(PC) Revis v. Moore

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 21, 2021
• Docket: 1:19-cv-00034
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDRE L. REVIS, Case No. 1:19-cv-00034-DAD-SKO (PC)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS DEFENDANT AND CLAIMS 13 v. (Doc. 27) 14 S. SHERMAN, et al., 21-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Andre L. Revis alleges the defendants have denied him a kosher diet in violation 18 of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. (Doc. 27.) 19 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint states cognizable claims against 20 Defendants Moore, Alvarez, Guembe, and Shieffer, but not against Defendant Corral. Given that 21 Plaintiff has received three opportunities to amend, the Court finds that further amendment would 22 be futile. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, the Court 23 recommends that Defendant Corral be dismissed. 24 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 25 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 26 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 27 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 1 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 2 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 3 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 4 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 5 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 6 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 7 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 8 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 9 Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 10 plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 11 quotation marks and citation omitted). 12 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 13 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 14 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 15 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as 17 true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 18 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 19 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 20 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 21 theories. Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 22 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 23 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 24 quotation marks and citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 25 inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 26 marks and citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 27 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 1 B. Linkage and Causation 2 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 3 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 4 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 5 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 6 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 7 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 8 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally 9 required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 10 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 11 III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 12 Plaintiff is incarcerated at Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, Corcoran 13 (SATF). (See Doc. 27 at 1-3.) He alleges the defendants have denied his right to participate in the 14 prison’s “religious kosher meal program in accordance with [his] religious belief/practices.” (Id. 15 at 3.) He names as defendants J. Moore, community resource manager at SATF; D. Alvarez, 16 prison chaplain; R. Guembe, prison chaplain; P. Shieffer (sp), prison rabbi; and J. Corral, 17 institutional appeals coordinator.1 (Id. at 1, 2-3.) 18 Plaintiff states that Moore, Alvarez, Guembe, and Shieffer are members of the “institution 19 prison religious committee.” (Id. at 5.) On an unspecified date, Plaintiff submitted a “religious 20 kosher diet request,” which the committee denied for “insufficient evidence.” (Id.) Plaintiff 21 alleges that the denial prohibits him from adhering to the dietary requirements of the Old 22 Testament, which provides him “spiritual nutrition that is beneficial to the mind, body, and soul.” 23 (Id. at 5-6.) 24 Thereafter, Shieffer interviewed Plaintiff via telephone. (Id. at 6.) On January 26, 2016, 25 the religious committee again denied Plaintiff’s request for a kosher diet. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an 26 administrative grievance regarding the denial, which Corral rejected on March 2, 2016. (See id.) 27 1 Unlike his first amended complaint, Plaintiff no longer names K. Huffman, J. Dominguez, M. Voong, or S. 1 Between November 2016 and June 2017, Corral cancelled or rejected six of Plaintiff’s 2 grievances. (Id. at 4-5.) 3 Plaintiff alleges that he then spoke with Moore, who told Plaintiff that “he would make 4 the necessary correction in order for [Plaintiff] to be placed on the kosher meal program list.” (Id. 5 at 6.) However, Plaintiff continued to be denied kosher meals. (See id. at 6-7.) 6 Plaintiff submitted another request for a kosher diet on September 20, 2017. (Id. at 7.) On 7 October 9, 2017, Guembe interviewed him regarding the request. (Id.) On October 18, 2017, 8 Moore and Alvarez denied the request based on “insufficient evidence.” (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a 9 grievance regarding the denial, which was also denied. (Id.) 10 Plaintiff contends that the defendants’ refusal to provide him a kosher diet has “forced 11 [him] to act contrary to ‘his’ religious beliefs . . . causing [him] to . . . substitute ‘his’ diet,” which 12 in turn has “caus[ed] [him] to suffer stomach problems.” (Id. at 8.) 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 A. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 15 “Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, . . . including its 16 directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 17 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted). However, “[l]awful incarceration brings about the 18 necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the 19 considerations underlying our penal system.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 20 A plaintiff asserting a free exercise claim must show that the defendant’s actions 21 substantially burden her practice of religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 22 2015). “A substantial burden . . . place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it 23 must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert 24 substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Id. (internal 25 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A] prison policy that intentionally puts significant 26 pressure on inmates . . . to abandon their religious beliefs . . . imposes a substantial burden on [the 27 inmate’s] religious practice.” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 1 Once a plaintiff establishes that state action substantially burdens her exercise of religion, 2 “the government bears the burden of establishing that the regulation serves a compelling 3 government interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.” Id. In the prison 4 context, the Supreme Court has held that alleged infringements of prisoners’ free exercise rights 5 are “judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged 6 infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (citation omitted). 7 The challenged conduct “is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he availability of alternative means of 9 practicing religion is a relevant consideration” for claims under the First Amendment. Holt v. 10 Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (citations omitted). 11 Plaintiff states cognizable free exercise claims against Defendants Moore, Alvarez, 12 Guembe, and Shieffer. He alleges that these defendants, as members of SATF’s “institution 13 religious committee,” have denied his requests for a kosher diet, which has caused him to act 14 contrary to his religious beliefs and practices. (See Doc. 27 at 5-8.) At the screening stage, the 15 Court is unable to consider any alleged governmental or penological interests in the matter, as the 16 defendants have not yet appeared in the case. However, liberally construing his complaint, the 17 Court finds that Plaintiff sets forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to state a [free exercise] claim 18 that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation 19 omitted). 20 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Corral. Plaintiff’s factual 21 allegations against Corral are limited to the defendant’s cancellations or rejections of 22 administrative grievances. (See Doc. 27 at 4-8.) As explained in the Court’s Third Screening 23 Order, (Doc. 24 at 6), prisoners “lack a . . . constitutional entitlement to a specific prison 24 grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). 25 Plaintiff also fails to state a cognizable conspiracy claim. To state a conspiracy claim 26 under section 1983, a plaintiff “must show an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate 27 constitutional rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 1 elaborate scheme to deny [his] rights. . .” (Doc. 27 at 8.) This statement, however, is conclusory. 2 Plaintiff provides no facts “showing or suggesting an agreement or a meeting of the minds to 3 violate [his] constitutional rights.” Avery v. Virga, No. 2:11-cv-01945-DAD, 2013 WL 4523517, 4 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Plaintiff’s allegations that multiple defendants violated his First 5 Amendment rights are insufficient to show that the defendants shared a common objective of 6 denying those rights. 7 B. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 8 A prisoner’s ability to freely exercise his religion is also protected by the Religious Land 9 Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government 10 shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to 11 an institution, . . . unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 12 person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest . . . and is the least restrictive 13 means of furthering that . . . interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a). “RLUIPA defines ‘religious 14 exercise’ to include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system 15 of religious belief.’” Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th 16 Cir. 2013); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7). As with the First Amendment, under the RLUIPA, the 17 government imposes a “substantial burden” on a prisoner when it puts “substantial pressure on 18 [him] to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125 (citation 19 omitted). 20 RLUIPA is more protective than the First Amendment, in that the availability of 21 alternative means of practicing religion is irrelevant to whether the Act has been violated. See 22 Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862. With RLUIPA, the “‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks whether the 23 government has substantially burdened religious exercise . . ., not whether the RLUIPA claimant 24 is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise.” Id. 25 Once a plaintiff has shown that government action has substantially burdened her exercise 26 of religion, the burden shifts to the government to show that the challenged conduct furthers a 27 compelling government interest and is the lease restrictive means of furthering that interest. See 1 Government must use it.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000). 2 At the same time, in the prison context, “[c]ourts are expected to apply RLUIPA’s standard with 3 ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing 4 necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent 5 with consideration of costs and limited resources.’” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1124. (quoting Cutter 6 v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005)). 7 For the same reasons Plaintiff states cognizable free exercise claims, see section IV.A, 8 supra, Plaintiff states cognizable RLUIPA claims against Defendants Moore, Alvarez, Guembe, 9 and Shieffer. Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim against Defendant Corral because he fails 10 to show that Corral’s actions caused him to be denied a kosher diet. As with Plaintiff’s First 11 Amendment claims, the Court is unable, at the screening stage, to consider any alleged 12 governmental interests with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims. 13 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s third amended complaint 15 (Doc. 27) states cognizable First Amendment and RLUIPA claims against Defendants Moore, 16 Alvarez, Guembe, and Shieffer. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are not cognizable. Given that 17 Plaintiff has received three opportunities to amend (Docs. 9, 14, 24), the Court finds that further 18 amendment would be futile. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012). 19 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that: 20 1. Defendant Corral be DISMISSED; and, 21 2. The claims in Plaintiff’s third amended complaint be DISMISSED, except for its 22 claims against Defendants Moore, Alvarez, Guembe, and Shieffer for violation of the 23 Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for 24 violation of the RLUIPA. 25 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 26 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days of the date of 27 service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 1 Recommendations.” Plaintiff’s failure to file objections within the specified time may result in 2 waiver of his rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 3 Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

Sheila K. Oberto 6 Dated: May 20, 2021 /s/ . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7

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