Elliott v. United States

16 F.2d 164, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 6400, 1926 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1577, 1927 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 7032, 6 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 6400
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedNovember 16, 1926
DocketNo. 36
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 16 F.2d 164 (Elliott v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Elliott v. United States, 16 F.2d 164, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 6400, 1926 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1577, 1927 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 7032, 6 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 6400 (D. Me. 1926).

Opinion

HALE, District Judge.

The petitioner, a resident of Thomaston, Me., brings this petition under the Tucker Act (24 Stat. 505), authorizing him to sue the United States to recover back income taxes paid in 1919 for 1918, and in 1920 for 1919, upon his shares in three wooden vessels, namely V64 of the schooner Margaret Throop, of 1,800 tons dead weight capacity, V«4 of the barkentine Cecil P. Stewart, of 1,800 tons, */64 of the barkentine Reine Marie Stewart, of-2,000 tons. He claims amortization upon each of these ships under section 214, subd. a (9) of the Revenue Act of 1918, passed by Congress February 24, 1919 (Comp. St. § 6336%g). The section is as follows:

“In the case of buildings, machinery, equipment, or other facilities, constructed, erected, installed, or acquired, on or after April 6, 1917, for the production of articles contributing to the prosecution of the present war, and in the case of vessels constructed or acquired on or after such date for the transportation of articles or men contributing to the prosecution of the present war, there shall be allowed a reasonable deduction for the amortization of such part of the cost of such facilities or vessels as has been borne by the taxpayer, but not again including any amount otherwise allowed under this title or previous acts of Congress as a deduction in computing net income. At any time within three years after the termination of the present war, the Commissioner may, and at the request of the taxpayer shall, re-examine the return, and if he then finds as a result of an appraisal or from other evidence that the deduction originally allowed was incorrect, the taxes imposed by this title and by title III for the year or years affected shall be redetermined; and the amount of tax due upon such redetermination, if any, shall be paid upon notice and demand by the collector, or the amount of tax overpaid, if any, shall be credited or refunded to the taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of section 252.”

The clear object of the statute is to relieve a man from being taxed upon his ships, in ease he has had no actual income from them after setting off his losses.

Amortization has not been dealt with much in the courts. The lexicographers hold it to mean “the sum paid * 4 * toward the extinction of a liability.” The best defination I find is in Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure, 1922, as follows:

“To amortize means ‘to destroy; kill; deaden.’ Therefore a reasonable deduction for amortization means a deduction sufficient to destroy or kill or deaden the values on the hooks which represent plant or equipment used for war purposes. If the effective or usable value has disappeared entirely, the book value must be entirely killed (amortized). If the effective or usable value has only partly disappeared, the book must be killed (amortized) to an extent which will leave a remaining book value representing only the actual worth of the asset.”

In the Congressional Record of February 17, 1919, is found a statement made in the discussion of the 1918 act, before its passage, and which shows the concurrent understanding of the word’s meaning:

“If by reason of the investment of his profits in an extension of his yards, the ship owner has constructed a plant which was necessary in time of war to meet the demands which were made upon him at that time for production, but which after the termination of the war has depreciated in value because not needed; in that case under the amortization provisions he will be allowed to amortize to the full extent of the depreciation in value.”

The questions now before this court are whether the ships of the petitioner come within the act; and, if they do, what amortization is to be allowed upon each ship. It appears that the Commissioner allowed, in principle, the petitioner’s claim in reference to the Margaret Throop and the Cecil P. Stewart, but denied it as to the barkentine Reine Marie Stewart, and the petitioner now seeks, first, to obtain a larger amount of amortization than was allowed by the Commissioner on the first two vessels; and, see[166]*166ond, to establish liability, and fix the amount of amortization, on the barkentine Reine Marie Stewart.

It will be seen that, in amortizing the cost of shipping, the act directs that the cost of construction be compared with what has come to be called the “post-war residual value,” namely, the value to which the vessels had sunk when we consider them as assets after the war, in the period of three years from March 3, 1921, called the “post-war period” ; for the date of the termination of the war is fixed- by the statute of March 3, 1921 (Comp. St. § 311514/i5f), as follows:

“In the interpretation of any provision relating to the duration or date of the termination of the present war or of the present or existing emergency, meaning thereby the war between the Imperial German government and the Imperial and Royal AustroHungarian government and the government and people of the United States, in any acts of Congress, joint resolutions, or proclamations of the President containing provisions contingent upon the duration or the date of the termination of. such war or of such present or existing emergency, the date when this resolution becomes effective shall be construed and treated as the date of the termination of the war or of the present or existing emergency, notwithstanding any provision in any act of Congress or joint resolution providing any other mode of determining the date of such termination.” •

The petitioner offered testimony tending to prove his claim relating both to values and to liability. No testimony was offered by the government. Upon the subject of .values the petitioner qualified as an expert, and placed the residual value of the ships, during the post-war period, at $7.50 per ton-in the case of each ship. He testified to the sale of his own fractional interest in the Margaret Throop at $5.50 per ton in August, 1924, at which time the other fractional interests of the managing owners were also sold, and the management of the vessel. changed. August, 1924, is outisde of the post-war period, but close enough to it to be material and relevant. The petitioner called an expert of long standing in local shipping matters, who placed sailing ship values as being, early in the post-war period, $10 per ton, and at the end of the period nothing. In his opinion, at the end of the period they had become valueless, or a liability.

No testimony was offered.tending to show that values had changed between the end of the period and the sale by the petitioner.

The above figures tend to show, by average, a post-war residual value of $5.00. The expert testified to six purchases which he regarded as comparable, the purchases having been made by him all early in 1922, at prices which ran from $3.76 to $6.20 per ton.

The earning power of the vessels in question is relevant and material, as tending to show their value or lack of value. The evidence in the case was that during the postwar period, and up to the present date, such vessels as the three in question had no earning power. The petitioner testified that none of the three had made any actual net earnings in the post-war period; nor had any of the other vessels operated by his firm.

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16 F.2d 164, 6 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 6400, 1926 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1577, 1927 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 7032, 6 A.F.T.R. (RIA) 6400, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/elliott-v-united-states-med-1926.