. 2002).

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Related

White v. Colorado
157 F.3d 1226 (Tenth Circuit, 1998)
Lewis v. Sullivan
279 F.3d 526 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
O'NEAL v. Price
531 F.3d 1146 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Andrews v. King
398 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Tierney v. Kupers
128 F.3d 1310 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)

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(PC) Robinson v. Curry, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-robinson-v-curry-caed-2022.