1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VUSAL MANAFOV, No. 2:19-cv-0337-MCE-EFB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 E. ARNOLD, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). For the reasons stated below, the 19 request is granted but his complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend. 20 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 21 Plaintiff’s application, and separately-filed trust account statement (ECF No. 5), make the 22 showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court 23 directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly 24 payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). 25 Screening 26 I. Legal Standards 27 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 28 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 1 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 2 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 3 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 4 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 5 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 6 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 7 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 8 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute 9 on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 10 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, 11 has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. 12 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 13 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 14 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 15 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 16 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more 17 than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 18 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations 19 omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that 20 merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) 21 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d 22 ed. 2004)). 23 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 24 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 25 Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 26 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 27 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint 28 under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 1 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading 2 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 3 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 4 II. Analysis 5 Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening because it fails to state a cognizable claim 6 for relief and any potentially viable claims are not properly joined together in this lawsuit. 7 First, plaintiff claims that defendants Douglas, Arnold, and Allen’s processing of his 8 administrative appeal denied him due process. Inmates, however, have no standalone rights with 9 respect to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 10 2003); Williams v. Cate, No. 1:09-cv-00468-0WW-YNP PC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107920, 11 2009 WL 3789597, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in 12 the vindication of his administrative claims.”). 13 Second, plaintiff complains that on April 22, 2017, he was denied his right to pray as a 14 Muslim in violation of the First Amendment. The allegations, however, are too scarce to show 15 that any specific defendant improperly curtailed plaintiff’s right to exercise his religion. An 16 inmate’s right to exercise religious practices, “may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate 17 correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th 18 Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The complaint does not include factual context to show what acts 19 curtailed his right to pray and whether those acts were pursuant to a legitimate correctional or 20 security objective. In any amended complaint, should plaintiff wish to pursue this claim, he must 21 allege which defendant preventing him from praying and how that restriction was not in 22 furtherance of any legitimate correctional goals. 23 Third, plaintiff’s complaint is plainly deficient insofar as it attempts to bring multiple, 24 unrelated claims against multiple defendants. Plaintiff alleges the following claims arising out of 25 events that occurred on or around April 22, 2017: (1) defendant Rosario applied excessive force; 26 (2) defendants Leau, Brown, Douglas, Ocang, Ogunlaye, Chusorki, Corra, McGee, and Rohrer 27 were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs; and (3) Officers Samaniego and 28 ///// 1 Hanlon conducted an unreasonable strip search. It is well settled that a claimant may not proceed 2 with various unrelated claims against separate defendants: 3 “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VUSAL MANAFOV, No. 2:19-cv-0337-MCE-EFB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 E. ARNOLD, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). For the reasons stated below, the 19 request is granted but his complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend. 20 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 21 Plaintiff’s application, and separately-filed trust account statement (ECF No. 5), make the 22 showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, by separate order, the court 23 directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect and forward the appropriate monthly 24 payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). 25 Screening 26 I. Legal Standards 27 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 28 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 1 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 2 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 3 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 4 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 5 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 6 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 7 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Jackson v. Arizona, 8 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), superseded by statute 9 on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Neitzke, 490 10 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, 11 has an arguable legal and factual basis. Id. 12 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 13 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 14 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 15 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 16 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more 17 than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 18 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations 19 omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that 20 merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) 21 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d 22 ed. 2004)). 