(PC) Jongpil Park v. Kitt

District Court, E.D. California·Decided November 30, 2021·No. 1:19-cv-01551·Unknown

Opinion

JONGPIL PARK Case No. 1:19-cv-01551-AWI-HBK Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT VICTOR V. KITT, (Doc. No. 35) Defendant. FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Victor V. Kitt on March 26, 2021. (Doc. No. 35, “MSJ”). Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 17, 2021 (Doc. No. 41), and on May 24, 2021, Defendant filed a reply (Doc No. 42). For the reasons stated below, the undersigned finds no genuine dispute as to any material facts and recommends Defendant’s MSJ be granted. Plaintiff Jongpil Park (“Plaintiff” or “Park”), a state prisoner, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on October 31, 2019. (Doc. No. 1). On April 9, 2020, the then-assigned magistrate judge screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that Park had stated a cognizable claim of medical deliberate indifference against Defendant Victor V. Kitt.1 (Doc. No. 10). Defendants answered the complaint on May 18, 2020. (Doc. No. 14). After motion practice and discovery, and in compliance with the scheduling order (Doc. No. 16), Defendant timely filed the instant MSJ on March 26, 2021. (Doc. No. 35). In support, Defendant submit a statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 35-2); the declaration and CV of Dale Rice, M.D. (Doc. No. 35-3); the declaration of Amanda Lucas (Doc. No. 35-4); and excerpts of Plaintiff’s medical records (Doc. No. 35-3 at 48-86; Doc. No. 35-4 at 3-40). Plaintiff submitted a response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. No. 41 at 2-4), a brief memorandum (Doc. No. 41 at 4-5), a separate statement of disputed material facts (Doc. No. 41 at 7-8), his declaration in support (Doc. No. 41 at 9-10), and additional medical records (Doc. No. 41 at 11-14). Summary Judgment Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material where it is (1) relevant to an element of a claim or a defense under the substantive law and (2) would affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1987). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts, by affidavits, deposition testimony, documents, or discovery responses, showing there is a genuine issue that must be resolved by trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Pacific Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 992 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2021). A mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, the 1 Park also brought suit against Adventist Health-Bakersfield. (see Doc. No. 1). The Court dismissed Adventist Health-Bakersfield as a party on November 1, 2021. (Doc. No. 45). The evidence must allow a reasonable juror, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, to return a verdict in that party’s favor. Id. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 (2014). It may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017). Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits and supporting papers is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact and defeat summary judgment. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Eighth Amendment Medical Deliberate Indifference Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an incarcerated person constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A finding of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the plaintiff’s medical need (determined objectively) and the nature of the defendant's response (determined by defendant’s subjective state of mind). See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). On the objective prong, a “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat “could result in further significant injury” or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). On the subjective prong, a prison official must know of and disregard a serious risk of harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Such indifference may appear when a prison official intentionally denies or delays care, or intentionally interferes with treatment once prescribed. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. If, however, the official failed to recognize a risk to the plaintiff—that is, the official “should have been aware” of a risk, but in fact was not—the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment. Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original). That is because deliberate indifference is a higher standard than medical malpractice. Thus, a difference of opinion between medical professionals—or between the plaintiff and defendant—generally does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). An argument that more should have been done to diagnose or treat a condition generally reflects such differences of opinion and not deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. To prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a plaintiff must show that the chosen course “was medically unacceptable under the circumstances,” and was chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk” to the plaintiff’s health. Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016). Neither will an “inadvertent failure to provide medical care” sustain a claim, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, or even gross negligence, Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013). Misdiagnosis alone is not a basis for a claim of deliberate medical indifference. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). A delay in treatment, without more, is likewise insufficient to state a claim. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (

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