(PC) Hill v. Newsom

District Court, E.D. California·Decided April 11, 2025·No. 2:19-cv-01680·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATHAN HILL, No. 2:19-cv-1680 DJC AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state inmate proceeding without a lawyer in a civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court are the parties’ ten requests and motions. ECF Nos. 19 134 (plaintiff’s request for settlement conference); 136 (defendants’ motions to compel and for 20 sanctions); 137 (plaintiff’s motion to compel); 138 (plaintiff’s motion for copy of deposition 21 video and transcript); 139 (plaintiff’s motion for sanctions); 144 (plaintiff’s supplemental motion 22 for sanctions), 145 (plaintiff’s motion to terminate or limit deposition and motion for protective 23 order); 146 (plaintiff’s motion to modify the discovery and scheduling order); 148 (plaintiff’s 24 motion for order to view deposition video); and 150 (defendants’ motion to modify the discovery 25 and scheduling order). For the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion for monetary 26 sanctions and all of plaintiff’s motions, except for the motion for order to view deposition video, 27 are denied. The court will issue non-monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and defense counsel. 28 Defendants’ motion to compel and to modify the discovery and scheduling order are granted. 1 I. Relevant Legal Standards 2 A. Motion to Compel Written Discovery 3 A motion to compel may be made if “a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted 4 under Rule 33; or a party fails to produce documents or fails to respond that inspection will be 5 permitted . . . as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv). Rules 33 and 34 6 require that a responding party serve its answers and any objections to interrogatory requests and 7 respond in writing to any production requests within 30 days after being served with the requests, 8 unless a different timeframe is stipulated to or ordered by the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2); 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). Unless the court orders otherwise, to serve a party that is represented 10 by an attorney, service must be made to the attorney and is achieved by one of the seven ways 11 listed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A)-(F). 12 B. Motion to Modify a Discovery and Scheduling Order 13 To modify a scheduling order, the moving party must establish “good cause.” See 14 Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992). To establish good 15 cause for amending a scheduling order to reopen discovery, courts in the Ninth Circuit consider: 16 1) whether trial is imminent; 2) whether the request is opposed; 3) whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced; 4) whether the 17 moving party was diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court; 5) the foreseeability of the need 18 for additional discovery; and 6) the likelihood further discovery will lead to relevant evidence.” 19 City of Pomona v. SQM N. Amer. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United 20 States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1152, 1526 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on 21 other grounds, 520 U.S. 939 (1997). Although no one factor is dispositive, the primary factor 22 courts consider in making a good cause determination is whether the moving party was diligent. 23 Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing 24 the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is 25 upon the moving party's reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the 26 inquiry should end.” (internal citations omitted)). It is “significant” when a party is seeking to re- 27 open discovery rather than extend the discovery deadline. W. Coast Theater Corp. v. City of 28 1 Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1990). “The difference [between the two types of 2 requests] is considerable” because “a request for an extension acknowledges the importance of a 3 deadline, [while] a retroactive request suggests that the party paid no attention at all to the 4 deadline.” Id. 5 C. Motion to Compel Deposition Answers 6 “A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer . . . if . . . a 7 deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i). 8 Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs depositions by oral examination. “A 9 party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court except 10 as provided in Rule 30(a)(2).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). “A party who wants to depose a person 11 by oral questions must give reasonable written notice to every other party. The notice must state 12 the time and place of the deposition and, if known, the deponent’s name and address.” Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 30(b)(1). 14 “An objection at the time of examination—whether to evidence, to a party’s conduct, to 15 the officer’s qualifications, to the manner of taking the deposition, or to any other aspect of the 16 deposition—must be noted on the record, but the examination still proceeds; the testimony is 17 taken subject to any objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). A deponent can refuse to answer a 18 question “only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the 19 court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). 20 D. Motion to Terminate or Limit Deposition 21 Under Rule 30(d)(3), “[a]t any time during a deposition, the deponent or a party may 22 move to terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner 23 that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 30(d)(3). “If the objecting deponent or party so demands, the deposition must be suspended for 25 the time necessary to obtain an order.” Id. 26 E. Motion for Protective Order 27 A party may move for a protective order and a court may issue a protective order for good 28 cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

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27 1 Phillips and Beckman were both cases in which a newspaper sought access to court documents that were filed under a protective order. However, the Ninth Circuit applied Rule 26(c) and its 28 “good cause” standard in resolving both cases, and therefore are applicable. 1 “Because disqualification is a drastic measure, it is generally disfavored and should only be 2 imposed when absolutely necessary.” Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796, 814 3 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citations omitted). Motions for disqualification “should be subjected to 4 ‘particularly strict judicial scrutiny.’” Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int’l Corp. v. Style Companies, 5 Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 6 II. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel and Modify Discovery and Scheduling Order (ECF Nos. 137, 146) 7 8 A. The Parties’ Arguments 9 Plaintiff seeks an order that defendants produce all discovery requested by plaintiff’s prior 10 motions to compel, as well as responses to an additional discovery request sent to defendants on 11 February 9, 2025. ECF No. 137. In support of his motion, plaintiff attaches a copy of the 12 November 2024 discovery motion and a carbon copy of a health care grievance he filed on 13 February 6, 2025.2 14 Defendants filed an opposition arguing that plaintiff has, once again, failed to provide any 15 evidence that he served defendants with the requests, as required on a motion to compel. ECF 16 No. 143 at 2. Defendants note that (1) plaintiff previously attempted to compel defendants to 17 respond to discovery by first filing the requests with the court; (2) the court denied plaintiff’s 18 motion because he failed to show he served defendants with the interrogatory and production 19 requests and that defendants failed to respond; (3) in denying the prior motions, the court noted 20 that “plaintiff had until December 9, 2024, to serve discovery requests; has until February 7, 21 2025, to complete discovery and submit motions to compel . . .”; (4) the court informed plaintiff 22 that if he wanted to obtained discovery he would need to “promptly seek a brief modification to 23 the scheduling order to allow him to properly serve his requests on defendants”; and (5) instead of 24 filing a motion to modify the scheduling order, after the close of discovery, plaintiff filed another

25 2 Plaintiff’s motion to compel was filed concurrently with plaintiff’s motions for sanctions and 26 for copy of deposition video and transcript. See generally ECF Nos. 137-139. It appears the table of contents for the entire packet was docketed with plaintiff’s motion to compel. see also 27 ECF No. 138 at 3. Of the sixteen documents listed, it appears that only these two documents identified are relevant to the motion to compel. Accordingly, the court will not discuss the other 28 documents attached in this section. 1 motion to compel without first serving the requests on defendants. Id. 2 In response to defendants’ arguments, plaintiff has now filed a motion to modify the 3 discovery and scheduling order. ECF No. 146. This motion seeks an ordering modifying the 4 schedule because: (1) a typographical error in the original discovery and scheduling order resulted 5 in plaintiff failing to send defendants one of his discovery motions until after the court corrected 6 the error; and (2) defendants’ counsel has lied that he did not receive either one of plaintiff’s 7 discovery motions, even though plaintiff sent exact copies of his discovery motions to the court. 8 ECF No. 146. Plaintiff states that he “shouldn’t be denied any discovery simply because Def. 9 counsel ‘claims’ he did not get them!” and that he needs “at least 90 days from the approval of his 10 motion to resend discovery motions to court, get back & process discovery docs., possible motion 11 to compel, etc.” Id. 12 B. Discussion 13 1. Motion to Compel 14 The court agrees with defendants that plaintiff has not shown he is entitled to relief. 15 Plaintiff’s present motion to compel suffers from the same deficiencies this court identified when 16 it denied plaintiff’s two prior motions to compel— “plaintiff has not shown that he served 17 defendants with the interrogatory and production requests and that defendants have failed to 18 respond.” See ECF No. 131 at 1. 19 To the extent plaintiff attempts to argue that defendants’ counsel was served with 20 plaintiff’s discovery requests by virtue of plaintiff filing motions to compel, the court rejects this 21 argument. As the court has previously explained to plaintiff, discovery requests must be served 22 directly on the other party and not filed with the court. Most discovery is conducted without the 23 court’s involvement. If a party is dissatisfied with an opposing party’s response to a discovery 24 request, they may then file a motion to compel. But a motion to compel is a not a discovery 25 request, and the defendant’s receipt of a docketed motion through the court’s electronic filing 26 system does not satisfy plaintiff’s obligation to initially serve his discovery requests. Any motion 27 to compel further responses to requests must be supported by documentation of plaintiff’s 28 previous service of the requests at issue, and the opposing party’s allegedly deficient responses. 1 2 The discovery and scheduling order was clear that (1) “[d]iscovery requests shall be 3 served by the party seeking the discovery on all parties to the action”; (2) “[i]f an attorney has 4 filed a document with the court on behalf of any defendant, then plaintiff must serve documents 5 on that attorney and not on the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)”; (3) “[d]iscovery request 6 shall not be filed with the court except when required by Local Rules 250.1, 250.2, 250.3 and 7 250.4”; (4) “[r]esponses to written discovery requests shall be due forty-five days after the request 8 is served”; and (5) “[t]he parties are cautioned that filing of discovery requests or responses, 9 except as required by rule of court, may result in an order of sanctions, including, but not limited 10 to, a recommendation that the action be dismissed or the answer stricken.” ECF No. 125 at 5 11 (emphasis added). The court reproduced these portions of the discovery and scheduling order in 12 its January 6, 2025, order and advised plaintiff to promptly seek modification of the scheduling 13 order and to properly serve defendants. Instead of heeding the court’s advice, plaintiff filed 14 another deficient motion to compel and waited two and one-half months to file a motion to 15 modify the discovery and scheduling order. 16 Because plaintiff has not shown that he served defendants with the interrogatory and 17 production requests and that defendants have failed to respond, his motion to compel is denied. 18 2. Motion to Modify the Discovery and Scheduling Order 19 As an initial matter, the court rejects plaintiff’s argument that the court’s typographical 20 error in the original scheduling order is responsible for any of plaintiff’s delayed requests for 21 discovery. The discovery and scheduling order that issued on October 15, 2024, expressly set 22 December 9, 2024, as the deadline to serve discovery requests on the opposing party. ECF No. 23 125 at 6. It then provided that discovery would close on “February 7, 2024.” Id. That was an 24 obvious typographical error; the discovery deadline was intended to be February 7, 2025, 60 days 25 after service of all discovery requests. The discovery deadline could not in any case have 26 predated issuance of the order. Accordingly, it was readily apparent that the court had intended to 27 set a deadline of February 7, 2025. The court corrected its error and clarified the applicable 28 deadlines in its order of January 6, 2025. ECF No. 131. And as noted above, that order also 1 advised plaintiff to promptly seek modification of the scheduling order to properly serve 2 defendants, which he did not do. But in any event, plaintiff’s reliance on confusion about the 3 close of discovery is unavailing, because there was never a typographical error in the deadline for 4 service of discovery requests: December 9, 2024. 5 Because discovery has closed and plaintiff’s request to modify the discovery and 6 scheduling order is effectively a request to reopen discovery so he can serve defendants with his 7 discovery requests, the court considers the factors identified by the Ninth Circuit for amending a 8 scheduling order to reopen discovery. Although the time to file an opposition to this motion has 9 not passed, it will rule on this motion at this time because it has sufficient information to proceed 10 with its analysis. 11 The fourth and most important factor favors denial of plaintiff’s motion to modify the 12 discovery and scheduling order. Despite the clear language in the discovery and scheduling order 13 and the court’s subsequent order denying plaintiff’s November and December 2024 motions to 14 compel, which reiterated the process for requesting discovery and advised plaintiff to promptly 15 seek a modification of the discovery and scheduling order, plaintiff ignored the court and 16 continued to improperly seek orders to compel discovery that had yet to be properly served on 17 defendants. Plaintiff’s blatant disregard of this court’s orders, attempt to blame the untimeliness 18 of plaintiff’s actions on a typographical error in the discovery and scheduling order, and as 19 discussed below, his behavior in his excessive filings, which include personal attacks on 20 defendants’ counsel, are deeply concerning. As such, even though plaintiff’s discovery requests 21 might lead to relevant evidence, plaintiff’s lack of diligence will not be ignored, and his motion to 22 modify the scheduling order will be denied. See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 23 F.3d 1018, 1027 (“We decline to limit the district court’s ability to control its docket by enforcing 24 a discovery termination date, even in the face of requested supplemental discovery that might 25 have revealed highly probative evidence, when the plaintiff’s prior discovery efforts were not 26 diligent”). 27 //// 28 //// 1 C. Conclusion 2 For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff’s motions to compel and to modify the 3 discovery and scheduling order are denied. 4 III. Defendants’ Motion to Compel (ECF Nos. 136) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Terminate or Limit Deposition and for Protective Order (ECF No. 145) 5 6 A. The Parties’ Arguments 7 Defendants seek an order reopening discovery for the limited purpose of allowing them to 8 complete plaintiff’s deposition. Specifically, defendants seek a court order compelling plaintiff to 9 sit for the remainder of his deposition, answer all nonprivileged questions, and refrain from 10 making inappropriate statements or personal attacks. ECF No. 136. In support of their motion, 11 defendants report that during plaintiff’s deposition on February 13, 2025, plaintiff “refused to 12 answer questions” based on relevancy and asked and answered objections, provided 13 “purposefully evasive answers and refused to elaborate when asked,” and “engaged in rampant 14 abusive conduct, making multiple inappropriate comments throughout.” Id. at 2. Due to this 15 behavior and a threatening statement made by plaintiff towards defendants’ counsel, defendants’ 16 counsel terminated the deposition. Id. 17 At his deposition, plaintiff refused to answer any questions regarding his personal history 18 prior to 2017 claiming that “[f]or purposes of this hearing, I have no recollection of anything 19 before 2017.” ECF No. 144 at 13-43 (Nathan Hill Deposition (“Hill Depo.”)) 14:16-15:24. 20 Specifically, he refused to answer where he grew up, what is his highest level of education, and 21 where he went to school. Id. Plaintiff also refused to answer whether he has any evidence or any 22 witnesses that can corroborate his story. Id. 24:23-29:13. He responded “I will as soon as you 23 send the discovery request. That’s my answer.” Id. at 27:4-5. Plaintiff also refused to answer 24 who are his paying clients for the unhackable cyber-security he claims to have invented, id. 85:7- 25 87:25, whether he has any legal education, id. 106:22-107:21, and what IdeaATM23 means, id. 26 109:15-113:4. He objected to answering these questions because he claimed they were irrelevant 27 to the suit, asked and answered, or requested information such as client lists, which are protected 28 by privacy laws. Id. 87:13-25. 1 Before the deadline to oppose defendants’ motion, plaintiff filed a motion to terminate or 2 limit plaintiff’s deposition and for a protective order. ECF No. 145.3 Plaintiff argues that based 3 on defense counsel’s misconduct during plaintiff’s deposition on February 13, 2025, the court 4 should terminate or limit the deposition so that defense counsel “can no longer ask anymore 5 questions, or questions can only be about subject of suit, not me prior to getting to prison, my 6 tech. or company, & certainly not my signature block, or able to repeat any questions.” Id.4 7 B. Discussion 8 1. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Deposition and Reopen Discovery 9 Plaintiff’s objections to defendants’ counsel’s questions—that they had been asked and 10 answered or lacked relevance—were an improper basis for refusing to answer deposition 11 questions. See Doe v. City of San Diego, No. 12-cv-0689 MMA (DHB), 2013 WL 6577065, at 12 *5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179077, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013) (“objections that questions 13 have been asked and answered, exceeded the scope of the deposition, lacked relevance, assumed 14 facts, and misstated [a deponent’s] prior testimony are improper grounds for instructing a witness 15 not to answer”); Covington v. Curtis, No. SA CV 12-1258 FMO (ANx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16 53406, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2013) (a deponent cannot refuse to answer a questions on the 17 ground that it has been asked and answered or that it is irrelevant); see also Rutter Group Prac. 18 Guide Fed. Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 11(IV)-A § 11:1565 (“Rule 30(c)(2) renders ‘relevancy’ 19 objections meaningless in most depositions. The deponent must even answer questions calling 20 for blatantly irrelevant information ‘subject to the objection.’”); see also Vasquez v. Leprino 21 Foods Co., No. 1:17-cv-0796 AWI BAM, 2019 WL 1934015, at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. 73777, at 22 *14-15 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2019) (objection that a question is beyond the scope is improper). Rule 23 30(c)(2) provides the exclusive grounds for a deponent not to answer a question. Covington, 24 3 Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition claiming that plaintiff did not oppose defendants’ 25 motions to compel and for sanctions. ECF No. 147. The court, however, construes, plaintiff’s motion to terminate or limit deposition, ECF No. 145, as an opposition to defendants’ motion to 26 compel and plaintiff’s supplemental motion for sanctions, ECF No. 144, as an opposition to defendants’ motion for sanctions. 27 4 Plaintiff also seeks to have defendants’ counsel removed as counsel for his “egregious misconduct.” Id. This request is more relevant to the discussion of sanctions and therefore will 28 be discussed in the section of this order addressing the parties’ motions for sanctions. 1 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53406, at *6; Moore v. Stepp, No. C 11-5395 CW PR, 2013 WL 2 1832640, at *4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62526, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013). Here, plaintiff 3 was not attempting to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, as no limitation has been ordered, 4 or to terminate the deposition in order to present a Rule 30(b)(3) motion. Instead, he refused to 5 answer because he did not think he needed to, since he believed the questions were irrelevant or 6 had already been answered. Failure to answer on these bases was improper. 7 The only question plaintiff objected to on a different basis was defense counsel’s question, 8 regarding the unhackable cyber-security product that plaintiff claims to have invented, “who are 9 your paying clients?” According to plaintiff, banking privacy laws protect this information and as 10 such he did not need to answer. Hill Depo. 87:13-25. This objection is overruled, as the question 11 did not call for any banking or financial information regarding plaintiff or his clients, it called for 12 the identities of clients. Moreover, banking privacy laws such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 13 require financial institutions to protect their customer’s nonpublic financial information. 15 14 U.S.C. § 6801(a). Such laws do not apply to plaintiff, or give him any basis to object to revealing 15 client identities at his deposition. To the extent plaintiff argues that his business is a “financial 16 institution” subject to banking privacy laws, the court rejects that theory. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 6809(3)(a) (defining financial institution for purposes of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act); 12 18 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B) (defining financial institution for purposes of the Bank Holding Company 19 Act). Because plaintiff has not made a threshold showing of any protected privacy interest in the 20 identities of his cyber-security clients, this objection is overruled. 21 Because plaintiff’s objections were meritless, and because as discussed below, plaintiff’s 22 behavior during the deposition impeded, delayed, or frustrated the completion of his deposition, 23 the court will reopen discovery for the limited purpose of ordering plaintiff to sit for, complete, 24 and fully cooperate in a deposition to be scheduled as soon as practicable after the issuance of this 25 order. 26 2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Terminate or Limit Deposition 27 Plaintiff’s motion to terminate or limit the deposition is untimely. Rule 30(d)(3)(A) 28 requires that the motion be made during the deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3)(A) (“At any 1 time during the deposition, the deponent or party may move to terminate or limit it . . .”). A 2 motion to terminate or limit a deposition after a deposition has concluded should be denied as 3 untimely. See Mashiri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 12-cv-2838 L MDD, 2014 WL 4 4608718, at *1-2, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129599, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014) (finding that 5 “Plaintiff’s current motion to terminate the deposition is untimely for that purpose as Rule 6 30(d)(3) requires the motion be made during the deposition”). Because plaintiff did not move to 7 terminate or limit the deposition during the deposition, and instead, repeatedly raised improper 8 objections and refused to follow deposition procedures, plaintiff’s motion is denied. 9 3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order 10 Plaintiff’s broad allegations of harm are insufficient for this court to issue a protective 11 order at this time. To the extent plaintiff seeks disqualification of defense counsel based on his 12 conduct during the deposition, such request is addressed under the discussion for the parties’ 13 motions for sanctions. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is denied. 14 C. Conclusion 15 Defendants’ motion to compel is granted. Plaintiff will be required to sit for and complete 16 his deposition. Plaintiff’s motion to terminate or limit the deposition and for a protective order is 17 denied. 18 Plaintiff is advised that defense counsel can ask questions repeatedly and can generally 19 ask questions that are irrelevant. This includes questions concerning plaintiff’s history prior to 20 going to prison and to filing this suit, about the technology he allegedly invented, and his 21 signature block. To the extent plaintiff believes a question is objectionable, plaintiff can object 22 but must proceed to answer unless he is asserting (1) a valid privilege or privacy interest, (2) the 23 limitation that this court has stated above regarding questions about plaintiff’s client’s names, or 24 (3) he is terminating the deposition to file a motion under Rule 30(d)(3). Plaintiff is warned that 25 refusing to answer questions based on improper objections, recklessly asserting privilege or 26 privacy to avoid answering questions, or terminating the deposition where it is not warranted will 27 not be tolerated and may result in sanctions, including terminating sanctions. 28 //// 1 IV. Motions for Sanctions (ECF Nos. 136, 139, 144) 2 A. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions 3 Defendants seek monetary sanctions against plaintiff for his inappropriate statements 4 made in numerous prior filings and during his deposition on February 13, 2025, as well as for 5 making improper objections and refusing to answer questions he was required to answer during 6 the deposition. See ECF No. 136 at 2-7. In support of their motion, defendants provide examples 7 from four of plaintiff’s prior filings in which plaintiff referred to defense counsel as insane, 8 moronic, and delusional, claimed counsel is cognitively impaired, and accused counsel of making 9 “false statements, illogical arguments, & ignoring facts,” not being able to comprehend and read 10 English, and being a blatant and pathological liar. Id. at 3-4. Defendants also provide the 11 following examples from plaintiff’s deposition on February 13, 2025, claiming he impeded, 12 delayed, or frustrated the deposition: plaintiff refused to raise his right hand to be sworn in; 13 mocked defense counsel’s question of whether the instructions were “very clear” by answering 14 “regular clear”; refused to provide answers to questions regarding anything before 2017 by 15 answering “[f]or purposes of this hearing, I have no recollection of anything before 2017”; 16 repeatedly refused to answer questions claiming they were irrelevant and/or had been asked and 17 answered; refused to answer questions until defendants sent him the discovery he requested,5 and 18 cursed. Id. at 4-7. During the deposition, plaintiff also made statements attacking defense 19 counsel’s intelligence, and right before defense counsel terminated the deposition, plaintiff stated 20 “I’m glad I don’t have a job where people want to kill me for it.” Id. at 5-7. Perceiving such 21 statement as a threat, defense counsel decided to terminate the deposition and seek motions to 22 compel and for sanctions. Id. 23 B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions 24 Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions against defense counsel for every question defense 25 counsel repeated after it had been answered, for every time defense counsel laughed at one of 26 plaintiff’s answers or statements, for every editorial comment defense counsel made to plaintiff’s 27 5 As discussed above, plaintiff has not provided any proof that he has properly served defendants 28 with any discovery requests. 1 answers or statements, for defense counsel seeking dismissal of suit based on a lie, for defense 2 counsel lying about serving plaintiff with a deposition notice, for defense counsel violating 3 HIPAA by obtaining plaintiff’s medical records, and for every false or misleading statement 4 defense counsel made during the deposition or sent to plaintiff in writing at any time. ECF No. 5 139 at 2-3. 6 In his motion, plaintiff claims that the deposition video will show defense counsel’s 7 “incompetence & low IQ [plaintiff’s] pointed out in several filings,” that defense counsel is 8 unstable, and that the sole purpose of the deposition was for defense counsel “to be hostile, 9 condescending, harass, belittle, & retaliate for times [plaintiff] pointed out his incompetence, 10 errors, & low IQ for making them.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff then admits he “refused to answer 11 questions that aren’t related to the subject of suit, or were already answered and didn’t seek new 12 information,” and asserts that defense counsel is foolish for asking him about his unhackable 13 technology, and irrelevant questions about “IdeaATM23” and what it means. Id. at 4. Plaintiff 14 also suggests defense counsel or anyone else is “beyond retarded and unfit for any job on earth” if 15 they think plaintiff would create a corporation and lie about technology he invented and tried to 16 sell to the federal and California state governments. Id. at 6. Plaintiff then offers to agree to 17 dismiss the suit with prejudice and pay all costs associated with CA/CDCR defending suit if he 18 fails to prove his technology works. Id. at 7-8. Lastly, plaintiff refers to defense counsel as a 19 super hysterical male “karen,” bad actor, mentally disturbed to take my statement that “I’m glad I don’t have a job ppl. Want to kill me 20 for,” & ask if it’s a threat, twice. By definition, if you have to ask that factually means you don’t know! & therefore is not a threat! That 21 was my response too, “if you have to ask then it isn’t.” More proof of how unstable he is. 22 Id. at 8. 23 C. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions 24 In the opposition to plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, defense counsel points out the 25 numerous degrading comments and personal attacks plaintiff continues to make against him. 26 ECF No. 142 at 2-3. Defense counsel admits that the deposition was contentious and that he 27 raised his voice but denies that the motivation behind the deposition was to be “hostile, 28 condescending, harass, belittle, & retaliate” against plaintiff for prior personal attacks. Id. at 3. 1 Defense counsel claims his approach was a calculated tactic based on plaintiff’s prior antagonistic 2 filings and refusal to cooperate during the deposition, that involved numerous attempts to clarify 3 misunderstandings or misconceptions plaintiff had about proper deposition procedures and was 4 not intended to harass or belittle plaintiff. Id. Defense counsel further claims that because a 5 judge was not there to control plaintiff’s behavior, defense counsel took it upon himself to do 6 what he could to control the situation for as long as he could and then terminated the deposition 7 as soon as plaintiff’s comments went from personal attacks to threatening remarks. Id. at 3-4. 8 D. Plaintiff’s Reply6 9 In reply, plaintiff continues to assert that he did not receive notice of the deposition and 10 that as such sanctions based on such deposition would be improper. ECF No. 144 at 1-3. 11 Plaintiff admits the deposition notice was mailed out February 3, 2025, but claims it was not 12 delivered to him and he did not sign for it until after the deposition took place. Id. at 1. Plaintiff 13 claims that because the transcript was not proofread, contains almost 90 errors plaintiff has 14 identified, and does not reflect things like the numerous times defense counsel laughed or 15 interrupted plaintiff and defense counsel’s tone, the court must rely on the deposition video to 16 rule on the parties’ motions for sanctions. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also argues that sanctions can only be 17 sought for attorneys’ fees in preparing a motion for sanctions or motion to compel and cannot 18 include deposition costs. Id. at 4. 19 Plaintiff asserts that counsel’s questions during the deposition “were irrelevant, repetitive, 20 & done to embarrass, annoy, oppress, & in bad faith.” Id. In support of his argument, plaintiff 21 6 Although plaintiff captions this document as a “Motion Against Def. Counsel & Supplemental 22 Sanction Motion,” ECF No. 144, the court construes it as an opposition to defendants’ motion for 23 sanctions, ECF No. 136, and reply in support of plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, ECF No. 137. Because plaintiff signed the filing on March 18, 2020, two days before either deadline to oppose 24 or file a reply, the court deems the filing timely. See L.R. 230(l) (an opposition is due “not more than twenty-one (21) days after the date of service of the motion” and a reply is due “not more 25 than fourteen (14) days after the opposition has been filed in CM/ECF, serve and file a reply to 26 the opposition”); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (under the prison mailbox rule a document is deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivered the document to prison officials for 27 mailing); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768 N.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (the constructive filing date for prisoner giving pleading to prison authorities is the date the pleading is signed). For the sake of 28 clarity, the court will refer to this filing as “Plaintiff’s reply” or “reply.” 1 cites to the deposition transcript where defense counsel said “[i]t is odd to be called difficult by 2 someone wearing what you are wearing,” referring to plaintiff’s prison clothes, and claimed “you 3 are clearly proud to be where you are,” meaning plaintiff is proud to be in prison. See Id. at 11; 4 see also Hill Depo. 113:5-6; 113:12. 5 As with plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and other filings, plaintiff repeatedly states that 6 defense counsel lies, is incompetent, delusional, moronic, has flawed logic, and asserts that 7 defense counsel had a “hysterical Karen reaction” to plaintiff’s statement that “I’m glad I don’t 8 have a job people want to kill me for.” Id. at 2, 3, 5-8, 12. Plaintiff also accuses defense counsel 9 of a homosexual advance during the deposition because defense counsel stated, twice, that he was 10 in love with plaintiff’s signature block. Id. at 10. 11 Plaintiff also asks the court to “remove Deputy Attorney General Paul Kozina as Def. 12 counsel for his egregious misconduct fully described & outlined in both my motions for 13 sanctions.” ECF No. 145. 14 E. Discussion 15 As an initial matter, the court disagrees with plaintiff that the video recording of the 16 deposition is necessary to rule on the parties’ motions for sanctions. The court has before it the 17 full transcript,7 which confirms that the deposition was contentious, and filings prior to and 18 subsequent to the deposition, which inform the court’s analysis. 19 With respect to defendants’ motion for sanctions, there is ample evidence that prior to and 20 during his deposition, plaintiff engaged in inappropriate personal attacks against defense counsel 21 and impeded, delayed, and frustrated the taking of his deposition. See ECF No. 97 at 7; 102 at 1, 22 2, 8-9; and 126 at 1, 4; ECF No. 144, Hill Depo. 5:24-6:12, 7:17-10:22, 14:16-15:24, 18:11-20, 23 26:3-29:15; 30:2-22, 35:9:22, 39:5-41:24, 42:6-25; 86:20-90:4; 93:9-23, 106:22-107:21, 109:15- 24 113:4; 115:11-12. There is also evidence in the form of plaintiff’s own subsequent filings, that he 25 is continuing to engage in inappropriate and hostile personal attacks against defense counsel. See 26

27 7 The errors in the transcript identified by plaintiff are largely typographical or not material or significant for purposes of resolving the present motion. Accordingly, the court will not order 28 defendants file and/or lodge the video recording at this time. 1 ECF Nos. 139 at 1, 4, 7-8; 144 at 2,3, 4-8, 10, 12. Although plaintiff’s conduct warrants 2 sanctions, because no prior sanctions have been issued against plaintiff for this conduct and 3 because plaintiff is indigent, the court will not order monetary sanctions at this time. Instead, the 4 court will issue the following sanctions: (1) an admonishment regarding plaintiff’s harassing and 5 obstructionist actions to date; (2) an order that plaintiff shall cease said actions for the remainder 6 of these proceedings; (3) a warning that similar actions taken by plaintiff in the future may result 7 in an outright dismissal of this action; (4) a warning that plaintiff is required to follow all rules 8 and laws throughout these proceedings; and (5) an order requiring plaintiff to sit for and complete 9 his deposition without any further obstructive conduct. 10 With respect to plaintiff’s motion, the court will not order monetary sanctions against 11 defendants’ or defense counsel. Given plaintiff’s conduct prior to and during plaintiff’s 12 deposition, the court understands defense counsel’s frustration. The court, however, does not 13 condone defense counsel’s conduct, which crossed the civility line on occasion. See ECF No. 14 40:5, 92:22-23, 102:104:7-8, 107:22-24, 111:14-15, 113:5-20. To ensure civility going forward, 15 the court hereby warns defense counsel that the court will not tolerate personal attacks by either 16 party or counsel. 17 F. Conclusion 18 Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ motions for monetary sanctions are both denied. The court 19 will, however, issue nonmonetary sanctions. Both parties and counsel are warned that personal 20 attacks will not be tolerated by the court and may result in monetary, disqualifying, terminating, 21 or other sanctions. 22 V. Plaintiff’s Request for a Settlement Conference (ECF No. 134) 23 After the close of discovery, and after plaintiff’s deposition, plaintiff filed a request for a 24 settlement conference. ECF No. 134. The court ordered defendants to respond, which they did. 25 ECF Nos. 135, 140. Defendants argue that given the unsuccessful completion of plaintiff’s 26 deposition, a settlement conference at this time would not be fruitful. See ECF No. 140. The 27 court agrees and will therefore not schedule a settlement conference at this time. 28 //// 1 VI. Plaintiff’s Motion to Obtain Copy of Deposition Video and Transcript (ECF No. 138) 2 Plaintiff’s motion seeks a copy of the video and transcript from his deposition on February 3 13, 2025. ECF No. 138. Defendants oppose arguing that plaintiff cites to no law or statutes that 4 provides that he is entitled to a copy of either free of charge. ECF No. 141. 5 Sometime after the filing of the motion and opposition, plaintiff obtained a copy of the 6 deposition transcript and video recording. See ECF Nos. 144 at 13-43 (plaintiff attached full 7 transcript to his supplemental motion for sanctions); 148 (plaintiff states that he has a copy of the 8 deposition video). As a result, plaintiff’s motion is now moot and will be denied as such. 9 VII. Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to View Deposition Video (ECF No. 148) 10 Plaintiff received a copy of the deposition video taken on February 13, 2025. See ECF 11 No. 148. The footage was provided to plaintiff on a USB drive. Id. Plaintiff seeks a court order 12 allowing him access to a computer that will allow him to view the deposition video so that he can 13 “make all necessary corrections to the transcripts.” Id. The court grants plaintiff’s motion and 14 will require the Litigation Coordinator at Kern Valley State Prison to make arrangements with 15 plaintiff to view the deposition video. 16 VIII. Defendants’ Motion to Modify the Discovery and Scheduling Order (ECF No. 150) 17 Defendants seek a motion to modify the discovery and scheduling order to extend the 18 deadline for the filing of dispositive motions to 90 days after the court’s ruling on defendants’ 19 motion to compel and for sanctions. ECF No. 150 at 2. Defendants argue that such extension is 20 necessary due to plaintiff’s abuse of the discovery process and refusal to engage in good faith. 21 ECF No. 150-1 at 2. Defendants claim that plaintiff’s failure to cooperate during his deposition, 22 resulting in the need to file and resolve a motion to compel, has prevented defendants from 23 obtaining the information they need to determine whether dispositive motions are appropriate 24 and, if so, to draft such motions. Id. Defense counsel declares that “[e]ven if the Court rule on 25 Defendants’ motion today, there would be insufficient time to set a date to complete Plaintiff’s 26 deposition, conduct the remainder of the deposition, obtain the transcript, and prepare the 27 motion.” Id. at 4. This is the first request to modify the dispositive motion deadline. Id. 28 Good cause appearing, the court will grant defendants’ motion. The deadline to file 1 pretrial motions will be extended to 90 days from the service of this order. 2 IX. CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 4 1. Plaintiff’s Request for Settlement Conference (ECF No. 134) is DENIED. 5 2. Defendants’ Motion to Compel and for Monetary Sanctions (ECF No. 136) is 6 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 7 a. Defendants’ motion to compel plaintiff to sit for and complete a deposition is 8 GRANTED. 9 b. Good cause appearing, fact discovery is reopened for the sole purpose of allowing 10 defendants to schedule, serve, and take plaintiff’s continued deposition. 11 c. Within thirty days of the service of this order, defendants may take plaintiff’s 12 deposition by videoconference. Defendants shall serve all parties with the notice required by 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1) at least fourteen days before such a deposition. If 14 plaintiff refuses to participate in his deposition, defendants may bring a motion for sanctions 15 within fourteen days of being advised of plaintiff’s refusal. 16 d. Defendants’ motion for monetary sanction against plaintiff is DENIED. 17 e. The court formally admonishes plaintiff that the conduct identified by defendants 18 was harassing and impeded, delayed, and frustrated the completion of his deposition. Plaintiff 19 shall cease said actions for the remainder of the proceedings. Similar actions by plaintiff will 20 result in sanctions, which may include terminating sanctions. Plaintiff is required to follow all 21 rules, laws, and this court’s orders throughout these proceedings. 22 3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 137) is DENIED. 23 4. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Copy of Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript and Video (ECF No. 24 138) is DENIED as moot. 25 5. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 139) is DENIED. All parties and counsel 26 are admonished that personal attacks by any party or counsel against another—moving forward— 27 will not be tolerated by this Court and will result in sanctions provided by law, including 28 terminating sanctions. 1 6. Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 144) is construed as an 2 || opposition to defendants’ motion for sanctions (ECF No. 136) and reply to plaintiff’s motion for 3 || sanctions (ECF No. 137) and is therefore terminated. 4 7. Plaintiff's Motion to Terminate or Limit Deposition and for Protective Order (ECF 5 || No. 145) is DENIED. 6 8. Plaintiff's Motion to Modify the Discovery and Scheduling Order (ECF No. 146) is 7 || DENIED. 8 9. Plaintiffs Motion for Order to View Deposition Video (ECF NO. 148) is GRANTED. 9 || The Litigation Coordinator at Kern Valley State Prison is directed to make arrangements with 10 | plaintiff so that plaintiff can view the deposition video. 11 10. Good cause appearing, defendants’ Motion to Modify the Discovery and Scheduling 12 || Order (ECF No. 150) is GRANTED. The deadline to file pretrial motions is extended to 90 days 13 || from the service of this order. 14 | DATED: April 10, 2025 ~ Ctt10 Lhar—e_ Is ALLISONCLAIRE. SS 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20

(PC) Hill v. Newsom, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

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