(PC) Marsala v. Diaz

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedApril 2, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00513
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Marsala v. Diaz ((PC) Marsala v. Diaz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Marsala v. Diaz, (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH AUGUST MARSALA, No. 2:19-cv-0513 KJM CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 RALPH DIAZ, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of civil rights 18 under 42 U.S.C. §1983. On July 27, 2019, the court screened plaintiff’s complaint as the court is 19 required to do under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court found plaintiff’s complaint did not state a 20 claim upon which relief could be granted, gave plaintiff leave to amend, and provided plaintiff 21 with instructions and guidance as to the contents of his amended complaint. Plaintiff has now 22 filed an amended complaint. 23 As plaintiff now knows, the court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners 24 seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 25 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must 26 contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 27 entitled to relief.” 28 ///// 1 The body of plaintiff’s amended complaint is 17 pages, mostly single spaced. Plaintiff 2 identifies 15 defendants, and the allegations span numerous events occurring over at least a year. 3 Much of the information included in the amended complaint is vague, confusing, not relevant to 4 stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, and / or unnecessary background information. 5 With respect to some of the defendants, plaintiff fails to make any allegations suggesting personal 6 participation in any of the deprivations alleged. Liability in a 42 U.S.C. §1983 case “arises only 7 upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 8 (9th Cir. 1989). 9 As plaintiff’s amended complaint is not “short and plain,” it must be dismissed. The court 10 will, however, grant leave to file a second amended complaint. 11 If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, the complaint must comply with 12 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To that end, the second amended complaint may 13 not exceed 20 pages double spaced with normal type and font. The allegations must be clear and 14 concise. Unnecessary background information and any other information not relevant to stating a 15 claim upon which relief can be granted shall be omitted. 16 Also, plaintiff may bring as many claims as he likes against a particular defendant in his 17 second amended complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). But, claims brought against other defendants 18 must arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” as a 19 claim against the first defendant. Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Vague allegations concerning 20 conspiracy do not satisfy court rules regarding joinder of claims. 21 As to the specific contents of his second amended complaint, plaintiff is advised as 22 follows: 23 1. In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in his second amended 24 complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a 25 deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, see Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980), 26 alleging in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. Also, in order to avoid 27 dismissal for failure to state a claim must have facial plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 28 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 1 2. Plaintiff is advised that under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) “[n]o action shall be brought with 2 respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a 3 prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 4 remedies as are available are exhausted.” 5 3. Prison officials generally cannot retaliate against inmates for exercising First 6 Amendment rights. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985). Because a prisoner’s 7 First Amendment rights are necessarily curtailed, however, a successful retaliation claim requires 8 a finding that “the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the 9 correctional institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Id. at 532. 10 The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional 11 goals for the conduct of which he complains. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). 12 Also, in order to state a claim for retaliation, plaintiff must point to facts indicating a 13 causal connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct. Watison v. Carter, 668 14 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). 15 4. Prisoners do not have “a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison 16 grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. 17 Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, the prison grievance procedure does 18 not confer any substantive constitutional rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing and 19 denying inmate appeals generally do not serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. Id. 20 5. In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment with respect to conditions of 21 confinement, plaintiff must point to facts demonstrating he suffered injury as a result of a prison 22 official’s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 23 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 24 6. In order to state a cognizable claim for violation of due process a plaintiff must allege 25 facts which suggest that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. With respect to prisoners, 26 liberty interests are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the 27 sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of 28 its own force, [citations omitted], nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the 1 inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 2 (1995). 3 7. The law with respect to an inmate’s right to access to courts was discussed in detail by 4 the United States Supreme Court in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Sandin v. Conner
515 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Edwards v. Balisok
520 U.S. 641 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Shirk v. Vista Unified School District
164 P.3d 630 (California Supreme Court, 2007)
Ramirez v. Galaza
334 F.3d 850 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Ellis v. Cassidy
625 F.2d 227 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
Rizzo v. Dawson
778 F.2d 527 (Ninth Circuit, 1985)
Taylor v. List
880 F.2d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
(PC) Marsala v. Diaz, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-marsala-v-diaz-caed-2020.