(PC) Mitchell v. Archiega

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 29, 2020
• Docket: 1:19-cv-00876
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 COREY ALEXANDER MITCHELL, 1:19-cv-00876 JLT (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT A RESPONSE 13 v. (Doc. 6) 14 LVN ARCHIEGA, et al, THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. 16

17 Plaintiff has filed a first amended complaint asserting claims against employees of the 18 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.1 (Doc. 6.) Generally, the Court is 19 required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or 20 officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a 21 complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous, 22 malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 23 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 24 “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 25 dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 26 claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 27

28 1 Though titled a “First Amended Complaint,” this is the only complaint filed by plaintiff in this action. The original 1 I. Pleading Standard 2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 3 is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 4 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 5 do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiffs must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 7 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility 8 demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual 9 allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. 10 Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 11 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 12 Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under section 1983, 13 a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws 14 of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 15 acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. 16 Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 17 Under section 1983 the plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 18 participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 19 This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. 20 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners 21 proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and 22 to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 23 (citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the 24 plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 25 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 26 At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a state inmate housed at California 27 Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) Prison in Corcoran, California. He names as 28 defendants Licensed Vocational Nurse Archiega, Primary Care Physician (Dr. Merritt), ADA 1 Coordinator / Associate Warden S. Smith, and “Chief of California Correctional Health Care” S. 2 Gates. Plaintiff sues each defendant in her or her individual and official capacities. He seeks 3 injunctive relief and damages. 4 Plaintiff’s allegations can be fairly summarized as follows: 5 A. Batteries for Hearing Aids 6 On or around August 29, 2018, plaintiff requested an exchange of four hearing aid 7 batteries. LVN Archiega denied this request and instead took plaintiff’s spare batteries. Though 8 not entirely clear, LVN Archiega is also accused of “depriving the Plaintiff of his medical 9 device.” 10 Plaintiff filed an appeal arguing that it was institutional policy that plaintiff be offered 11 batteries on a one-for-one exchange with no limit as to how often the batteries could be replaced. 12 He also suggests that he was authorized to possess spare batteries following a previous 13 institutional appeal and that these spare batteries were necessary because it sometimes took an 14 extended period before his batteries could be replaced by staff. Associate Warden S. Smith 15 upheld LVN Archiega’s conduct. Dr. Merritt then “rubber stamped a doctor’s order granting 16 Archiega [the] right to take Plaintiffs batteries, after the fact acting in a conspiracy to deny 17 plaintiff his Eighth Amendment rights.” Defendant Gates “is the ultimate authority on this issue 18 and has assigned a new meaning to the definition of CDC’s use of the term one for one exchange 19 in order to deny liability.” 20 Plaintiff claims he has been made to go extended periods without the use of his hearing 21 aid. Without a hearing aid, plaintiff lacks the ability for effective communication and, at times, he 22 fears for his life. He cannot enjoy activities such as phone calls or RV or radio. He has also 23 missed hearing alarms, which he claims places himself, staff, and other inmates at risk of injury 24 from responding officers. 25 B. Hepatitis C Treatment 26 Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis C in 2008. Since then, plaintiff has sought 27 treatment for the condition, but each request was denied because his viral load was deemed too 28 low. In 2017, plaintiff’s primary care physician at another institution started the process of getting 1 plaintiff started on the treatment. However, plaintiff was then transferred to CSATF where Dr. 2 Merritt “stopped the treatment plan.” 3 III. Discussion 4 A. Improper Joinder 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 20 provides, 6 All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right 7 to relief arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact 8 common to all defendants will arise in the action. 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (emphasis added). Further, Rule 21 provides that where parties are 10 misjoined, they may be “dropped or added by order of the court ... on such terms as are just.” Fed. 11 R. Civ. P. 21; Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). 12 Rule 20(a) requires that a plaintiff cannot assert unrelated claims against different 13 defendants. In his first amended complaint, plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim against 14 all the defendants for their alleged failure to provide him batteries for his hearing aid. He also 15 brings a separate claim against Dr. Merritt for the allegedly improper denial of treatment for 16 plaintiff’s Hepatitis C. These allegations do not arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence or 17 series of transactions or occurrences” and there is no overlap of law or facts between the denial of 18 batteries for a hearing aid and the alleged denial of treatment for Hepatitis C. Plaintiff will 19 therefore be directed to identify which of the two claims he wishes to proceed with in this action. 20 The remaining claim must be alleged in a separate complaint filed in a separate action. 