JAMES LEE MATHEWS, No. 2:23-cv-00922-DC-SCR P Plaintiff, v. ORDER Defendants. Plaintiff is a former county inmate who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On June 5, 2024, the previously assigned magistrate judge vacated the recommendation that this action be dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint after discovering that plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) was entered as a new case.1 (ECF No. 13.) The FAC (ECF No. 14) is now before the court for screening. For the reasons set forth below, the FAC states a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment against County of Sacramento but no other cognizable claims. Plaintiff may proceed on the claim stated or may file a second amended complaint under the guidelines set forth below. The court further grants plaintiff the option to file a letter describing any current circumstances that warrant the appointment of counsel.
1 The complaint was assigned case number 2:23-cv-1021-DB (E.D. Cal.) and was also entitled Mathews v. County of Sacramento, et al. The complaint did not bear the case number for this case and the boxes for both “original complaint” and “amended complaint” were checked. I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). II. Factual Allegations of the First Amended Complaint Plaintiff’s FAC is a handwritten, 16-page document that is difficult to follow and illegible at times. Its caption page (ECF No. 14 at 1) and its attachment (Id. at 7-8) list County of Sacramento, UC Davis Medical Center,2 and ten individuals as defendants: Sheriff Jim Cooper; Captain Yee; Captain Vaden Vanessa; Lt. A. Leahy; Dep. Petersen; Psyche Dr., RCCC; Psyche Dr. Main Jail; Psyche Nurse; Public Defender Mike Mallen; and Public Defender Anthony Crisostamo. Plaintiff claims violations of the “right to treatment and to be free of cruel and
2 The FAC alternatively lists the seventh defendant as “UC Davis Medical Center” and “UC Davis Psyche Services.” For screening purposes, the court treats them as one single entity. unusual punishment,” a violation of “due process and equal protection of laws,” and a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at 3-5.) He requests one million dollars in damages. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges he has cognitive, developmental, and mental disabilities, including diagnoses of written language disorder of written expression, dyslexia, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (ECF No. 14 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that upon arrest and incarceration in the Sacramento County Jail, all prescribed medications were “abruptly terminated (against medication warning)” and withheld during incarceration. Plaintiff states that he was not seen by a psychiatrist and did not receive the full dose of his psychiatric medication in the first two months of his incarceration at Sacramento County Jail. After he sent a letter to the court, a nurse called him out to the hallway and said he would receive his psychiatric medications. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges he is “entitled to an accommodation by way of a scribe” due to courts’ past rejections of his documents for illegibility. (Id. at 12.) He claims this accommodation and his related grievances have been denied. (Id.) He cannot meaningfully access the courts as a result. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he has “been able to make massive improvements” with medication but struggles with SSRI inhibitor withdrawal and an inability to communicate when medications are “abruptly terminated.” (ECF No. 14 at 4.) Only “trained people or loved ones” can understand him in this state. (Id. at 12.) His PTSD is now so bad that he sweats profusely, convulses, and has nightmares. (Id. at 4.) III. Discussion a. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, plaintiff must show that the government “had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [plaintiff] suffered.” See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must also show that the policy or custom of the government “reflects deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Unless the challenged policy is in writing, the municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant's “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a claim for relief under § 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. i. Fourteenth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care Plaintiff appears to have been a pretrial detainee during the events in the FAC.3 As such, the court construes plaintiff’s claim for denial of the “right to treatment and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment” as alleging inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). “[T]he elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. “[C]laims for violations of the right to adequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.” Id. at 1122–25 (relying on Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070). The court considers the County of Sacramento’s potential municipal liability under Monell. Construing the FAC in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the FAC alleges that the Sacramento County Jail has an intentional policy or custom of “abruptly terminat[ing]” prescriptions upon incarceration and delaying access to psychiatric care. (ECF No. 14 at 3.) The FAC’s allegations that support a showing of deliberate indifference include claims that the jail’s withholding of medication is against the medication’s warnings. (Id.); see Castro, 833 F.3d at 1076 (holding that the deliberate indifference standard for municipal liability under § 1983 is an 3 On its own motion, the court takes judicial notice of case information pertaining to the state criminal case underlying the allegations in the FAC. See Case No. 20FE003567, https://services.saccourt.ca.gov/PublicCaseAccess/Criminal/CaseDetails?sourceSystemId=8&sou rceKey=1670425. objective inquiry). Finally, plaintiff alleges that withholding access to his medication and psychiatric care caused SSRI inhibitor withdrawal, communication difficulties and worsening PTSD. (ECF No. 14 at 4.) For screening purposes, Plaintiff has minimally pled a Monell claim for inadequate medical care against County of Sacramento. Plaintiff has not adequately pled a connection or link between any other defendant and the alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care. In fact, outside of the caption page and its attachment, the FAC does not reference any defendant besides the County of Sacramento. At least six of the ten individual defendants are alleged to work at the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center (RCCC), but the FAC’s allegations all appear to have occurred at Sacramento County Jail. Further, plaintiff’s claims against public defenders Mallen and Crisostamo cannot survive screening because court-appointed attorneys representing indigent defendants are not state actors within the meaning of § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981) (public defenders do not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions); Rivera v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 391 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014) (same; citing Polk, 454 U.S. at 325). In sum, the court finds that Plaintiff has pled a Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against the County of Sacramento but no other defendants. ii. Due Process and Equal Protection of Laws The court finds it difficult to determine which Fourteenth Amendment cause of action plaintiff intends to plead with this claim. Regardless, the FAC does not link this claim to any defendant. The claim’s “supporting facts” consist of general complaints regarding the criminal justice system’s treatment of people with disabilities. (See ECF No. 14 at 5.) Because of the absence of a connection between any defendants and an alleged violation of plaintiff’s own rights, the FAC fails to state a claim for relief on either due process or equal protection grounds. b. Title II of the ADA Under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is “otherwise qualified” to participate in or receive the benefit of the entity’s services, programs, or activities, i.e., he meets the essential eligibility requirements of the entity, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the entity is a public entity. Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). “A disability discrimination claim may be based on ‘one of three theories of liability: disparate treatment, disparate impact, or failure to make a reasonable accommodation.’” Payan v. Los Angeles Community College District, 11 F.4th 729, 738 (quoting Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 260 (2d Cir. 2016)). In contrast to a Title II disparate impact claim, which “is focused on modifying a policy or practice to improve systemic accessibility,” a Title II “reasonable accommodation claim is focused on an accommodation based on an individualized request or need[.]” Id. In addition, “[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA ... a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). Only state and local government entities can be held liable under Title II of the ADA. See Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1045; Everett H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elem. Sch. Dist., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1181 (E.D. Cal. 2014). As such, plaintiff cannot bring an ADA claim against any of the ten individual defendants. The court then will consider whether the FAC states a claim for relief against County of Sacramento and UC Davis Medical Center. The FAC adequately pleads that plaintiff has ADHD, PTSD, and other disabilities that substantially limit him in the major life activities of communicating, reading, and writing. (ECF No. 14 at 4; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102.) But the FAC does not identify the public entity alleged to have refused plaintiff his accommodation of a scribe and denied his related grievances. This portion of the FAC repeatedly uses “they” to describe the alleged wrongdoer, but it is unclear whether this refers to County of Sacramento, UC Davis Medical Center, or some other public entity or individual. Accordingly, the FAC lacks adequate linkage to state a claim for relief under Title II of the ADA. IV. Conclusion After conducting the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court finds that plaintiff’s FAC states a potentially cognizable Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against defendant County of Sacramento but states no other claims. Based on the court’s screening, plaintiff will be given a choice. Plaintiff may proceed immediately against defendant County of Sacramento on the Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim or file an amended complaint. If plaintiff chooses to proceed on his inadequate medical care claim, he will voluntarily dismiss all remaining defendants and claims. If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint should be titled “Second Amended Complaint” and reference case number 2:23-cv-00922. The second amended complaint must demonstrate how the conditions about which plaintiff complains resulted in a deprivation of his own constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Also, it must specifically identify how each named defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Starr, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08. Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make his amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint replaces the prior complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, in an amended complaint, every claim and every defendant must be included. V. Appointment of Counsel Plaintiff states in the FAC that because his disabilities affect his ability to read and write, he would “greatly appreciate the appointment of counsel.” (ECF No. 14 at 14.) If not, then he requests a “court order” telling the Sacramento County Sheriff to allow him two sessions in the law library per week with a trained staff as an accommodation “so that I could enjoy my right to meaningful access to the court.” (Id.) District courts lack authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request that an attorney voluntarily represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. Wood, 900 F.2d at 1335; Riley v. Franke, 340 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787 (E.D. Wis. 2018). Beyond § 1915(e)(1), other sources of law may implicate a request for counsel. For example, appointed counsel may be required in a civil proceeding as an accommodation for a litigant who is disabled. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492, at *3-*9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (granting summary judgment to class of mentally disabled individuals in civil immigration proceedings on their request for appointed representatives under the Rehabilitation Act). Due process may also require appointment of counsel in certain proceedings. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444-45 (2011) (analyzing request for appointment of counsel in civil proceeding under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), procedural due process framework). Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. Considering plaintiff’s changed circumstances, the court cannot analyze whether the alleged difficulties plaintiff faced in Sacramento County Jail warrant the appointment of counsel. However, because of plaintiff’s pro se status and the apparent disability-related reasons for his inability to heed the court’s prior instructions to write legibly (see ECF No. 11 at 2, n.2), the court will give plaintiff 30 days to submit a short letter of no more than five pages explaining whether there are current, exceptional circumstances that require the court to consider the appointment of counsel. VI. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer One of the allegations in the first amended complaint state a claim against a defendant and the rest do not. The allegation that Sacramento County Jail took away your medication when you entered the jail states a claim for inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment against Sacramento County. None of your other allegations stated a claim because you didn’t link specific individuals or public entities to the alleged violations. You have a choice to make. You may either (1) proceed immediately on your Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against Sacramento County and voluntarily dismiss the other claims; or (2) try to amend the complaint. You may fill out and mail the attached “Notice of Election” form to let the court know what choice you made. Lastly, because you are no longer incarcerated, the court does not know whether you are still having trouble accessing the courts. The court asks you to submit a short letter within 30 days explaining whether you still seek appoint of counsel and your reasons why. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. The Clerk's Office shall send plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form. 2. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states a cognizable claim for inadequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment against defendant County of Sacramento but no other cognizable claims. 3. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on his Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against County of Sacramento or to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff chooses to proceed on his cognizable claim in the complaint, he shall voluntarily dismiss his other claims and defendants. 4. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this order plaintiff shall notify the court how he chooses to proceed. Plaintiff may use the “Notice of Election” form included with this order for this purpose. 5. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, plaintiff may file a short letter of no more than five pages explaining whether there are current, exceptional circumstances that require the court to consider the appointment of counsel. 6. Plaintiff is warned that his failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. DATED: January 29, 2025 Emde SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11
JAMES LEE MATHEWS, No. 2:23-cv-00922-DC-SCR P Plaintiff, v. NOTICE OF ELECTION Defendants. Check one: _____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against defendant County of Sacramento without amending the complaint. Plaintiff understands that by choosing this option, the remaining defendants will be voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). _____ Plaintiff wants time to file an amended complaint. DATED:_______________________
James Lee Mathews Plaintiff pro se