(PC) Patterson v. Anderson

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRYAN DAMON PATTERSON Case No. 1:25-cv-00602-JLT-HBK

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION 13 v. 14-DAY DEADLINE 14 J. ANDERSON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Bryan Patterson is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action. 18 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the District Court dismiss this 19 action for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee or move to proceed in forma pauperis, failure to 20 comply with a court order and prosecute this action, and abuse of the judicial process. 21 BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 23 May 21, 2025. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff did not accompany the complaint with the $405.00 filing 24 fee or an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Accordingly, 25 on May 22, 2025, the Court issued an order directing Plaintiff to either submit a completed IFP 26 application or pay the full filing fee within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 3). Plaintiff was cautioned 27 that failure to comply with the Court’s order could result in dismissal of the action. (Id. at 1). As of the date of these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff has not paid the filing fee, filed an 1 IFP application, or requested an extension of time. (See docket). 2 Additionally, on June 20, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause (“OTSC”) after 3 taking judicial notice that Plaintiff had initiated at least twelve prior lawsuits, which contradicted 4 Plaintiff’s sworn declaration that he had never filed another action while incarcerated. (Doc. No. 5 6). Plaintiff was ordered to show cause by July 18, 2025, why the action should not be dismissed 6 for misrepresentation and abuse of judicial process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 7 Plaintiff has failed to respond to the OTSC and has not otherwise communicated with the Court. 8 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 9 A. Plaintiff is Required to Pay the Filing Fee 10 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 11 States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.00. See 28 12 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only 13 if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 14 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 15 The fee is not waived for prisoners, however. If granted leave to proceed IFP, a prisoner 16 nevertheless remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 17 Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), 18 regardless of whether his action is dismissed for other reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (2); 19 Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 20 The Court advised Plaintiff that for this case to proceed further, he must pay the $405.00 21 filing fee or submit an IFP application within 30 days of receiving the May 22, 2025 Order. (See 22 Doc. No. 3). Because Plaintiff has failed to either pay the filing fee of $405.00 or submit an IFP 23 application, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s case be dismissed without prejudice. See 24 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that a district court “will be 25 free to dismiss the complaint” if the filing fee is not paid or application to proceed in forma 26 pauperis is not granted); see also In re Perroton, 958 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming 27 dismissal of pro se litigant’s claim for failure to pay required filing fees). 1 B. Failure to Prosecute 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 3 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules or with a court 4 order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 5 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Local Rules, corresponding with Federal Rule 6 of Civil Procedure 11, provide, “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with … any order of 7 the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions … within the 8 inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have inherent power to control 9 their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, including dismissal of an 10 action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 11 court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, obey a court order, 12 or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) 13 (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal 14 Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order); 15 Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for failure to prosecute and 16 to comply with local rules). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must 17 consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the 18 Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 19 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 20 sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 21 The undersigned considers each of the above-stated factors and concludes dismissal is 22 warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of litigation is deemed to 23 be in the public interest, satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 24 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 25 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 26 overstated. This Court has one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and due to the delay in 27 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operated 1 Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This 2 Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a 3 recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to 4 litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor 5 weighs in favor of dismissal. 6 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale or witnesses’ 7 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 8 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 9 to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 10 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 11 1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, 12 the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 13 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the 14 disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case 16 toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is 17 the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 18 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on 19 multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” 20 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of 21 district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to 22 timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon 23 the size and load of the docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our 24 beleaguered trial judges.”). 25 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 26 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 27 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s June 20, 2025 expressly 1 district court dismiss this case as a sanction for Plaintiff’s abuse of the judicial process, which 2 will count as a strike, and/or for failure to prosecute this case as a sanction under Local Rule 3 110.” (Doc. No. 6 at 3, ¶2). Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal could result from 4 his failure to respond to the OTSC. And the instant dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice, 5 which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby satisfying the fifth factor. 6 After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned 7 recommends dismissal, without prejudice, for abuse of the judicial process, and under Fed. R. 8 Civ. P. 41 and Local Rule 110. 9 C. Abuse of the Judicial Process 10 Under Rule 11, the person who signs, files, submits, or later advocates any paper to the 11 court certifies that “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 12 inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” inter alia, the paper “is not being presented for any 13 improper purpose,” and “the factual contentions have evidentiary support.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 11(b)(1), (3). The Court may sanction persons who violate Rule 11 and may exercise its inherent 15 authority to respond to a party’s bad faith conduct. Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 16 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed against pro se litigant); Walker v. 17 Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). Fraud on the court is an example of bad faith 18 conduct meriting sanctions under the court’s inherent authority. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 19 U.S. 32, 54 (1991) (affirming sanctions against plaintiff “for the fraud he perpetrated on the 20 court”). Courts find a complaint “malicious when a prisoner misrepresents his prior litigation 21 history on a complaint form requiring disclosure of such history and signs the complaint under 22 penalty of perjury.” Allen v. Santiago, No. 22- 11946, 2023 WL 5745494, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 23 6, 2023) (citation omitted). This is because “‘perjury is among the worst kinds of misconduct’ 24 and cuts at the very heart of the mission of the federal courts.” Kennedy v. Huibregtse, No. 13-C- 25 004, 2015 WL 13187300, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 13, 2015), aff’d, 831 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2016) 26 (quoting Rivera v. Drake, 767 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir. 2014)). The Court afforded Plaintiff an 27 opportunity to show cause why the district court should not dismiss this case as a sanction for 1 | Plaintiff has not responded to the OTSC. Thus, this Court has inherent authority to dismiss this 2 | action as an abuse of the judicial process, which qualifies as a strike under the PLRA. 3 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 4 This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for the above stated reasons. 5 NOTICE 6 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 7 | Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 8 | of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 9 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 10 | Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff's failure to file objections within the specified time 11 may result in waiver of his rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 12 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 13 Dated: __July 30, 2025 Mihaw. Mh. Bareh Zaskth 15 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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