(PC) Jakubowski v. Clendenin

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: 1:23-cv-00897
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 DAVID JAKUBOWSKI, Case No. 1:23-cv-00897-JLT-EPG (PC) 11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 TO DENY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION v. TO DISMISS 13 STEPHANIE CLENDENIN, et al., (ECF NO. 12) 14 Defendants. 15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS 16 17 Plaintiff David Jakubowski is a civil detainee at Department of State Hospitals, 18 Coalinga (“DSH-Coalinga”). He is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 19 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants who are employees at DSH- 20 Coalinga. 21 Plaintiff initiated this action on June 14, 2023. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that 22 Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to have access to mental health treatment 23 that gives him a realistic opportunity to be cured and released because they have not adequately 24 staffed DSH-Coalinga with enough psychologists and because they are using non-licensed 25 rehabilitation therapists and behavioral specialists in treatment plans. (Id. at 4).1 Plaintiff also 26 alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from punishment 27

28 1 Page numbers refer to the blue CM/ECF numbers in the top right corner of the document. 1 by making Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement more restrictive than those of inmates in 2 county jails and prisons. (Id. at 24 ¶ 68, 69). The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and 3 found both of his claims cognizable. (ECF No. 7 at 8). 4 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12), which Plaintiff 5 opposed (ECF No. 13). Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 14). For the reasons stated below, 6 the Court will recommend that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) be DENIED. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 A. Allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint 9 Plaintiff filed a complaint commencing this action on June 14, 2023. (ECF No. 1). 10 Plaintiff alleges that he is “an adjudicated Sexually Violent Predator (SVP)” committed to 11 DSH-Coalinga since October 13, 2022. (ECF No. 1 at 10 ¶ 8.) He names DSH-Coalinga 12 employees Stephanie Clendenin, Director; Brandon Price, Executive Director; Dr. Cory Fulton, 13 Chief Psychologist; Dr. Scott van de Putte, Senior Psychologist; and Frank Maul, Chief of 14 Rehab Therapy as Defendants in this action. (Id. at 9–10 ¶¶ 3–6). He sues Defendants in their 15 official capacities. (Id.) 16 Plaintiff alleges that he is “civilly detained for treatment and rehabilitation.” (Id. at 10 17 ¶ 7). The appropriate treatment is determined during the initial assessment upon admission. (Id. 18 at 11 ¶ 11). The treatment is overseen by the treatment plan team, whose purpose is “to 19 facilitate the Plaintiffs recovery and reintegration into the community.” (Id. at 12 ¶ 17). DSH- 20 Coalinga offers sex offender treatment program (SOTP), which involves Plaintiff presenting to 21 facilitators and peers in SOTP groups. (Id. at 12 ¶ 19; 13 ¶ 22). The SOTP group facilitator is 22 supposed to be “a clinician trained to do psychotherapy, or being supervised by someone 23 licensed to do psychotherapy. . . . Practically speaking, this involves primarily psychologists 24 and social workers.” (Id. at 14–15 ¶¶ 28–29). 25 Plaintiff then alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 26 process when they collectively, via acts and omissions, failed to properly staff DSH-Coalinga 27 with enough psychologists to provide psychotherapy services, and failed to reduce the risk of 28 violence and harm resulting from said practice. (Id. at 24 ¶ 68; see also id. at 4). Plaintiff also 1 alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because Defendants properly 2 staffed the treatment groups for “penal code offender,” or criminal patients that had mental 3 health disorders, but failed to do so for him. (Id. at 24 ¶¶ 68–69.) The criminal offender 4 treatment groups, Plaintiff claims, were “consistent and uninterrupted.” (Id. at 24 ¶ 69). He also 5 contends that because of the different treatment, he has been subjected to punishment because 6 his condition of confinement is more restrictive than that of inmates in county jails and prisons. 7 (Id. at 24 ¶ 68; see also id. at 4). 8 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring those treating him to have specific levels of 9 education and state licenses. (ECF No. 1 at 26 ¶¶ 2–7; see also id. at 7). He also asks that 10 Defendants properly staff DSH-Coalinga with enough therapists, refrain from placing non- 11 licensed individuals and behavioral specialists in sex offender treatment groups, and ensure that 12 Plaintiff is offered SOTP treatment enrollment or re-enrollment on a monthly basis, even if he 13 un-enrolls from the treatment. (Id. at 26 ¶ 4; 12 ¶ 17). 14 B. Screening Order 15 The Court screened Plaintiff’s Complaint on March 14, 2023 (ECF No. 7) and issued an 16 order finding that “Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims for violations of the right to 17 curative treatment and to be free from punishment against Defendants Clendenin, Price, Fulton, 18 Van De Putte, and Maul should proceed past screening.” (Id. at 8). 19 II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 20 A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 21 On June 10, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 22 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 12). Defendants provide background on SVPA and 23 SOTP (id. at 5–7), then argue that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim because Plaintiff 24 “has not alleged facts supporting a finding of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.” 25 (Id. at 3, 7–9). Next, Defendants argue that the type of medical care that patients committed to 26 DSH under non-SVP statutes receive is irrelevant. (Id. at 9–10). Finally, Defendants argue that 27 the Court “should defer to the Department’s discretion when implementing and administering 28 the SOTP.” (Id. at 3, 10–12). 1 Defendants ask that the Court grant their motion to dismiss without leave to amend and 2 dismiss the complaint. (Id. at 12). 3 B. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 4 Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13), arguing that his claims 5 under the Fourteenth Amendment meet the legal threshold. 6 Plaintiff argues that the proper standard to apply to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment 7 claim for violation of the right to curative treatment is based on Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 8 307 (1982) and Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980). He argues he alleged 9 sufficient facts under what has been referred to as the “Youngberg professional judgment 10 standard,” which provides that in the involuntary civil commitment context a constitutional 11 deprivation occurs when the provider’s conduct “substantially departs from generally accepted 12 standards of care” that is, a conduct that departs from how a professional would treat a patient 13 under the same circumstances. (Id.) 14 Plaintiff also argues that comparison of the treatment he is receiving as a civil detainee 15 to that of the treatment received by convicted inmates is necessary under Jones v. Blanas, 393 16 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) for his Fourteenth Amendment claim to be free from punishment. 17 Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Defendants’ motion or allow leave to amend. (Id. at 8). 18 C. Defendants’ Reply 19 In their Reply (ECF No. 14), Defendants assert that none of Plaintiff’s allegations 20 related to DSH-Coalinga staffing practices “establish a medical need, much less a serious one, 21 as required for an inadequate medical care cause of action.” (ECF No. 14 at 2) (citing Estelle v. 22 Gamble (429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 23 Defendants emphasize that the SVPA allows DSH broad discretion in designing 24 treatment programs and argue that the SVPA detainees and Offenders with Mental Health 25 Disorders (OMD) cannot be compared because unlike with the program for OMDs, 26 “Defendants have discretion in designing and implementing the SOTP . . . program.” (ECF No. 27 13 at 5). 28 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 1 2 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact 3 in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). “[T]he court must 4 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking all [of the plaintiff’s] 5 allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from the complaint in [the plaintiff’s] 6 favor.” Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, pro se pleadings 7 “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. 8 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 9 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the 10 complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement 11 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair 12 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 13 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “The 14 issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to 15 offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236 (1974). 16 IV. ANALYSIS 17 A. Right to Access to Adequate Mental Health Treatment 18 1. Parties’ arguments 19 Again, in their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that a claim for inadequate medical 20 care requires showing “deliberate indifference” to a serious medical need. (ECF No. 12 at 7) 21 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to 22 allege this claim for four reasons. First, Plaintiff failed to allege deliberate indifference because 23 he “does not allege facts to support any intentional decisions made by any of the individual 24 defendants with respect to [Plaintiff’s] specific medical care.” (Id. at 8). Second, Plaintiff failed 25 to allege that Defendants put Plaintiff “at substantial risk of any medical harm, thereby causing 26 him medical injuries.” Further, “even if deliberate indifference is shown,” Defendants argue, 27 Plaintiff “must demonstrate harm caused by the indifference to support an Eighth Amendment 28 1 claim.” (Id.) Third, the complaint fails to identify any measures that could have abated 2 Plaintiff’s medical injuries. (Id.) And four, it fails to allege any medical injuries. (Id.) 3 In his response, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ motion is based on the incorrect legal 4 standard. Instead, under Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) and Ohlinger v. Watson, 5 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980), civilly committed individuals, like Plaintiff, are entitled to 6 mental health treatment that provides a realistic pathway towards rehabilitation and a