(PC) Price v. Pacheco

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JoANN PRICE, et al., No. 2:22-CV-1610-DAD-DMC-P 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 ARTURO PACHECO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiffs, who are proceeding with retained counsel, bring this civil rights action 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs are the estate and successor-in-interest of Ronnie Price, 19 who is deceased. Pending before the Court is the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' third amended 20 complaint filed by Defendants Lynch and Baughman. See ECF No. 130. The parties appeared 21 for a hearing before the undersigned on April 24, 2024. At the hearing, the Court considered the 22 parties' arguments and directed supplemental briefing on the following issues: (1) whether 23 Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to establish the supervisory liability of Defendants Lynch 24 and Baughman; and (2) whether the third amended complaint constitutes a "sham pleading." On 25 May 8, 2024, the parties stipulated to withdrawal of the "sham pleading" issue, see ECF No. 147, 26 and the parties have filed supplemental briefs on the supervisory liability issue, see ECF Nos. 27 148, 149, and 152. 28 / / / 1 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of 2 material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The 3 Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer 4 v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 5 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All 6 ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 7 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual 8 factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). 9 In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 10 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 12 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair 13 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 14 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order 15 to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 16 more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 17 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The 18 complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 19 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 20 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 21 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but 22 it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 24 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement 25 to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials 2 outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); 3 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court may, however, consider: (1) 4 documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no 5 party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, 6 and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see 7 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials 8 of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 9 1994). 10 Finally, leave to amend must be granted “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no 11 amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 12 curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 13 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 A. Procedural History 16 This action was commenced with Plaintiffs’ original complaint against Defendants 17 Pacheco, Aurich, and Lynch filed on September 14, 2022. See ECF No. 1. On October 19, 2022, 18 the Court determined Plaintiffs’ complaint was appropriate for service on the three named 19 defendants. See ECF No. 3. On December 29, 2022, Defendant Lynch filed a waiver of service 20 of process. See ECF No. 13. On January 4, 2023, service of process was returned executed as to 21 Defendants Aurich and Pacheco. See ECF Nos. 16 and 17. 22 Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on 23 February 21, 2023. See ECF No. 29. In this pleading, Plaintiffs added Bigney, Villa, and 24 Baughman as named defendants. See id. at 1. On March 7, 2023, Defendant Lynch filed a 25 motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. See ECF No. 31. Defendant Aurich joined in that 26 motion. See ECF No. 32. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 On April 4, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, again pursuant 2 to stipulation. See ECF No. 36. In this pleading, Plaintiffs added Luna and Lopez as named 3 defendants. See id. at 1. The filing of the second amended complaint rendered Defendant 4 Lynch’s motion to dismiss moot. Defendant Lynch’s motion to dismiss the second amended 5 complaint was filed on April 17, 2023. See ECF No. 38. No other defendants have joined in this 6 motion.1 On June 2, 2023, the Court held a hearing on Defendant Lynch's motion to dismiss and 7 took the matter under submission. See ECF No. 45 (minutes). Defendant Baughman filed a 8 motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on August 1, 2023. See ECF No. 61. 9 On August 16, 2023, the Court issued findings and recommendations that 10 Defendant Lynch's motion to dismiss be granted. See ECF No. 67. Before these findings and 11 recommendations regarding Defendant Lynch's motion to dismiss had been submitted to the 12 District Judge, the Court conducted a hearing on Defendant Baughman's motion to dismiss on 13 November 1, 2023. See ECF No. 103 (minutes). In briefing on Defendant Baughman's motion to 14 dismiss, and at the November 1, 2023, hearing, Plaintiffs informally sought leave to file a third 15 amended complaint to address the issues raised in the pending motions to dismiss as well as to 16 provide notice of Mr. Price's next of kin.2 At the hearing, the Court directed Plaintiffs to file a 17 formal motion for leave to amend and, on November 2, 2023, the Court issued an order setting a 18 filing deadline of November 21, 2023, for such a motion. See ECF No. 104. The Court deferred 19 submission of the August 16, 2023, findings and recommendations as to Defendant Lynch's 20 motion to dismiss, as well as further consideration of Defendant Baughman's motion to dismiss, 21 pending ruling on a motion for leave to amend. See id. 22 / / / 23 1 Though served, Defendant Pacheco has not appeared in the action. Service of 24 process has been approved for the remaining defendants. See ECF No. 47. Summons was returned executed as to Defendants Bigney, Lopez, Baughman, Luna, and Villa on July 11 and 25 12, 2023. See ECF Nos. 50-54. Defendant Pacheco filed an answer on July 14, 2023. See ECF No. 55. Defendant Luna filed an answer on August 15, 2023. See ECF No. 65. Defendant Luna 26 also filed a crossclaim on August 15, 2023. Defendant Aurich has been voluntarily dismissed pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. Defendant Luna has also been voluntarily dismissed, as has 27 his crossclaim. 2 By this time, Plaintiffs were represented by new counsel, who substituted in the 28 case in September 2023. See ECF No. 83 (order approving substitution). 1 Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a third amended complaint on 2 November 21, 2023. See ECF No. 107. The parties appeared for a hearing before the 3 undersigned on January 10, 2024. See ECF No. 126 (minutes). At the hearing, the Court 4 indicated that it would be granting the motion for leave to amend and, on this ruling, Defendants 5 Lynch and Baughman withdrew their pending motions to dismiss. On January 25, 2024, the 6 Court issued an order granting leave to amend, vacating the August 16, 2023, findings and 7 recommendations addressing Defendant Lynch's withdrawn motion to dismiss, and setting a 8 deadline for Defendants to respond to the third amended complaint. See ECF No. 129. 9 Defendants Lynch and Baughman filed the pending motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' 10 third amended complaint on February 26, 2024. See ECF No. 130. The parties appeared for a 11 hearing before the undersigned on April 24, 2024. See ECF No. 143 (minutes). At the hearing 12 the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on the following issues: (1) whether 13 the third amended complaint contains sufficient facts to establish supervisory liability; and (2) 14 whether the third amended complaint constitutes a "sham pleading." The parties thereafter filed a 15 stipulation for withdrawal of the "sham pleading" argument, see ECF No. 147, and filed 16 supplemental briefs on the supervisory liability argument, see ECF Nos. 148, 149, and 152. 17 B. Plaintiffs' Current Allegations 18 This action proceeds on Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint. See ECF No. 128. 19 Plaintiffs name the following as defendants: (1) Arturo Pacheco; (2) Ashley Aurich; (3) Jeffrey 20 Bigney; (4) Arturo Luna; (5) Dorian Lopez; (6) Brenda Villa; (7) Jeffrey Lynch; and (8) David 21 Baughman. See id. at 1-4. All Defendants are alleged to have been employees of the California 22 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) working at California State Prison – 23 Sacramento (CSP-Sac.) during the times relevant to the complaint. See id. Defendants Aurich, 24 Lopez, and Luna have been voluntarily dismissed. See ECF Nos. 62, 140, and 155. All 25 remaining defendants are represented by counsel except Defendant Pacheco who is proceeding 26 pro se. Defendants Bigney and Villa remain unserved. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Plaintiffs allege the following introductory facts:

2 2. On or about September 15, 2016, Mr. Price was assaulted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [hereinafter 3 CDCR] guard Arturo Pacheco and taken to University of California Davis Medical Center [hereinafter UC Davis Medical Center] for treatment where 4 he died two days later as a result of the injuries suffered in the assault. Unbeknownst to the Price family, multiple prison guards falsified reports and 5 conspired to cover up the assault and other felonious conduct toward Mr. Price. 6 ECF No. 128, pg. 2. 7 8 By way of further background, Plaintiffs allege that the CDCR Health Care 9 Department Operations Manual, section 3.1.19, requires the prison warden or his/her designee to 10 notify an inmate’s next of kin within 24 hours of the death, serious illness, or serious injury of the 11 inmate. See id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs also allege an informal “code of silence” among correctional 12 staff to not report on another correctional staff member’s errors, misconduct, or crimes. See id. at 13 6. Plaintiffs assert that correctional staff who violate this informal code of silence experience 14 harassment and retaliation. See id. According to Plaintiffs, beginning in 2016 one or more 15 correctional officers filed reports with Defendants Baughman and Lynch alleging rampant 16 corruption and the continued existence of the code of silence within CSP-Sac. See id. Plaintiffs 17 claim that, despite these reports, it took nearly two years for CDCR to complete its investigation 18 in this case. See id. 19 Plaintiffs next outline the facts relating to Mr. Price’s death. See id. at 6-9. 20 Plaintiffs state that Mr. Price was assaulted by Defendant Pacheco on September 15, 2016, as 21 Pacheco and Aurich were escorting Mr. Price between buildings at SCP-Sac. See id. at 6. 22 Pacheco informed Mr. Price that he was being moved to another cell with a new cellmate. See id. 23 Mr. Prices asked to be taken to Administrative Segregation. See id. Nonetheless, and although 24 Mr. Price had agreed to be handcuffed and escorted to Administrative Segregation, Pacheco told 25 Mr. Price that he was being taken to his new cell. See id. at 7. When so informed, Mr. Price 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 stated that he was not going to a new cell and stopped walking. See id. Plaintiffs next allege:

2 30. While being observed by Defendants Aurich, Luna, and Bigney, Defendant Pacheco squatted down, placed his shoulder on Mr. 3 Price's buttock area, grabbed Mr. Price's quadriceps and intentionally pushed Mr. Price forward with his body weight while Price still had his hands 4 handcuffed behind his back. Defendant Pacheco's unjustified use of force caused Mr. Price to fall violently forward onto his face impacting the 5 concrete floor.

