(PC) Hill v. Newsom

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NATHAN HILL, No. 2:19-cv-01680 DJC AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion 19 to recuse the undersigned based on alleged misconduct. ECF No. 117. 20 I. Motion to Recuse 21 In support of his motion, plaintiff cites to the denial of his two separate motions for a 22 temporary restraining order. See ECF Nos. 14, 39 (Findings and Recommendations). Based on 23 the denial of these motions, plaintiff contends that the undersigned is biased against him. Plaintiff 24 also requests that the District Judge rule on the motion because of the undersigned’s refusal to 25 recuse herself. 26 II. Legal Standards 27 As an initial matter, the motion for recusal is properly before the undersigned, as the Ninth 28 Circuit has “held repeatedly that the challenged judge h[er]self should rule on the legal 1 sufficiency of a recusal motion in the first instance.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 2 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978)). If the 3 affidavit is legally insufficient, then recusal can be denied. United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. 4 Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 “Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and 6 sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or 7 prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further 8 therein….” 28 U.S.C. § 144. “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall 9 disqualify h[er]self in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be 10 questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Under both recusal statutes, the substantive standard is 11 “whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s 12 impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Studley, 783 F.2d at 939 (quoting Mayes v. 13 Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 14 III. Analysis 15 All of plaintiff’s allegations of bias or prejudice arise out of the undersigned’s rulings in 16 this action. However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 17 partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Recusal “is required ‘only 18 if the bias or prejudice stems from an extrajudicial source and not from conduct or rulings made 19 during the course of the proceeding.’” Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 20 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Toth v. TransWorld Airlines, 862 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988)). 21 Plaintiff’s allegations of bias are legally insufficient to establish a reasonable question as to the 22 undersigned’s impartiality or that a bias or prejudice exists. Therefore, the motion for recusal will 23 be denied. 24 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal (ECF No. 25 117) is denied. 26 This ruling shall be final if plaintiff does not seek reconsideration of the order by the 27 District Judge within fourteen days of being served with this order. L.R. 303(b). If plaintiff seeks 28 reconsideration of this order by the district judge, he must file a request and serve a copy of the 1 || request on the undersigned. Any such request must specifically designate the ruling, or part 2 || thereof, objected to and the basis for that objection. Such request must be captioned “Request for 3 || Reconsideration by the District Court of Magistrate Judge’s Ruling.” L.R. 303(c). 4 | DATED: June 26, 2024 ° Cthten— Lape 6 ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28