safe 7 release into the community. (ECF No. 13 at 3). Plaintiff asserts that under what has been 8 referred to as the “Youngberg professional judgment standard,” in the involuntary civil 9 commitment context, a constitutional deprivation occurs when the provider’s conduct 10 “substantially departs from generally accepted standards of care” that is, conduct that departs 11 from how a professional would treat a patient under the same circumstances. (Id.) 12 Plaintiff then points to the allegations in his complaint that allege that Defendants have 13 not staffed SOTP programs with appropriately licensed psychologists, have reduced treatment 14 hours, and have used untrained individuals to deliver therapy. (ECF No. 13 at 3–4). These 15 allegations, Plaintiff contends, are sufficient to state a claim that the treatment he is receiving 16 falls below the Youngberg standard of generally accepted standards of care and therefore, is 17 unconstitutional. (Id. at 4–5). 18 Next, Plaintiff cites several cases involving SVP detainees that have found that 19 defendants in those cases failed to provide “constitutionally adequate” treatment because it “fell 20 below professional standards for the treatment of sexual offenders.” (Id. at 5) (citing Sharp v. 21 Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000); Howe v. Godinez, 558 F. Supp. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 2021)). 22 Plaintiff then notes, “The statutory framework of the SVPA also requires that sex offender 23 treatment to be based on current institutional standards for the treatment of sex offenders.” (Id. 24 at 6) (citing Welf & Inst. Code,§ 6606 (c): “The programming provided by the State 25 Department of State Hospitals in facilities shall be consistent with the current institutional 26 standards for the treatment of sex offenders, and shall be based on a structured treatment 27 protocol developed by the State Department of State Hospitals.”). 28 1 In their Reply (ECF No. 14), Defendants assert that none of Plaintiff’s allegations 2 related to DSH-Coalinga staffing practices “establish a medical need, much less a serious one, 3 as required for an inadequate medical care cause of action.” (ECF No. 14 at 2) (citing Estelle v. 4 Gamble (429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 5 2. Analysis 6 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is premised on an 7 incorrect legal standard. Defendants’ motion argues that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead 8 the elements of an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical 9 needs, which applies to sentences prisoners. But that is not the legal standard that applies to 10 Plaintiff’s claims, as a civilly committed detainee. 11 It is well settled that, in the involuntary civil commitment context, the “Youngberg 12 professional judgment standard” governs Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. 13 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–23 (1982) (creating a standard whereby whether a 14 hospital administrator has violated a patient’s constitutional rights is determined by whether the 15 administrator’s conduct diverges from that of a reasonable professional). In its decision in 16 Ammons v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., the Ninth Circuit has described the 17 Youngberg case and the standard articulated in its holding as follows: 18 In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 310, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), the Supreme Court was confronted with an involuntarily 19 committed mental patient in a state hospital who alleged that, while at the 20 hospital, he had been injured on numerous occasions “by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him.” The patient, Romeo, sued 21 three hospital administrators for failing to institute appropriate procedures 22 to prevent the injuries they “knew, or should have known” Romeo was 23 receiving, thereby violating Romeo’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Noting that “the right to personal security constitutes an 24 ‘historic liberty interest’ protected substantively by the Due Process 25 Clause,” the Court held that “[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional 26 to confine the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all— 27 in unsafe conditions.” Id. at 315–16, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (citations omitted). 28 According to Youngberg, the Constitution requires that hospital officials, 1 in order to protect a patient’s right to safe conditions, exercise professional 2 judgment. Id. at 321–22, 102 S.Ct. 2452. The Court explained that liability 3 may be imposed for failure to provide safe conditions “when the decision made by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted 4 professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the 5 person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452. Youngberg, then, created a standard whereby 6 whether a hospital administrator has violated a patient’s constitutional 7 rights is determined by whether the administrator’s conduct diverges from that of a reasonable professional. We refer to this as the “Youngberg 8 professional judgment standard.” In distinguishing this standard from the 9 “deliberate indifference” standard used in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment cases, the Youngberg Court noted that “[p]ersons who 10 have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate 11 treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions 12 of confinement are designed to punish.” Id. at 321–22, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (emphasis added). The Court approvingly cited the Youngberg 13 professional judgment standard in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 14 U.S. 833, 852 n. 12, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), noting that “[t]he combination of a patient’s involuntary commitment and his total 15 dependence on his custodians obliges the government to take thought and 16 make reasonable provision for the patient’s welfare.” 17 Relying upon Youngberg, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly recognized the Fourteenth Amendment right of involuntarily committed patients to safe 18 confinement conditions. 19 Ammons, 648 F.3d 1020, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnotes omitted) (applying Youngberg to 20 hold that hospital official’s decision violates the Fourteenth Amendment if it constitutes a 21 “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to 22 demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a 23 judgment”). 24 The Ninth Circuit and the district courts in this Circuit have also applied the Youngberg 25 standard in cases brought by SVPA detainees, like Plaintiff. See, e.g., Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 26 (citing Youngberg to find that because plaintiff “is detained under civil—rather than criminal— 27 process, an SVPA detainee is entitled to ‘more considerate treatment’ than his criminally 28 1 detained counterparts.”); Bodnar v. Clendenin, No. 2:22-CV-1533 AC P, 2023 WL 3077653, at 2 *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2023) (applying Youngberg standard in holding that SVPA detainee’s 3 claim based on violation of the right to restorative treatment is cognizable and can proceed past 4 screening); Kindred v. Dike, No. 1:19-CV-00955 AWI JLT PC, 2021 WL 3847609, at *3–4 5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4480494 (E.D. Cal. 6 Sept. 30, 2021) (applying Youngberg professional standard to a due process claim for 7 inadequate medical care brought by SVPA detainee at Coalinga); Allen v. Kramer, No. 1:15- 8 CV-01609 DAD JDP, 2019 WL 932029, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019), report and 9 recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1370358 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (holding that “the 10 deliberate indifference standard does not apply [to SVPA detainee]” and that “Youngberg 11 standard governs a civil detainee’s conditions-of-confinement claim”). 12 Indeed, none of the cases Defendants rely upon in their motion to dismiss involve 13 civilly committed detainees—let alone those held under the SVPA. Instead, each case concerns 14 either convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees: Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2002) 15 (action by a class of prisoners at women’s state prison); Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 16 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (pre-trial detainee); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (plaintiff was a 17 convicted prisoner); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (same); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 18 1091 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Shapley v. 19 Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Hunt v. Dental 20 Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). Because none of these authorities address the 21 rights of civil detainees, they have no bearing on Plaintiff’s claims. 22 Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 23 claim the Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to have access to mental health 24 treatment that gives him a realistic opportunity to be cured and released.2

25 2 Defendants’ argument under the deliberate indifference standard is also not supported. For 26 example, Defendants’ motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiff has not “establish[ed] a medical need, 27 much less a serious one” (ECF No. 14 at 2, citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). However, Plaintiff’s civil commitment is based on a diagnosed mental disorder requiring psychiatric treatment. Indeed, the SVPA 28 expressly conditions confinement on the presence of such a disorder. Cal. Wel. & Inst. § 6600(a)(1); Hubbart v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 4th 1138, 1157 (1999) (“[A] person cannot be adjudged an SVP unless B. Right to Be Free from Punishment as a Civil Detainee 1 1. Parties’ arguments 2 The Court now turns to Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants 3 violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from punishment by making Plaintiff’s 4 conditions of confinement more restrictive than those of inmates in county jails and prisons. 5 Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff’s claim based on violation of his right to be free 6 from punishment as a civil detainee is premised on disparate treatment compared to criminal 7 detainees. (ECF No. 12 at 9). Defendants also acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has held that 8 because the purpose of confinement of a civil detainee “is not punitive, the state must also 9 provide the civilly-committed with ‘more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement 10 than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.’” (Id.) (quoting Sharp, 11 233 F.3d at 1172 and Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 233). But Defendants ask that Plaintiff’s claim 12 nevertheless be dismissed because differences in staffing or treatment for other categories of 13 detainees do not establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation because courts “have found that, 14 particularly with respect to the third element of deliberate indifference, the test for finding that 15 the defendant failed to abate the risk will necessarily ‘turn [ ] on the facts and circumstances of 16 each particular case.’” (Id.) (quoting Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th 17 Cir. 2018)). 18 19 20 21 22 he ‘currently’ suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder . . . . ”) (citing § 6600(a)); see also id. at 1166 (“The Act is based on the premise that SVP’s suffer from clinically diagnosable mental disorders which 23 require psychiatric care and treatment . . .”). By detaining Plaintiff under the SVPA, the State has already conceded that he has a serious medical need requiring psychiatric treatment. Hubbart, 19 Cal. 24 4th at 1139. Similarly, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has not shown harm or injury from the failure to 25 obtain treatment (ECF No. 12 at 8) disregards the fact that Plaintiff cannot be released from civil commitment until he has been successfully treated. “The SVPA is also designed to ensure that the 26 committed person does not ‘remain confined any longer than he suffers from a mental abnormality 27 rendering him unable to control his dangerousness.’” Hubbart, 19 Cal. 4th at 1177 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). If an SVPA detainee is adjudged to be “safe to be at large,” 28 immediate release is statutorily required. Id. The denial of treatment prolongs Plaintiff’s involuntary confinement, which itself constitutes an injury. 1 Defendants also argue that comparison of treatment of SVPA detainees to treatment of 2 Offenders with Mental Health Disorders (OMDs) and offenders housed in “unit 21” is 3 inappropriate because: 4 OMDs are civilly committed to DSH only after meeting specific criteria as outlined in California Penal Code section 2962, and have a statutory right 5 to treatment once said criteria has been met. Similarly, offenders housed in 6 unit 21 are civilly committed because they’ve been evaluated and determined to benefit from care and treatment at a state hospital, thereby 7 triggering a statutory right to temporary treatment at DSH pursuant to 8 California Penal Code section 2684. Each of these types of commitments 9 has a specific diagnosed medical need, and therefore a right to treatment exists. 10 (ECF No. 12 at 10). 11 In response, Plaintiff contends that comparison of the treatment he is receiving a civil 12 detainee to that of the treatment received by convicted inmates is necessary for his Fourteenth 13 Amendment claim to be free from punishment under Jones v. Blanas. Plaintiff asserts that in 14 Jonas, the Ninth Circuit has held that if the detainee is subjected to conditions identical to, 15 similar to, or more restrictive than those applied to individuals detained under criminal codes, 16 than the detainee is presumed to being punished. (Id. at 7). Therefore, “Plaintiff has pled facts 17 in his complaint” that show that staffing shortages and treatment reductions are unconstitutional 18 because they deprive him of the same opportunities afforded to other detainees, such as those in 19 the CDCR system. (Id. at 7–8). 20 In their Reply, Defendants cite Hubbart and emphasize that the SVPA allows DSH 21 broad discretion in designing treatment programs, and Plaintiff cannot demand a specific 22 treatment approach or staffing model. (ECF No. 14 at 3). Defendants argue that the SVPA 23 detainees and Offenders with Mental Health Disorders (OMD) cannot be compared because 24 unlike with the program for OMDs, “Defendants have discretion in designing and 25 implementing the SOTP . . . program.” (ECF No. 13 at 5). Defendants again insist that the 26 adequacy of treatment must be evaluated based on the individual needs of SVPs, not by 27 comparing them to other populations. 28 2. Analysis 1 The Court finds Defendants’ argument does not warrant dismissing Plaintiff’s 2 Fourteenth Amendment claim to be free from punishment. Once again, Defendants’ position is 3 based on an erroneous legal standard. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not met “the third 4 element of deliberate indifference” (ECF No. 13 at 9), but as previously discussed at length, 5 deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment is not the applicable standard. Instead, the 6 substantive due process standard applies here: 7 The case of the individual confined awaiting civil commitment 8 proceedings implicates the intersection between two distinct Fourteenth 9 Amendment imperatives. First, “[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of 10 confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed 11 to punish.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22, 102 S.Ct. 2452. Second, when 12 the state detains an individual on a criminal charge, that person, unlike a criminal convict, “may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in 13 accordance with due process of law.