8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 JOSE ANTONIO MARTINEZ, 1:19-cv-00378-NONE-GSA-PC
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 13 vs. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BE DENIED 14 M. NAVARRO, et al., (ECF No. 36.)
15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS 16
17 18 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Jose Antonio Martinez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 21 pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case now proceeds with 22 Plaintiff’s original complaint filed on March 22, 2019, against defendants Sergeant M. Navarro, 23 C/O Navarro, C/O E. Mares, and C/O Cruz (“Defendants”), for use of excessive force in violation 24 of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1.) 25 On May 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for removal of C/O D. Navarro from 4A Yard, 26 and to keep all staff involved away from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 36.) On May 25, 2021, Defendants 27 filed an opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 37.) 28 1 The motion is now before the court. L.R. 230(l). The court construes this motion as a 2 motion for preliminary injunctive relief, or a temporary restraining order. 3 II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4 Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has 5 personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See 6 Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one 7 “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of 8 summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served 9 must appear to defend). Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court 10 jurisdiction over prison officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491– 11 93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court’s jurisdiction 12 is limited to the parties in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is 13 proceeding. Summers, 555 U.S. at 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. The court may not attempt 14 to determine the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 15 245 U.S. 229, 234-35, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 16 (9th Cir. 1983); Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F.Supp. 953, 961 17 (M.D. Fl. 1993); Kandlbinder v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Suster v. 18 Marshall, 952 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 19 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to give 20 only the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) 21 an injunction binds only “the parties to the action,” their “officers, agents, servants, employees, 22 and attorneys,” and “other persons who are in active concert or participation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 65(d)(2)(A)-(C). 24 A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 25 may impose without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 26 moving party “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result 27 to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 28 The substantive purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction 1 hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent irreparable 2 loss of rights prior to judgment. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto 3 Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974). But the legal standard 4 that applies to a motion for a TRO is the same as a motion for a preliminary injunction. See 5 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 7 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted); Epona v. Cty. of Ventura, 8 876 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 9 establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 10 the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 11 injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction 12 may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation 13 omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 14 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 15 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 16 Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 17 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly 18 drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 19 least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Section 3626(a)(2) 20 also places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to 21 inmates. “Section 3626(a) therefore operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of 22 federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators – no longer may courts 23 grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional 24 minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 III. PARTIES’ POSITIONS 26 Plaintiff seeks to have all staff involved on a “keep away” status during this case because 27 they have a habit of encouraging violence against inmates with their “friends” who work on 28 Plaintiff’s yard. (ECF No.
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11 JOSE ANTONIO MARTINEZ, 1:19-cv-00378-NONE-GSA-PC
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 13 vs. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BE DENIED 14 M. NAVARRO, et al., (ECF No. 36.)
15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS 16
17 18 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Jose Antonio Martinez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 21 pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case now proceeds with 22 Plaintiff’s original complaint filed on March 22, 2019, against defendants Sergeant M. Navarro, 23 C/O Navarro, C/O E. Mares, and C/O Cruz (“Defendants”), for use of excessive force in violation 24 of the Eighth Amendment. (ECF No. 1.) 25 On May 6, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion for removal of C/O D. Navarro from 4A Yard, 26 and to keep all staff involved away from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 36.) On May 25, 2021, Defendants 27 filed an opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 37.) 28 1 The motion is now before the court. L.R. 230(l). The court construes this motion as a 2 motion for preliminary injunctive relief, or a temporary restraining order. 3 II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4 Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has 5 personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See 6 Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one 7 “becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of 8 summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served 9 must appear to defend). Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court 10 jurisdiction over prison officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491– 11 93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court’s jurisdiction 12 is limited to the parties in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is 13 proceeding. Summers, 555 U.S. at 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. The court may not attempt 14 to determine the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 15 245 U.S. 229, 234-35, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 16 (9th Cir. 1983); Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F.Supp. 953, 961 17 (M.D. Fl. 1993); Kandlbinder v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Suster v. 18 Marshall, 952 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 19 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to give 20 only the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) 21 an injunction binds only “the parties to the action,” their “officers, agents, servants, employees, 22 and attorneys,” and “other persons who are in active concert or participation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 65(d)(2)(A)-(C). 24 A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 25 may impose without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 26 moving party “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result 27 to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 28 The substantive purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction 1 hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent irreparable 2 loss of rights prior to judgment. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto 3 Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974). But the legal standard 4 that applies to a motion for a TRO is the same as a motion for a preliminary injunction. See 5 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 7 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted); Epona v. Cty. of Ventura, 8 876 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 9 establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 10 the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 11 injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction 12 may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation 13 omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 14 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 15 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 16 Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 17 Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly 18 drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 19 least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Section 3626(a)(2) 20 also places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to 21 inmates. “Section 3626(a) therefore operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of 22 federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators – no longer may courts 23 grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional 24 minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 25 III. PARTIES’ POSITIONS 26 Plaintiff seeks to have all staff involved on a “keep away” status during this case because 27 they have a habit of encouraging violence against inmates with their “friends” who work on 28 Plaintiff’s yard. (ECF No. 36 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff asserts that these “friends” have a tendency to beat 1 up inmates, so Plaintiff is always on “high alert” when D. Navarro is walking around on 4A Yard. 2 (Id.) Plaintiff argues that D. Navarro should be moved because Plaintiff is in R.C.G.P and is 3 A.D.A. and therefore cannot be transferred, but D. Navarro can be placed on another yard. 4 In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because the court 5 does not have jurisdiction over “all staff;” is not supported by an affidavit; and Plaintiff fails to 6 provide specific facts showing that he is entitled to the requested relief. 7 Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not identified the other officers or “all staff,” and the 8 court does not have jurisdiction over non-parties; no details to explain what “habit of encouraging 9 violence” Plaintiff is referencing; and no facts about any other altercations with other inmates or 10 whether those altercations had anything to do with Plaintiff or this case. Defendants argue that 11 Plaintiff’s motion is based purely on speculation and unsupported by articulable facts. 12 IV. DISCUSSION 13 First, the court cannot opine at this early stage of the proceedings whether Plaintiff is 14 likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. Second, while defendant D. Navarro has appeared 15 in this case, the “other staff” referred to by Plaintiff are not identified and the court does not have 16 jurisdiction over them to order injunctive relief that would require them to take action or refrain 17 from acting. Zepeda v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 18 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the 19 parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights 20 of persons not before the court.”). Third, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that he is likely 21 to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in 22 his favor, or that an injunction is in the public interest. 23 Plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to the preliminary relief he requests and 24 therefore, his motion should be denied. 25 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 26 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for 27 preliminary injunctive relief, filed on May 6, 2021, should be DENIED. 28 1 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 2 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 3 (14) days after the date of service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file 4 written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 5 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served 6 and filed within ten days after the objections are filed. The parties are advised that failure to file 7 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 8 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 9 (9th Cir. 1991)). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11
12 Dated: July 8, 2021 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13
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