(PC) McPherson v. Carpenter

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 11, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00202
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) McPherson v. Carpenter ((PC) McPherson v. Carpenter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) McPherson v. Carpenter, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAELL BRUCE ANTHONY No. 2:25-cv-0202 DC CSK P MCPHERSON, 12 ORDER Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 B. CARPENTER, 15 Defendant. 16

17 18 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 19 § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 20 proceeding was referred to this Court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 21 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 22 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 23 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 24 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will 26 direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 27 and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly 28 payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 1 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 2 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 3 § 1915(b)(2). 4 As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 5 I. SCREENING STANDARDS 6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 8 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally 9 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 10 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 11 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 12 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 13 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 14 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 15 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 16 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 17 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 18 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 19 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 20 1227. 21 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 22 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 23 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 24 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 25 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 26 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 27 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 28 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 1 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 2 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 3 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 4 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 5 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 6 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 7 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 8 On March 1, 2024, plaintiff was going to work in the lunchroom at High Desert State 9 Prison (“HDSP”), and defendant commented he was going to make everyone strip naked. 10 Plaintiff responded, “that’s illegal, you know you can’t do that.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Defendant 11 replied, “I ain’t gonna see nothing anyway.” (Id.) While plaintiff was on his way to mental 12 health, defendant stripped plaintiff down naked, and while he was searching plaintiff’s clothes, 13 looked directly at plaintiff’s penis. (Id.) Plaintiff confronted defendant and never went back to 14 work again. Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment, and as injury, claims he was humiliated, 15 embarrassed, and suffered psychological trauma. 16 III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 17 Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a prison official is a violation of the Eighth 18 Amendment. Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Schwenk v. 19 Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In evaluating a prisoner’s claim, courts consider 20 whether ‘the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ and if the alleged 21 wrongdoing was objectively ‘harmful enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.” Wood, 692 22 F.3d at 1046 (alteration in original) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). As 23 “sexual assault serves no valid penological purpose . . . where an inmate can prove that a prison 24 guard committed a sexual assault, we presume the guard acted maliciously and sadistically for the 25 very purpose of causing harm, and the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment claim is 26 satisfied.” Bearchild v.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Raymond Watison v. Mary Carter
668 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Lance Wood v. Tom Beauclair
692 F.3d 1041 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Sergio Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino
806 F.3d 1002 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Elliott v. United States
16 F.2d 164 (D. Maine, 1926)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
(PC) McPherson v. Carpenter, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-mcpherson-v-carpenter-caed-2025.