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861 14 (emphasis added); see also Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir.2004) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all punishment of 15 pretrial detainees.”). As civil detainees retain greater liberty protections 16 than individuals detained under criminal process, see Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–24, 102 S.Ct. 2452, and pre-adjudication detainees retain greater 17 liberty protections than convicted ones, see Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–36, 99 18 S.Ct. 1861, it stands to reason that an individual detained awaiting civil 19 commitment proceedings is entitled to protections at least as great as those afforded to a civilly committed individual and at least as great as those 20 afforded to an individual accused but not convicted of a crime. 21 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931–32 (9th Cir. 2004). In light of these principles, the Ninth 22 Circuit has held that “when a SVPA detainee is confined in conditions identical to, similar to, 23 or more restrictive than, those in which his criminal counterparts are held, we presume that the 24 detainee is being subjected to ‘punishment.’” Id. at 932. 25 In contrast, Defendants rely on Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th 26 Cir. 2018) (ECF No. 12 at 9–10), which discussed the standard applicable to claims of pretrial 27 detainees. As Jones states, however, “civil detainees retain greater liberty protections than 28 individuals detained under criminal process.” 393 F.3d at 932. Gordon is inapplicable here. 1 Under the correct legal framework articulated in Jones, the comparison between SVPA 2 detainees and those held as OMDs is entirely appropriate. “[W]hen a SVPA detainee is 3 confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than, those in which his 4 criminal counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is being subjected to 5 ‘punishment.’” Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. Because this standard unequivocally requires a 6 comparative analysis, Defendants’ efforts to distinguish between these groups do not justify 7 dismissal at the pleading stage. Such arguments are more appropriately addressed at summary 8 judgment or trial. 9 In addition, Defendants’ attempt to distinguish between the treatment of SVPAs and 10 OMDs (ECF No. 12 at 10) based on the fact that OMDs have a serious medical need is 11 unsupported. (ECF No. 12 at 10) (“Each of these types of commitments has a specific 12 diagnosed medical need, and therefore a right to treatment exists.”). After all, SVPAs are 13 civilly committed to DSH only after meeting specific criteria as outlined in § 6600 et seq. They 14 have a specific diagnosed medical need. Hubbart, 19 Cal. 4th at (“[A] person cannot be 15 adjudged an SVP unless he ‘currently’ suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder . . . . ”) (citing 16 § 6600(a)); (ECF No. 13 at 2). Additionally, they have a statutory right to treatment. (Id. at 6); 17 Hubbart, 19 Cal. 4th at 1178 (“[T]he Department of Mental Health is required to develop and 18 provide appropriate treatment programs under the Act.” (citing §§ 6604, 6606, subds. (a) & 19 (c)). In addition, they have a constitutional right to treatment. (ECF No. 13 at 3) (citing 20 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322). 21 Finally, while DSH may enjoy “wide latitude” in developing its treatment program 22 (ECF No. 12 at 10) (quoting Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 603), such discretion is not absolute. The 23 provision of treatment during civil commitment is the primary reason why SVPA has been 24 found constitutional. “The Act is based on the premise that SVP’s suffer from clinically 25 diagnosable mental disorders which require psychiatric care and treatment.” Hubbart, 969 P.2d 26 at 602). Treatment is central to the justification for the SVPA and is written into the statute: 27 The facility designated by the community program director may be a state hospital, a local treatment facility, a county jail, or any other appropriate 28 facility, so long as the facility can continue the person’s program of 1 treatment, provide adequate security, and minimize interference with the person’s program of treatment. Cal. Penal Code § 1610(b); see also WIC § 6604 (“the person shall be committed for an ° indeterminate term . . . for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility”). Thus, the DSH’s discretion in developing a treatment program does not take away Plaintiff's ° Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from punishment, which is decided in part by ° comparison with similarly situated criminal detainees. ’ Therefore, the Court will recommend that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim to be free from punishment also be denied.

10 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER ll Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss D (ECF No. 12) be DENIED. 13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States district judge 14 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty 15 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 16 objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no more than 15 1g || Pages including exhibits. 19 Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within thirty days after service 0 of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time || may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th 09 Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 || Dated: _ February 18, 2025 hey — 95 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28 14