6 Id. 7 Following this, Mr. Price was taken to the prison medical clinic where it was 8 determined that Mr. Price needed to be sent to U.C. Davis Medical Center for emergency medical 9 treatment. See id. at 7-8. Mr. Price received extensive emergency medical care at the hospital 10 and was admitted. See id. at 8. At the hospital, Mr. Price gave a recorded interview to Sergeant 11 Kevin Steele. See id. at 8-9. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants Baughman and Lynch, the 12 acting warden and assistant warden, respectively, either knew or should have known about the 13 recorded interview. See id. at 9. Plaintiffs state that Mr. Price died on September 17, 2016, as a 14 result of the injuries sustained two days earlier. See id. Mr. Price’s death was ruled a homicide 15 by the Sacramento County Coroner. See id. 16 Plaintiffs next outline the facts relating to notification of Mr. Price’s death. See id. 17 at 9-10. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Baughman and Lynch failed to notify Mr. Price’s next 18 of kin “consistent with the requirements of CDCR Health Care Operations Manual 3.1.19.” Id. at 19 9. According to Plaintiffs, on September 24, 2016, Sergeant Steele, who conducted the recorded 20 interview of Mr. Price and identified himself to Mr. Price’s family as a member of the 21 Investigative Services Unit, “deceived Ms. Price by informing her that Mr. Price was hit in the 22 jaw by a cellmate.” Id. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Price’s family reasonably relied on Sergeant 23 Steele’s representation and had no reason to question the stated cause of death. See id. at 9-10. 24 The family elected to have Mr. Price’s body cremated. See id. at 9. Plaintiffs state that, “[d]ue to 25 the concealment of the cause of Mr. Price’s death,” the family was not provided the opportunity 26 to request an autopsy. Id. at 10. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Next, Plaintiffs outline facts relating to an alleged cover-up. See id. at 10-14. 2 Central to these allegations are various text messages sent to and from the officers who were on 3 the scene on September 15, 2016. See id. Specifically, Plaintiffs reference a February 19, 2017, 4 text sent by Defendant Lopez to an unknown individual which stated: “LOL! Code of Silence 5 homie” and “you know it.” Id. at 13. As to Defendants Baughman and Lynch, Plaintiffs contend 6 that they became aware of a cover-up “by the Spring of 2017.” Id. at 14. According to Plaintiffs:

7 89. Defendants Baughman and Lynch became aware of defendant Lopez's text conversation no later than the Spring of 2017. Despite being 8 aware of this conduct defendant Lopez continued to work at CSP Sacramento for more than another year. 9 90. On or about June 25, 2018, defendants Villa, Pacheco, Aurich, Luna, Lopez and Bigney were fired due to the aforementioned conduct. 10 91. The Notice of Adverse Action terminating defendant Lopez's employment acknowledges the existence of the code of silence at CSP Sac. 11 The notice states "When confronted with the above text message exchange, you [defendant Lopez] confirmed that you had indeed authored the text 12 messages referring to the "code of silence" at CSP-SAC...." While the Notice of Adverse Action goes on to state that the code of silence is not allowed, the 13 notice confirms the code of silence exists. 92. The Notice of Adverse Action was signed by defendant 14 Baughman. 93. Accordingly, Baughman was aware of the truth pertaining to 15 Mr. Price’s death on or before June 25, 2018 (within the two-year statute of limitations for the causes of action at issue). However, no one informed Ms. 16 Price or her family about the truth of his death and concealed the truth of the death from Ms. Price and her family. 17 Id. 18 19 Next, Plaintiffs allege facts relating to notification provided to the family of Mr. 20 Price’s true cause of death. See id. at 16-17. According to Plaintiffs:

21 113. On or around July 22, 2022, Ms. Price received a letter from attorney Kresta Daly. Ms. Daly stated that she was involved in a wrongful 22 death and cover up case occurring at CSP where prison guards were believed to be involved in a murder. The letter continued: “[w]e 23 recently learned about a potentially [sic] situation involving another person, Ronnie Price, and believe you may have important information.” For the first 24 time since Mr. Price’s death, his family was told the truth that the prison guards were believed to be responsible for Mr. Price’s death. 25 114. Upon receiving the letter Ms. Price and her family initiated an internet search and became aware of prison guard’s potential involvement in 26 the death of Mr Price. 115. Prior to receiving Ms. Daly’s letter, Ms. Price had no clue that Mr. Price was killed by a prison guard and instead, believed Mr. 27 Price was killed by his cellmate because that is the lie she was told by

28 / / / 1 CDCR. The instant action was filed less than two months after the family was notified of the potential wrongdoing. 2 Id. at 16-17. 3 4 Plaintiffs allege the following claims: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 5 Defendants Pacheco, Bigney, and Luna based on excessive force; (2) violation of California Civil 6 Code § 52.1 (Bane Act) against Defendants Pacheco, Bigney, and Luna; (3) violation of 42 7 U.S.C. § 1983 based on supervisory liability against Defendants Baughman and Lynch; (4) 8 violation of California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60, et seq., against all defendants based on 9 wrongful death; (5) violation of 42 US.C. § 1983 against Defendants Baughman, Lynch, and 10 Villa based on failure to protect; (6) violation of California Civil Code § 1710(3) against 11 Defendants Baughman and Lynch based on concealment; and (7) violation of California Civil 12 Code § 1710(3) against Defendants Baughman and Lynch based on intentional misrepresentation. 13 See ECF No. 128, pgs. 21-31. 14 15 II. DISCUSSION 16 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants Baughman and Lynch argue as follows (1) 17 Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a 18 claim upon which relief can be granted; (3) Plaintiffs have failed to join an indispensable party, 19 namely Mr. Price's half-sibling Beverly Dapremont; and (4) Plaintiffs' new state law claims 20 must be dismissed for failure to allege compliance with the California Government Tort Claims 21 Act. See ECF No. 130. In their supplemental briefing, Defendants further contend – for the 22 first time – that Plaintiffs' state law claims against them also fail because they are immune 23 pursuant to California Government Code § 820.8. See ECF No. 149. 24 A. Statute of Limitations 25 For claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the applicable statute of limitations is 26 California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 27 387-88 (2007); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[f]or actions under 42 U.S.C. 28 § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”); Jackson 1 v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); Karim- 2 Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). In California, there is a 3 two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions such as § 1983 cases. See Cal. Civ. 4 Proc. Code § 335.1; Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). 5 Notwithstanding the application of the forum’s state law regarding the statute of 6 limitations, including statutory and equitable tolling, in the context of a § 1983 action it is 7 “federal law” which “governs when a claim accrues.” Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th 8 Cir. 1999) (citing Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir.1994)). “A claim 9 accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the basis of the cause of 10 action.” Id. (citing Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also TwoRivers v. 11 Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 12 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims accrued on September 15, 2016 – the date 13 of the incident. See ECF No. 130, pg. 4. Applying a two-year limitations period, Defendants 14 conclude that Plaintiffs’ complaint was due on or before September 15, 2018. See id. Defendants 15 argue that this action, which was not filed until September 2022 is untimely and barred. See id. 16 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue: (1) the claims accrued in July 2022 under the California delayed 17 discovery rule; and (2) Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations 18 defense. See ECF Nos. 136, pgs.14-18, and 137, pgs. 12-16. 19 California’s delayed discovery rule permits delayed accrual of a cause of action 20 “until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” El Paso Loco, 21 Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations to California cases omitted). “To 22 rely on this rule, the plaintiff must plead specific facts describing the time and manner of 23 discovery and the inability to have discovered the claim earlier despite due diligence.” Parrish v. 24 Nat’l Football Players Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Application of the 25 rule involves a two-part analysis. See Alexander v. Exxon Mobile, 219 Cal. App. 4th 1236 26 (2013). The initial inquiry is whether the plaintiff possessed information that would cause a 27 reasonable person to inquire into the cause of his injuries. See id. The duty to inquire arises 28 when the plaintiff becomes aware of facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to 1 suspect his injuries were the result of wrongdoing. See id. If the inquiry duty is triggered, the 2 next question is whether an investigation would have disclosed to the plaintiff a factual basis for 3 his claim. See id. The statute of limitations begins to run when the investigation brings such 4 information to light. See id. 5 In opposition, Plaintiffs argue:

6 Despite Defendants’ argument to the contrary, the California delayed discovery rule does not require any “particular involvement” or fraud on 7 behalf of the Defendant to toll the limitations period. Rather the limitations period begins when an investigation done by Plaintiff would have revealed 8 the factual basis for a cause of action. Here, Plaintiff was in possession the fact that Price died while incarcerated. (3AC at ¶¶ 42-47). However, Plaintiff 9 alleged that she was told that Mr. Price was killed by an inmate and was not in possession of any factual basis for determining that Mr. Price was killed 10 by a prison guard. (Id). Plaintiff alleged she attempted to investigate and she and her family called 20-30 times and attempted to get answers about Mr. 11 Price’s death. (3AC at ¶¶ 43-45). Any investigation that the Plaintiff could have theoretically conducted outside of the prison would not have brought 12 the truth to light as the officials involved were engaged in a massive cover- up. It was not possible for Plaintiff to have uncovered the information prior 13 to Pacheco’s guilty plea as no one informed her of the facts and it was not reported in the news until July 2022. (3AC at ¶¶ 113-116, 134, 135, 137). As 14 such, the statute of limitations should be considered to run in July 2022. Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on September 14, 2022—well within 15 the statute of limitations.

16 ECF Nos. 136, pgs. 15-16, and 137, pg. 13 (emphasis in originals). 17 In reply, Defendants argue that there is no duty to update Plaintiffs on the true 18 cause of death of Mr. Price. See ECF No. 138, pgs. 2-3. Defendants further contend that 19 Plaintiffs made no reasonable attempt at investigation. See id. 20 Plaintiffs’ argument is persuasive. Specifically, the duty to inquire was not 21 triggered in this case until July 2022 when Plaintiffs were informed for the first time that Mr. 22 Price’s cause of death may not have resulted from an attack by another inmate. Until that time, 23 and despite Plaintiffs’ numerous unreturned phone calls asking for further information, Plaintiffs 24 believed that Mr. Price’s cause of death was an attack by another inmate, as relayed to the family 25 by Sergeant Steele in September 2016, whom they had no reason to disbelieve. Under the belief 26 that Mr. Price died as a result of an inmate-on-inmate assault, and not as a result of wrongdoing 27 on the part of correctional staff, Plaintiffs would not have reasonably been expected to seek to 28 obtain the coroner’s report prior to July 2022. Once the duty to investigate was triggered in July 1 2022, Plaintiffs then conducted an investigation and learned Mr. Price’s true cause of death and 2 timely filed suit in September 2022. 3 In applying the delayed discovery rule, it does not matter whether Defendants had 4 any duty to inform the Price family of Mr. Price’s cause of death. What matters is the facts 5 known to Plaintiffs and when. Thus, Defendants’ arguments concerning the specific 6 requirements of the notice provision of section 3.1.19 are irrelevant. Further, because Plaintiffs 7 believed prior to July 2022 that Mr. Price’s death was caused by an inmate-on-inmate assault, 8 there would have been no reason for the family to have requested the autopsy report any sooner. 9 Because Plaintiffs’ claims accrued in July 2022 and the statute of limitations ran in 10 July 2024, and because Plaintiffs timely filed suit in September 2022, it is unnecessary to 11 determine whether Defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of 12 limitations defense. Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied insofar as they argue 13 Plaintiffs' claims against them are barred by the statute of limitations. 14 B. Failure to State a Claim 15 Defendants Baughman and Lynch argue that Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint 16 fails to state sufficient facts to establish their liability under § 1983. See ECF No. 130, pgs. 5-8. 17 Defendants Baughman and Lynch assert that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any 18 facts showing their personal involvement and that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 theories improperly rest on 19 the theory of respondeat superior. See ECF No. 130, pgs. 5-8. More specifically, Defendants 20 contend: (1) as to all federal claims under § 1983, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts 21 to establish their liability as supervisors; and (2) as to Plaintiffs' failure-to-protect claim under 22 § 1983, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to show that Defendants Baughman or Lynch had 23 knowledge of any risk to Mr. Price's safety. See id. 24 1. Supervisory Liability 25 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 26 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 27 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 28 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. A 1 supervisory defendant may also be liable where he or she knew of constitutional violations but 2 failed to act to prevent them. See id. Supervisory personnel who act by implementing a policy so 3 deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind 4 a constitutional violation may also be liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate 5 in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en 6 banc). 7 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 8 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 9 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 10 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 11 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 12 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 13 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 14 662, 676 (2009). "'The requisite causal connection can be established. . . by setting in motion a 15 series of acts by others or by knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which 16 [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 17 constitutional injury.'" Rodriguez v. Cnty. Of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) 18 (quoting Starr v. Bacca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)). 19 According to Defendants Baughman and Lynch, Plaintiffs fail to allege how they 20 are "responsible for, or otherwise involved in, the policies, practices, or customs Plaintiff[s] now 21 claim[] are at issue." ECF No. 130, pg. 6. In opposition, Plaintiffs contend:

22 Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Baughman and Lynch violated the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment by 23 ignoring their subordinates’ use of force. Plaintiff alleged that Baughman and Lynch were aware guards (including Pacheco) were assaulting 24 inmates prior to Price’s death yet did not stop the behavior. (3AC at ¶¶ 102-103,143-144). Plaintiff further alleged that Baughman and Lynch 25 were aware that their subordinates followed a “code of silence,” which they reasonably should have known would cause his subordinates to freely 26 inflict constitutional injuries knowing they would be “protected” yet failed to implement any training or enforcement to remedy the issue. (3AC at 21- 27 23, 85-91, 101-106).

28 / / / 1 The Code of Silence is in direct contradiction to the CDCR’s Code of Ethics “CDCR's Department Operations Manual, 33030.3.3 Law 2 Enforcement Code of Ethics provides, in pertinent part: "As employees and appointees of the Department, we are expected to perform our duties, 3 at all times, as follows: Demonstrate professionalism, honesty, and integrity; Accept responsibility for our actions and their consequences; 4 Appreciate differences in people, their ideas, and opinions; Treat fellow employees, inmates, wards, parolees, victims, their families, and the 5 public with dignity and respect; Respect the rights of others and treat them fairly regardless of race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, 6 marital status, age, disability, medical condition, pregnancy, sexual orientation, veteran status, or political affiliation; Comply with all 7 applicable laws and regulations.." (3AC at ¶ 19). Baughman and Lynch were responsible for ensuring that officers were trained and complied with 8 the Code of Ethics. (3AC at ¶ 164). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Baughman and Lynch were acquiescent in the clear disregard of policy 9 which led to constitutional violations.

10 ECF No. 136, pgs. 19-20.

11 On the Court's order following the April 24, 2024, hearing, the parties have filed 12 supplemental briefs on the issue of supervisory liability. See ECF Nos. 148, 149, and 152. In 13 further opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs argue: (1) Defendants Baughman 14 and Lynch had a duty under California law to establish operational plans and procedures for 15 implementation of prison regulations and the law allows for supervisors to be liable for 16 implementing a policy that itself repudiates a constitutional right; and (2) Defendants Baughman 17 and Lynch were on notice of and deliberately indifferent to the "culture of corruption" and "code 18 of silence" which contributed to Mr. Price's death. See ECF No. 148. 19 According to Plaintiffs: 20 . . . Plaintiff has alleged that the Code of Silence and known failure 21 to investigate uses of force emboldened Pacheco, so he too was impervious to the consequences of his misconduct, and his text messages 22 confirming the code of silence evidence his bold confidence that his brutal assault, witnessed by several of his co-correctional officers, would be 23 ignored and unpunished. (3AC at para. 48-84, 141-142).

