VUSAL MANAFOV, No. 2:19-cv-0337-MCE-EFB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER E. ARNOLD, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). For the reasons stated below, the request is granted but his complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff’s application, and separately-filed trust account statement (ECF No. 5), make the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening I. Legal Standards The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). II. Analysis Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening because it fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and any potentially viable claims are not properly joined together in this lawsuit. First, plaintiff claims that defendants Douglas, Arnold, and Allen’s processing of his administrative appeal denied him due process. Inmates, however, have no standalone rights with respect to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Cate, No. 1:09-cv-00468-0WW-YNP PC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107920, 2009 WL 3789597, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in the vindication of his administrative claims.”). Second, plaintiff complains that on April 22, 2017, he was denied his right to pray as a Muslim in violation of the First Amendment. The allegations, however, are too scarce to show that any specific defendant improperly curtailed plaintiff’s right to exercise his religion. An inmate’s right to exercise religious practices, “may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The complaint does not include factual context to show what acts curtailed his right to pray and whether those acts were pursuant to a legitimate correctional or security objective. In any amended complaint, should plaintiff wish to pursue this claim, he must allege which defendant preventing him from praying and how that restriction was not in furtherance of any legitimate correctional goals. Third, plaintiff’s complaint is plainly deficient insofar as it attempts to bring multiple, unrelated claims against multiple defendants. Plaintiff alleges the following claims arising out of events that occurred on or around April 22, 2017: (1) defendant Rosario applied excessive force; (2) defendants Leau, Brown, Douglas, Ocang, Ogunlaye, Chusorki, Corra, McGee, and Rohrer were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs; and (3) Officers Samaniego and ///// Hanlon conducted an unreasonable strip search. It is well settled that a claimant may not proceed with various unrelated claims against separate defendants: “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross- claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelat
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VUSAL MANAFOV, No. 2:19-cv-0337-MCE-EFB P Plaintiff, v. ORDER E. ARNOLD, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). For the reasons stated below, the request is granted but his complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Plaintiff’s application, and separately-filed trust account statement (ECF No. 5), make the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). Screening I. Legal Standards The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). II. Analysis Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening because it fails to state a cognizable claim for relief and any potentially viable claims are not properly joined together in this lawsuit. First, plaintiff claims that defendants Douglas, Arnold, and Allen’s processing of his administrative appeal denied him due process. Inmates, however, have no standalone rights with respect to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Cate, No. 1:09-cv-00468-0WW-YNP PC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107920, 2009 WL 3789597, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in the vindication of his administrative claims.”). Second, plaintiff complains that on April 22, 2017, he was denied his right to pray as a Muslim in violation of the First Amendment. The allegations, however, are too scarce to show that any specific defendant improperly curtailed plaintiff’s right to exercise his religion. An inmate’s right to exercise religious practices, “may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The complaint does not include factual context to show what acts curtailed his right to pray and whether those acts were pursuant to a legitimate correctional or security objective. In any amended complaint, should plaintiff wish to pursue this claim, he must allege which defendant preventing him from praying and how that restriction was not in furtherance of any legitimate correctional goals. Third, plaintiff’s complaint is plainly deficient insofar as it attempts to bring multiple, unrelated claims against multiple defendants. Plaintiff alleges the following claims arising out of events that occurred on or around April 22, 2017: (1) defendant Rosario applied excessive force; (2) defendants Leau, Brown, Douglas, Ocang, Ogunlaye, Chusorki, Corra, McGee, and Rohrer were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs; and (3) Officers Samaniego and ///// Hanlon conducted an unreasonable strip search. It is well settled that a claimant may not proceed with various unrelated claims against separate defendants: “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross- claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the alleged events occurred close in time, plaintiff’s claims encompass discrete events involving separate defendants that are ill- suited to proceed in a single suit. Indeed, each subset of allegations poses entirely separate questions – both legally and factually – from the others. Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.1 Leave to Amend Plaintiff is cautioned that any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). Plaintiff may also include any allegations based on state law that are so closely related to his federal allegations that “they form the same case or controversy.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The amended complaint must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). /////
1 Plaintiff has also failed to properly plead his state tort law claims of assault, battery, and negligence. The California Torts Claims Act (“Act”) requires that a party seeking to recover money damages from a public entity or its employees submit a claim to the entity before filing suit in court, generally no later than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945, 950.2 (emphasis added). When a plaintiff asserts a claim subject to the Act, he must affirmatively allege compliance with the claim presentation procedure, or circumstances excusing such compliance, in his complaint. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 209 (2007). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of such allegations. Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See George, 507 F.3d at 607. Nor, as mentioned above, may he bring unrelated claims against multiple defendants. Id. Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)). Any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in fulfilling the above requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of procedural or factual background which has no bearing on his legal claims. He should also take pains to ensure that his amended complaint is as legible as possible. This refers not only to penmanship, but also spacing and organization. Plaintiff should carefully consider whether each of the defendants he names actually had involvement in the constitutional violations he alleges. A “scattershot” approach in which plaintiff names dozens of defendants will not be looked upon favorably by the court. Conclusion Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted; 2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected in accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith; 3. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days from the date of service of this order; and ///// ///// ///// 4. Failure to file an amended complaint that complies with this order may result in the dismissal of this action for the reasons stated herein. DATED: February 10, 2020. ‘ tid, PDEA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE