(PC) Ramirez v. Brown

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 13, 2019·No. 2:18-cv-01835·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 FRANK MARTINEZ RAMIREZ, No. 2:18-cv-1835 MCE DB P 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 JERRY BROWN, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights 17 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims defendants violated his rights when officers 18 used excessive force, filed false disciplinary reports against him, and failed to provide him with 19 adequate medical and mental health treatment. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s third 20 amended complaint for screening. For the reasons set forth below, the court will recommend that 21 the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 22 SCREENING 23 I. Legal Standards 24 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 25 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 26 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 27 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 28 //// 1 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 3 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 5 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 6 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 7 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 8 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 9 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 10 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 11 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 12 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 13 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 14 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 15 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 16 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 17 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 18 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 19 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 20 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 21 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 22 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 23 or other proper proceeding for redress. 24 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 25 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 26 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 27 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 28 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 1 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 2 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 3 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 4 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 5 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 6 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 7 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 8 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 9 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 10 II. Allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint 11 Plaintiff states the events giving rise to the claim occurred at California State Prison, 12 Corcoran (“CSP-COR”), California State Prison, Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”), and California 13 Correctional Institution (“CCI”). (ECF No. 54 at 1.) Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Governor 14 Gavin Newsom; (2) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 15 Secretary Ralph Diaz; (3) “Federal Monitor” J. Clark Kelso; and (4) the “Warden’s Association.” 16 (Id. at 1-2.) 17 Plaintiff claims there have been “numerous incidents of employee unnecessary excessive 18 force, willful code of conduct of silent green wall tactics directed primarily at plaintiff . . . .” (Id. 19 at 3.) Plaintiff appears to allege CDCR employees have falsified documents and denied or 20 prevented him from receiving medical care. Plaintiff states defendants were the legal officials in 21 charge of his imprisonment and therefore are responsible for his health and welfare at all times. 22 (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims he has notified the defendants about the abusive behaviors of their 23 employees, but they refused to respond. 24 Finally, plaintiff again claims that all of his grievances are rejected, cancelled for frivolous 25 reasons, or thrown away. (Id. at 5.) In relief, plaintiff has requested “1-trillion in total damages” 26 and that he be placed in “protective federal custody.” (Id. at 6.) 27 //// 28 //// 1 III. Failure to State a Claim 2 A. Supervisory Defendants 3 As in prior complaints, plaintiff has named as defendants in this action only individuals 4 who hold supervisory positions within CDCR. Plaintiff concludes that these defendants should 5 be liable because they are responsible for the welfare of inmates within CDCR. 6 Plaintiff was previously informed that liability may not be imposed on supervisory 7 personnel for the action or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat 8 superior. Ashcroft v.

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