24 * * *

25 Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Baughman and Lynch were on notice of and deliberately indifferent to the known of obvious 26 consequences of the Code of Silence, including the failure to conduct adequate investigations. . . . 27 * * * 28 1 . . . Plaintiff alleged that Baughman and Lynch were aware of the “culture of corruption resulting in the use of excessive force against 2 inmates” prior to Price’s death but failed to issue any discipline of corrective action. (3AC at para. 102, 168). Baughman and Lynch were 3 aware guards (including Pacheco) were assaulting inmates prior to Price’s death yet did not stop the behavior. (3AC at ¶ 102-103,143-144). Plaintiff 4 further alleged that Baughman and Lynch were aware that their subordinates followed a “code of silence,” which they reasonably should 5 have known would cause his subordinates to freely inflict constitutional injuries knowing they would be “protected” yet failed to implement any 6 training or enforcement to remedy the issue. (3AC at 21-23, 85-91, 101- 106). 7 * * * 8 Just four months prior to Pacheco’s assault on Price, Pacheco 9 pepper-sprayed a 54-year-old prisoner in his cell, falsely claiming later that the prisoner had a piece of glass and refused to drop it. (3AC at 103). 10 Upon information and belief, Baughman and Lynch knew or should have known that Pacheco was falsifying the reports to cover up excessive force. 11 (3AC at 104). Since Pacheco was not disciplined for this conduct, it can be reasonably inferred that procedure to investigate the use of force was also 12 inadequate in Pacheco’s prior incident. . . . Despite the fact that the prison had a videorecorded interview 13 of Mr. Price in its possession outlining the brutal and unlawful force utilized against him, as required under the CCR, Baughman and Lynch 14 clearly had an existing policy to abide by the Code of Silence and not adequately investigate uses of force and staff misconduct because they did 15 nothing. The complete failure to properly investigate this incident by multiple levels of review—despite a videorecorded interview in the 16 prison’s possession where a deceased inmate accounts what happened to him--is evidence that there was a policy of failing to investigate uses of 17 force, which further emboldened officers to commit constitutional violations. 18 * * * 19 If the investigation did occur as required by the CDCR, Baughman 20 and Lynch would have known about the recording. (3AC at para 40). Pursuant to the CCR, the Warden is involved in reviewing uses of force. 21 See 15 CCR Section 3268.1. The fact that Pacheco was not disciplined until 2018 creates a reasonable inference that Baughman and/or Lynch 22 ratified his conduct. (3AC at para. 90). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges facts that support a theory of supervisory 23 liability against Baughman and Lynch. An order to dismiss would deprive Mr. Price’s family of an opportunity to hold prison officials for obvious 24 deliberate indifference to the clear evidence that Officer Pacheco engaged in an unnecessary and deadly use of force. . . . 25 ECF No. 148, pgs. 4-8. 26 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 In their supplemental brief, Defendants argue Plaintiffs' reliance on Starr v. Baca is 2 misplaced because the facts of this case are distinguishable. See ECF No. 149, pg. 2. Defendants 3 also criticize Plaintiffs' citation to Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946, F 2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991), 4 which considered the sufficiency of a jury verdict following evidence at trial, including expert 5 testimony on police department procedures, showing the police chief's "condonation of, and 6 acquiescence in, the officers' use of excessive force. . . ." ECF No. 149, pg. 3 (citing 946, F 2d 7 630, 647 (9th Cir. 1991)). Defendants state:

8 Here, by contrast, Plaintiff only supplies conclusory statements that defendant Baughman and Lynch knew or should have known about a 9 single incident months before the incident that is the basis for Plaintiff’s lawsuit, and which involves an unrelated individual. Unlike the expert 10 testimony in Larez, Plaintiff's conclusions are her own supposition that is not supported by factual allegations. There are no factual allegations that 11 Baughman or Lynch knew about, let alone ignored or dismissed, prior complaints against any of the officer defendants for similar displays of 12 excessive force.

13 Id. 14 Finally, as to the "code of silence," Defendants argue:

15 . . .Plaintiff alternatively argues that there can be supervisor liability under a theory akin to a Fourth Amendment “Monell claim” and 16 that the Defendants can be liable based on “customs and policies.” (Gille Dec., Ex. A, p. 14:9-15.). . . [N]o facts are alleged that could support 17 Plaintiff’s conclusion that there was a “custom and policy” of deliberate indifference, and that Baughman or Lynch must have been aware of the 18 same. Again, apart from citing a single prior incident, there are no factual allegations that there was a prior custom and practice whereby Baughman 19 or Lynch knowingly allowed officers to violate constitutional rights or were aware of it and turned a blind eye. And in this matter, the allegations 20 are that the officers in question were fired and some were prosecuted because of the subject incident. This does not infer there was a custom or 21 policy in effect as Plaintiff summarily asserts.

