(PC) Polk v. Lattimore

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 25, 2022·No. 1:12-cv-01156·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 SUSAN MAE POLK, Case No. 1:12-cv-01156-DAD-BAM (PC) 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 11 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST 12 LATTIMORE, et al., ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

13 Defendants. (ECF No. 147) 14 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 15 16 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17 I. Background 18 Plaintiff Susan Mae Polk (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 19 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on 20 Plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint against Defendant Baron for retaliation in violation of the 21 First Amendment and deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, arising from 22 allegations that he placed a “snitch jacket” on Plaintiff by informing Inmate Miranda that Plaintiff 23 had reported Inmate Miranda’s threats on Plaintiff’s life. 24 On July 23, 2021, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that 25 Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the 26 Prisoner Litigation Reform Act.1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th

27 1 Concurrent with this motion, Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th 28 Cir. 1988); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988). (ECF No. 147-8.) 1 Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 968 (2014). (ECF No. 147.) Following three 2 extensions of time, Plaintiff filed an opposition on December 10, 2021. (ECF No. 159.) 3 Defendant filed a reply on December 16, 2021. (ECF No. 160.) 4 The motion for summary judgment is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 5 II. Legal Standards 6 A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement 7 Section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that “[n]o action 8 shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 9 law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 10 administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is 11 required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the 12 process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to 13 all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 14 The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of 15 raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); Albino, 16 747 F.3d at 1166. “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, 17 a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, 18 the defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to 19 summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most 20 favorable to the plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id. 21 Defendant must first prove that there was an available administrative remedy and that 22 Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th 23 Cir. 2015) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to 24 Plaintiff to show something in his particular case made the existing and generally available 25 administrative remedies effectively unavailable to her. Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (citing Albino, 26 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks omitted). The ultimate burden of proof on the issue of 27 exhaustion remains with Defendant. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 28 /// 1 B. Summary Judgment Standard 2 Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment 3 if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 4 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 5 747 F.3d at 1166; Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each 6 party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by 7 (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, 8 documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the 9 presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible 10 evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may 11 consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do 12 so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 13 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 14 The defendant bears the burden of proof in moving for summary judgment for failure to 15 exhaust, Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166, and he must “prove that there was an available administrative 16 remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy,” id. at 1172. If the defendant 17 carries his burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff “to come forward with evidence 18 showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 19 available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. “If undisputed evidence 20 viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is 21 entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. at 1166. However, “[i]f material facts are 22 disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should 23 determine the facts.” Id. 24 III. Discussion 25 A. Summary of CDCR’s Administrative Review Process 26 At the relevant time, “[t]he California prison grievance system ha[d] three levels of 27 review; an inmate exhausts administrative remedies by obtaining a decision at each level.” Reyes 28 v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b) (repealed 1 June 1, 2020) & Harvey v.

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