(PC) Kern v. Edar

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedApril 10, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-02104
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Kern v. Edar ((PC) Kern v. Edar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Kern v. Edar, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES CURTIS KERN, No. 2:24-cv-2104 DC CSK P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 DR. CORWIN EDAR, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 18 §1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 19 proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 21 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will 25 direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 26 and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly 27 payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(b)(2). 3 As set forth below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 4 I. SCREENING STANDARDS 5 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 6 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 7 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally 8 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 9 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 10 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 11 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 12 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 13 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 14 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 15 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 16 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 17 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 18 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 19 1227. 20 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 23 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 24 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 25 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 26 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 27 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 28 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 1 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 2 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 3 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 4 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 5 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 6 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 7 Plaintiff alleges that on December 13, 2023, plaintiff saw defendant Dr. Corwin Edar and 8 explained that plaintiff’s primary care physician had left plaintiff on a list for several months to 9 be seen by a nerve doctor but then later claimed they had no contract with a nerve doctor. (ECF 10 No. 1 at 4.) Dr. Edar claimed he was plaintiff’s primary care physician’s boss. Plaintiff 11 explained he was very concerned about his medical care, and wanted a different doctor; Dr. Edar 12 said he could not promise he could take her off plaintiff’s chart or ensure follow-up visits. 13 Plaintiff explained he has severe pain in his left forearm and bicep, and it feels like major nerve 14 damage and limits his range of motion. (Id.) In addition, he informed Dr. Edar that although 15 RCCC medical staff has been aware of the mass on plaintiff’s left forearm since October 2022, no 16 biopsy has been performed to confirm it’s just a lipoma, as medical staff presumes. (Id.) While 17 plaintiff was explaining, Dr. Edar quietly walked behind plaintiff, put one hand on plaintiff’s 18 shoulder, and quickly and forcefully snatched plaintiff’s left arm, forcing it past the range of 19 motion limit plaintiff had identified. Plaintiff states that Dr. Edar’s actions “instantly inflicted 20 extreme pain to an already very painful condition, making things much worse.” (Id.) As a result, 21 plaintiff alleges that the mass has become very hard and presses directly on a nerve, and the left 22 bicep is under much more stress when moving, increasing his nerve damage to unbearable. 23 In his second claim, plaintiff alleges that on January 23, 2024, near the elevator, plaintiff 24 informed Dr. Fadaki that plaintiff’s blood pressure pill had changed to an extremely strong green 25 pill that made plaintiff sick for four days. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims that Dr. Fadaki responded, 26 “you’ll either take the pill or refuse your medicine,” which plaintiff alleges is medical 27 malpractice. (Id.) Plaintiff then told Dr.

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Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
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416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
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Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Davis v. Scherer
468 U.S. 183 (Supreme Court, 1984)
West v. Atkins
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Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Bluebook (online)
(PC) Kern v. Edar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-kern-v-edar-caed-2025.