22 ECF No. 149, pg. 4. 23 In paragraph 21 of the third amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege the existence of 24 the "code of silence" which is an "informal code of silence among correctional [and other] 25 officers not to report on a colleague's errors, misconducts, or crimes." ECF No. 128, pg. 6. In 26 paragraph 22, Plaintiffs further allege that, in November 2016, inmate Milton Beverly, Jr. died 27 while at CSP-Sac. and one officer was prepared to testify as to a "code of silence" cover-up, the 28 officer reported the facts to Defendants Baughman and Lynch, and that Defendants failed to act. 1 See id. In paragraph 23, Plaintiff allege that, "no later than 2016," other officers filed multiple 2 reports with Defendants Baughman and Lynch alleging rampant corruption and the continued 3 existence of the "code of silence" at CSP-Sac. Id. 4 In paragraph 85, Plaintiffs allege that Luna was interviewed by OIA in October 5 2016, and that, after learning of OIA's investigation, Pacheco sent a text message to Aurich to 6 maintain the "code of silence." Id. at 13. In paragraph 86, Plaintiffs claims that Defendants 7 Baughman and Lynch became aware of this test message in the Spring of 2017. See id. In 8 paragraph 87, Plaintiffs allege that Lopez texted an unknown person about the "code of silence" 9 at CSP-Sac. Id. In paragraphs 88 and 89, Plaintiffs further contends that, as with the October 10 2016, text, Defendants Baughman and Lynch became aware of the Spring 2017 text shortly after 11 it was sent and nonetheless allowed Lopez to continue in his duties for more than a year. See id. 12 at 14. In paragraphs 91 and 92, Plaintiffs allege that the Notice of Adverse Action which related 13 to the termination in June 2018 of Villa, Pacheco, Aurich, Luna, Lopez and Bigney for complicity 14 with the "code of silence" was signed by Defendant Baughman. Id. 15 In paragraph 101, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Baughman and Lynch had 16 actual and/or constructive knowledge of the so-called "code of silence." Id. at 14. In paragraph 17 102, Plaintiffs more specifically allege that, prior to Mr. Price's death, Defendants Baughman and 18 Lynch received reports from other correctional officers, presumably referring to the reports 19 outlined above, about a "culture of corruption" resulting in the use of excessive force against 20 inmates. Id. at 15. In paragraph 103, Plaintiffs contend that Pacheco pepper-sprayed an inmate in 21 his cell in May 2016 and later joked in a text to a friend that the incident was "funny" and that it's 22 "all about how u write ur report" and "ur partners have ur back." Id. In paragraph 104, Plaintiffs 23 contend Defendants Baughman and Lynch "knew or should have known" that Pacheco was 24 falsifying reports to cover up excessive force. Id. In paragraph 105, Plaintiffs contend that, a 25 year after Mr. Price's death, Defendants Baughman and Lynch received other reports from 26 officers concerning the "code of silence" and corruption and that they took no timely action. Id. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 In paragraphs 143 and 144, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Baughman and Lynch 2 were aware of and failed to take action concerning serious instances of excessive force by prison 3 guards at CSP-Sac. See id. at 20. 4 In paragraph 168, under the heading "Supervisory Liability for Violation of Civil 5 Rights 42 U.S.C. Section 1983," Plaintiffs allege Defendants' failure to supervise, train, and 6 discipline based on the more specific facts outlined above. See id. at 24-25. 7 The Court finds that Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to allow for Plaintiffs' 8 supervisor liability claims to proceed as against Defendants Baughman and Lynch. Specifically, 9 Plaintiffs' allegations, when accepted as true, show the requisite causal connection between 10 Defendants Baughman and Mr. Price's death by setting forth facts which show: (1) that 11 Defendants Baughman and Lynch knew or should have known prior to Mr. Price's death of the 12 corruption at CSP-Sac. associated with excessive force on inmates and a "code of silence" to 13 cover up misconduct by officers; and (b) that this corruption and "code of silence" allowed for the 14 excessive force which resulted in Mr. Price's death. See Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 798; Starr, 652 15 F.3d at 1207. 16 While the Court agrees with Defendants that it is not plausible to infer that a prison 17 warden is aware of everything that happens in the prison, see Vega v. Davis, 572 F. App’x 611, 18 618 (10th Cir. 2014), the facts alleged here are sufficient to allow for the inference that 19 Defendants Baughman and Lynch knew or should have known about the specific corruption and 20 "code of silence" which was pervasive at CSP-Sac. in the time leading up to and even after Mr. 21 Price's death. Unlike Sullivan v. Biter, 2017 WL 1540256, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2017), Herrera v. 22 California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2017 WL 117861, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2017), and Tennyson v. 23 County of Sacramento, 2020 WL 4059568, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2020), where the plaintiffs' 24 allegations were too vague and conclusory, the allegations here are specific enough and sufficient 25 to put Defendants on notice of the nature of the claims against them. In particular, as discussed 26 above, the allegations in Plaintiffs' third amended complaint indicate that Defendants Baughman 27 and Lynch had actual knowledge of the corruption and "code of silence" operating at CSP-Sac., 28 and that they had this knowledge prior to Mr. Price's death and nonetheless failed to take timely 1 corrective action, and that this failure led to Mr. Price's death. 2 2. Failure-to-Protect Claim 3 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 4 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 5 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 6 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 7 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 8 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 9 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 10 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 11 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 12 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 13 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 14 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 15 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 16 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 17 Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to 18 protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 19 1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) 20 objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious 21 harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 22 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. 23 See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, 24 however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 25 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials 26 know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a 27 mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the 28 plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually 1 knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, 2 even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 3 The Court rejects Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a failure-to- 4 protect claim because Defendants lacked knowledge of a risk to Mr. Price. As discussed above, 5 Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendants Baughman and Lynch were aware 6 of the corruption and "code of silence" at CSP-Sac. to cover up instances of excessive force on 7 inmates. Mr. Price's incarceration under this regime posed a danger to his safety, and the facts 8 alleged are sufficient to allow for the inference that Defendants Baughman and Lynch were aware 9 of this danger and failed to take corrective action. 10 C. Joinder 11 Defendants Baughman and Lynch argue that the entire action should be dismissed 12 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensable party 13 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. See ECF No. 130, pgs. 8-10. Defendants assert:

14 There is an indispensable party in this case, the Decedent’s adult brother Beverly Dapremont, who is an equal heir under California intestate 15 succession. (ECF 46.) However, Mr. Dapremont was not included as a plaintiff or a nominal defendant. (ECF 128.) The existence of equal heir and 16 the intentional exclusion of that person presents an indispensable-party issue under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7). 17 * * * 18 Because Plaintiff was aware of Mr. Dapremont’s existence and equal 19 claim, her case must be dismissed, unless Mr. Dapremont is joined as a party to this suit. If the case is allowed to proceed without him, Defendants could 20 potentially be exposed to a double judgment for the same occurrence and therefore, a judgment rendered in Dapremont’s absence would not be 21 adequate.