23 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 24 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 25 Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 26 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 27 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint 28 under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, 1 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading 2 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 3 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 4 II. Analysis 5 Plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive screening because it fails to state a cognizable claim 6 for relief and any potentially viable claims are not properly joined together in this lawsuit. 7 First, plaintiff claims that defendants Douglas, Arnold, and Allen’s processing of his 8 administrative appeal denied him due process. Inmates, however, have no standalone rights with 9 respect to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 10 2003); Williams v. Cate, No. 1:09-cv-00468-0WW-YNP PC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107920, 11 2009 WL 3789597, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in 12 the vindication of his administrative claims.”). 13 Second, plaintiff complains that on April 22, 2017, he was denied his right to pray as a 14 Muslim in violation of the First Amendment. The allegations, however, are too scarce to show 15 that any specific defendant improperly curtailed plaintiff’s right to exercise his religion. An 16 inmate’s right to exercise religious practices, “may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate 17 correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th 18 Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The complaint does not include factual context to show what acts 19 curtailed his right to pray and whether those acts were pursuant to a legitimate correctional or 20 security objective. In any amended complaint, should plaintiff wish to pursue this claim, he must 21 allege which defendant preventing him from praying and how that restriction was not in 22 furtherance of any legitimate correctional goals. 23 Third, plaintiff’s complaint is plainly deficient insofar as it attempts to bring multiple, 24 unrelated claims against multiple defendants. Plaintiff alleges the following claims arising out of 25 events that occurred on or around April 22, 2017: (1) defendant Rosario applied excessive force; 26 (2) defendants Leau, Brown, Douglas, Ocang, Ogunlaye, Chusorki, Corra, McGee, and Rohrer 27 were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs; and (3) Officers Samaniego and 28 ///// 1 Hanlon conducted an unreasonable strip search. It is well settled that a claimant may not proceed 2 with various unrelated claims against separate defendants: 3 “The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross- 4 claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the 5 party has against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be 6 joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” 7 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the alleged events occurred close 8 in time, plaintiff’s claims encompass discrete events involving separate defendants that are ill- 9 suited to proceed in a single suit. Indeed, each subset of allegations poses entirely separate 10 questions – both legally and factually – from the others. 11 Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.1 12 Leave to Amend 13 Plaintiff is cautioned that any amended complaint must identify as a defendant only 14 persons who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving him of his constitutional 15 rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the 16 deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to 17 perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). Plaintiff may also 18 include any allegations based on state law that are so closely related to his federal allegations that 19 “they form the same case or controversy.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 20 The amended complaint must also contain a caption including the names of all defendants. 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). 22 ///// 23
24 1 Plaintiff has also failed to properly plead his state tort law claims of assault, battery, and negligence. The California Torts Claims Act (“Act”) requires that a party seeking to recover 25 money damages from a public entity or its employees submit a claim to the entity before filing 26 suit in court, generally no later than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945, 950.2 (emphasis added). When a plaintiff asserts a claim subject to the Act, 27 he must affirmatively allege compliance with the claim presentation procedure, or circumstances excusing such compliance, in his complaint. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 28 209 (2007). Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of such allegations. 1 Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by alleging new, unrelated claims. See 2 George, 507 F.3d at 607. Nor, as mentioned above, may he bring unrelated claims against 3 multiple defendants. Id. 4 Any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is complete in itself 5 without reference to any earlier filed complaint. E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. This is because an amended 6 complaint supersedes any earlier filed complaint, and once an amended complaint is filed, the 7 earlier filed complaint no longer serves any function in the case. See Forsyth v. Humana, 114 8 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (the “‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter 9 being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (quoting Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 10 1967)). 11 Any amended complaint should be as concise as possible in fulfilling the above 12 requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should avoid the inclusion of procedural or factual 13 background which has no bearing on his legal claims. He should also take pains to ensure that his 14 amended complaint is as legible as possible. This refers not only to penmanship, but also spacing 15 and organization. Plaintiff should carefully consider whether each of the defendants he names 16 actually had involvement in the constitutional violations he alleges. A “scattershot” approach in 17 which plaintiff names dozens of defendants will not be looked upon favorably by the court. 18 Conclusion 19 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted; 21 2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected in 22 accordance with the notice to the California Department of Corrections and 23 Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith; 24 3. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days 25 from the date of service of this order; and 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 4. Failure to file an amended complaint that complies with this order may result in the 2 dismissal of this action for the reasons stated herein. 3 || DATED: February 10, 2020. ‘ tid, PDEA 5 EDMUND F. BRENNAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28