(PC) Kelly v. Newsom

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 18, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00154
StatusUnknown

This text of (PC) Kelly v. Newsom ((PC) Kelly v. Newsom) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
(PC) Kelly v. Newsom, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 JAMES CARL KELLY, Case No. 1:25-cv-00154-JLT-EPG (PC) 10

Plaintiff, 11 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, v. RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF BE 12 REQUIRED TO PAY THE FILING FEE IN GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., FULL IF HE WANTS TO PROCEED WITH 13 THIS ACTION Defendants. 14 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS 15 16 Plaintiff, an inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 17 § 1983. This case was transferred from the Northern District of California, where Plaintiff filed a 18 declaration in support of the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3), but not the 19 application itself. It appears, however, that ordering Plaintiff to file the application would be 20 futile, because Plaintiff is a “three-striker” within the meaning of Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See 21 Kelly v. Jones, et al., 2:24-cv-2462-KJM-JDP (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2024) (recognizing plaintiff as a 22 “three-striker” within in the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Kelly v. Sao, No. 1:19-cv-00681- 23 LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2019) (same); Kelly v. Bandaru, 2:24-cv-1161-DJC-JDP (E.D. 24 Cal. June 27, 2024) (same). Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff had at least three “strikes” prior to filing this 25 action and because he was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed 26 it, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff be required to pay the $405 filing fee in full if he wants 27 to proceed with the action. 28 1 I. THREE-STRIKES PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 2 Pertinent here is the so called “three strikes provision” of 28 U.S.C. § 1915: 3 In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated 4 or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 5 frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 6 physical injury. 7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In determining whether a dismissal counts as a “strike” under § 1915(g), 8 “the reviewing court looks to the dismissing court’s action and the reasons underlying it. . . . This means that the procedural mechanism or Rule by which the dismissal is accomplished, while 9 informative, is not dispositive.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 10 citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “interpreted the final form of dismissal under the statute, 11 ‘fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,’ to be essentially synonymous with a 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Id. (alteration in original). 13 In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that failure to file an amended complaint did “not 14 negate the determination already made by the court that the complaint that [plaintiff] had filed . . . 15 failed to state a claim,” and therefore, counted as a “strike” under § 1915(g). See Harris v. 16 Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017); see also id. at 1143 (“A prisoner may not avoid 17 incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of [an] opportunity to amend.”). 18 II. ANALYSIS 19 A. Strikes 20 Plaintiff filed this action on February 3, 2025. (ECF No. 1). The Court takes judicial 21 notice1 of the following four cases, each of which counts as a “strike”: (1) Kelly v. Youngblood, 22 No. 2:04-cv-2462-WBS-DAD (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2004) (dismissed for failure to exhaust 23 administrative remedies clear from the face of complaint);2 (2) Kelly v. Gyorkey, No. 2:11- cv- 24 1 “In particular, a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases . . . .” United 25 States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 2 See El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 2016) (Holding that a dismissal for 26 failure to exhaust administrative remedies counts as a strike dismissal under § 1915(g) if the failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint); Kelly v. Elit, No. 1:18-cv-00019-DAD-SAB, 2018 WL 27 1905667, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2018) (“[I]f a case is dismissed because the failure to exhaust was clear 28 on the face of the complaint, and no outside evidence was considered in reaching that determination, the 1 2142-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); (3) Kelly v. Elit, 2 No. 1:18-cv-0019-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2018) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); 3 (4) Kelly v. Islam, No. 1:18-cv-0018-DAD-JDP (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2018) (dismissed for failure to 4 prosecute, following a screening order dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim). In addition, this Court on several prior occasions has held that Plaintiff is a three-striker, 5 has denied IFP, and required him to pay the full filing fee in order to proceed. See, e.g., Kelly v. 6 Jones, et al., 2:24-cv-2462-KJM-JDP (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2024); Kelly v. Sao, No. 1:19-cv-00681- 7 LJO-BAM (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2019); Kelly v. Bandaru, 2:24-cv-1161-DJC-JDP (E.D. Cal. June 8 27, 2024). 9 B. Imminent Danger 10 Because Plaintiff had at least three “strikes” prior to filing this action, Plaintiff is 11 precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis unless Plaintiff was, at the time the complaint was 12 filed, in imminent danger of serious physical injury. The availability of the imminent danger 13 exception “turns on the conditions a prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at 14 some earlier or later time.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 “Imminent danger of serious physical injury must be a real, present threat, not merely speculative 16 or hypothetical.” Blackman v. Mjening, No. 1:16-CV-01421-LJO-GSA (PC), 2016 WL 5815905, 17 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016). 18 To meet his burden under § 1915(g), Plaintiff must provide “specific fact allegations of 19 ongoing serious physical injury, or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent 20 serious physical injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). “[V]ague and 21 utterly conclusory assertions” of imminent danger are insufficient. White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 22 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 1998). The “imminent danger” exception is available “for genuine 23 emergencies,” where “time is pressing” and “a threat . . . is real and proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Acosta-Colon
157 F.3d 9 (First Circuit, 1998)
United States v. John Paul Wilson
631 F.2d 118 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
Lewis v. Sullivan
279 F.3d 526 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Eric Knapp v. Hogan
738 F.3d 1106 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
J. Wilkerson v. B. Wheeler
772 F.3d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Adonai El-Shaddai v. Jeffrey Wang, Md
833 F.3d 1036 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Jason Lee Harris v. J. Kenneth Mangum
863 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
(PC) Kelly v. Newsom, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pc-kelly-v-newsom-caed-2025.