22 ECF No. 130, pgs. 8-10. 23 Defendants’ argument has been rendered moot pursuant to the parties' stipulation 24 and order thereon. See ECF Nos. 154 and 155. Specifically, the parties have agreed that Mr. 25 Dapremont was provided notice of the pending action in May 2024, that for purposes of naming 26 Mr. Dapremont the statute of limitations ran on July 22, 2024, and that there would be no need to 27 file a fourth amended complaint naming Mr. Dapremont should the Court issue a final ruling on 28 the pending motion to dismiss after July 22, 2024. See id. Because July 22, 2024, passed before 1 the Court's final ruling, the parties' stipulation takes effect and there is no longer any need to 2 consider whether Mr. Dapremont must be named. Mr. Dapremont has been provided notice and 3 has not joined in the action prior to expiration of the statute of limitations. 4 D. State Law Claims 5 Defendants Baughman and Lynch argue that Plaintiffs’ state law claims must be 6 dismissed because Plaintiffs have admitted in the third amended complaint non-compliance with 7 the California Government Tort Claims Act. See ECF No. 130, pg. 8. In supplemental briefing, 8 Defendants Baughman and Lynch also argue, for the first time, that Plaintiffs' state law claims 9 against them fail because they are immune under the California Government Code. See ECF No. 10 149, pgs. 6-7. 11 1. Claims Presentation 12 According to Defendants Baughman and Lynch:

13 Defendants seek dismissal of all state law claims because Plaintiffs filed their original complaint after the time allowed by California 14 Government Code, Section 945.6. Under those requirements, all claims alleged against public entities and their employees must be brought within 15 six months or 182 days, whichever is earlier, from the date the notice rejections were deposited in the mail. Cal. Govt. Code § 945.6; Gonzales v. 16 County of Los Angeles, 199 Cal. App. 3d 601, 604 (1988). This six-month period “is mandatory and strict compliance is required.” Clarke v. Upton, 17 703 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1044 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Julian v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal. App. 3d 169, 176 (1986)). 18 For the first time, Plaintiff seeks relief under California law. However, Plaintiff failed to file a Government Claim against any defendant, 19 even after she claims she learned about the cause of her brother’s death. She also failed to allege any excuse for non-compliance or relief for filing a late 20 claim. In sum, she has made no effort to rectify this defect. Accordingly, her state law claims must be dismissed. 21 ECF No. 130, pg. 8. 22 23 Citing California Government Code § 950.4, Plaintiffs assert that the claims 24 presentation requirement is inapplicable in this case because Plaintiffs had no reason to suspect 25 the involvement of government employees until July 2022 when the family learned the true cause 26 of Mr. Price’s death. See ECF No. 136, pg. 22. Defendants Baughman and Lynch argue that the 27 rare exception to the claims presentation requirement allowed under § 950.4 only applies where 28 the circumstances surrounding the injury give no clue as to the involvement of government 1 personnel. See ECF No. 138, pgs. 4-5. According to Defendants Baughman and Lynch: 2 “Government Code section 950.4 is inapplicable here because Plaintiff knew that public 3 employees were involved in the alleged incident.” Id. at 5. 4 Under § 950.4, an exception to the claims presentation requirement exists when 5 the plaintiff pleads and proves lack of knowledge within the time required to present a claim that 6 government personnel were involved. Here, Plaintiff have sufficiently alleged that, based on the 7 representation from Sergeant Steele in September 2016 that Mr. Price’s death was caused by 8 another inmate, they had no reason to suspect the involvement of prison staff until they learned 9 the true cause of Mr. Price’s cause of death in July 2022, well after the expiration of the time to 10 present a claim. What remains is whether this allegation can be proven such that § 950.4 applies. 11 Thus, whether § 950.4 ultimately works in Plaintiffs’ favor is a question for a later day, either on 12 summary judgment or at trial. Defendants’ motion should be denied as to the claims presentation 13 issue without prejudice to renewal on summary judgment or at time of trial. 14 2. Immunity 15 Defendants Baughman and Lynch argue that they are immune from liability on 16 Plaintiffs' state law claims because they are immune under California Government Code § 820.8 17 for the conduct of subordinates. See ECF No. 149, pgs. 6-7. The Court notes that this issue was 18 not raised in Defendants' motion to dismiss and is argued for the first time in supplemental 19 briefing ordered on the issue of supervisory liability for Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. The Court did 20 not invite additional briefing on any other issue and Plaintiffs' have not had an opportunity to 21 respond to Defendant's newly raised immunity assertion. 22 In any event, the Court finds that Defendants' immunity argument is not 23 persuasive. Under § 820.8, direct tort liability for a state employee may not be premised on the 24 acts of subordinates. See Weaver By and Through Weaver v. State, 63 Cal. App. 4th 188, 202 25 (1998). As discussed above, the third amended complaint does not allege liability due only to the 26 actions of subordinates. Rather, the allegations are sufficient to show a causal connection 27 between knowledge possessed by Defendants Baughman and Lynch concerning corruption and 28 cover-ups at CSP-Sac. and that despite this knowledge Defendants failed to take appropriate 1 |} action. 2 IH. CONCLUSION 3 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends as follows: 4 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 130, be denied. 5 2. Defendants be directed to file an answer to Plaintiffs’ third amended 6 || complaint. 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 8 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I1). Within 14 days 9 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections 10 || with the Court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of objections. 11 | Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. 12 | Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 14 | Dated: September 10, 2024 Ss..c0_, 15 DENNIS M. COTA 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23