21 B. Official v. Individual Capacity Claims 22 Plaintiff brings claims against the defendants in their individual and official capacities, 23 and the relief he seeks includes injunctive relief and damages. Plaintiff is hereby informed that 24 the Eleventh Amendment bars actions seeking damages from state officials acting in their official 25 capacities. See Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 26 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Eleventh Amendment does not, however, bar suits 27 against state officials acting in their personal capacities. See id. Under the doctrine of Ex Parte 28 Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for prospective 1 declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. See Armstrong v. 2 Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 1997). 3 C. Eighth Amendment 4 Where a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims arise in the context of medical care, the 5 prisoner must allege and prove “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 6 indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). An Eighth 7 Amendment medical claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and 8 the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 9 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 10 Cir. 1997) (en banc). 11 A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat the condition could result in further 12 significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 13 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of 14 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and 15 he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant 16 is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk 17 by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. “It is enough that the official acted 18 or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.” Id. at 842. 19 In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a 20 prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be 21 substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause 22 of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 23 429 U.S. at 105–06). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating 24 a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 25 Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the 26 victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 27 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate 28 indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1 1990). Additionally, a prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support 2 a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 3 Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. 4 at 104-05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from a delay in providing care, a 5 plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th 6 Cir. 1994); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 7 1990); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). In this 8 regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would provide 9 additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his 10 needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 11 1060. In addition, a physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that 12 inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 13 1989) (per curiam). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some 14 treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. 15 a. Batteries for Hearing Aid 16 Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim based on the allegations related to his hearing 17 aid. Though plaintiff alleges that he is hearing impaired and needs a hearing aid for 18 communication and safety, the remainder of his allegations are imprecise. For example, plaintiff 19 accuses LVN Archiega of refusing to exchange batteries for the hearing aid, suggesting that 20 plaintiff was unable to use his hearing aid. However, he also suggests that LVN Archiega merely 21 deprived plaintiff of his spare batteries, suggesting that plaintiff possessed enough batteries for 22 his hearing aid and merely was unable to possess additional batteries. Because these allegations 23 make it impossible for the Court to properly analyze this claim, plaintiff’s pleading must be 24 dismissed. 25 b, Treatment for Hepatitis C 26 In addition, plaintiff’s allegations against Dr. Merritt are too conclusory to state a claim. 27 He alleges only that this defendant “stopped the treatment plan” for Hepatitis C. Without more, 28 1 plaintiff’s claim appears to be based solely on a disagreement with Dr. Merritt about the proper 2 course of treatment for plaintiff’s medical condition. This is insufficient to proceed. 3 IV. Conclusion 4 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 5 The Court will grant plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 6 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If plaintiff does not wish to amend, he may instead file a notice 7 of voluntary dismissal, and the action then will be terminated by operation of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Alternatively, plaintiff may forego amendment and notify the Court that he wishes 9 to stand on his complaint. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) 10 (plaintiff may elect to forego amendment). If the last option is chosen, findings and 11 recommendations will issue to dismiss the complaint without leave to amend, plaintiff will have an 12 opportunity to object, and the matter will be decided by a District Judge. 13 If plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation 14 of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 15 matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 16 555 (2007)). Plaintiff should note that although he has been granted the opportunity to amend his 17 complaint, it is not for the purposes of adding new and unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 18 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully review this screening order and focus his efforts 19 on curing the deficiencies set forth above. 20 Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 21 complete without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint 22 supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an 23 amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer serves a function in the case. Id. 24 Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement 25 of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly titled, in 26 bold font, “Second Amended Complaint,” reference the appropriate case number, and be an original 27 signed under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 28 1 Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 2 above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 3 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 4 1. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file either a 5 second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 6 order, a notice of voluntary dismissal, or a notice of election to stand on the first 7 amended complaint; and 8 2. If plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal, 9 the Court will recommend the action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to 10 obey a court order and failure to state a claim. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

13 Dated: January 29, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14

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