1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEON HAYGOOD, Case No. 2:20-cv-02272-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS BE GRANTED AND THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 14 T. LINDQUIST, et al., AMEND BE DENIED 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS 16 ECF Nos. 20, 28, & 29 17
18 19 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his First Amendment right to free expression 20 when they refused to accept his account withdrawal form because he had signed it using a series 21 of numbers rather than with his legal name.1 Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff’s 22 allegations fail to state a First Amendment claim and, alternatively, that they are entitled to 23 qualified immunity. After defendants’ motion was fully briefed, plaintiff separately filed two 24 amended complaints, which I construe as motions to amend the complaint. I recommend that 25 defendants’ motion be granted and that plaintiff’s motions be denied. 26 27
28 1 The court previously dismissed plaintiff’s unrelated claims. ECF No. 8. 1 Background 2 The complaint alleges that on February 25, 2019, plaintiff went to the prison library to 3 obtain copies of documents and an envelope. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. To pay for these items, he filled 4 out and signed an account withdrawal form, using a signature comprised solely of numbers. Id. at 5 3. A clerk approved plaintiff’s request for copies. Id. However, after the clerk made the 6 requested copies, defendant Lindquist, a librarian, reviewed the withdrawal form and allegedly 7 told plaintiff that his signature was invalid, asking why he had changed it. Id. Plaintiff explained 8 that he had had problems with correctional staff forging his old signature and so he had switched 9 to a numerical signature. Id. Lindquist allegedly informed plaintiff that she would accept the 10 signature this time but not in the future. Id. Plaintiff asked her to provide the law or regulation 11 that prohibited him from using a signature that did not reflect his name. Id. at 4. In response, 12 Lindquist allegedly called the account office and spoke with defendant Jordan, the office 13 technician, who agreed that numbers did not constitute a valid signature. Id. In response to 14 further questioning by plaintiff, Jordan stated that the Departmental Operations Manual 15 prohibited plaintiff from using a numerical signature. Plaintiff told Lindquist that he was going to 16 check that authority and, if it did not preclude him from using his new signature, he would file a 17 grievance and a lawsuit. Id. Lindquist ordered plaintiff to leave the library without giving him an 18 envelope. Id. 19 Motion to Dismiss 20 A. Legal Standard 21 A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, and 22 granting the motion is proper if there is no cognizable legal theory of liability or if insufficient 23 facts are alleged to support a cognizable theory. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 24 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011). A court’s review is generally limited to the operative pleading. 25 See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). A pleading is sufficient 26 under Rule 8(a)(2) if it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 27 is entitled to relief” that gives “the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 28 upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. 1 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Additionally, a court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint 2 liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), and may only dismiss 3 such a complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 4 of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 5 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014)). 6 B. Discussion 7 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s allegations do not state a First Amendment claim and that 8 qualified immunity shields them from suit.2 Because I find that defendants are entitled to 9 qualified immunity, I do not address the merits of plaintiff’s claim. 10 Qualified immunity shields government officials from money damages unless their 11 conduct violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. 12 Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018); accord Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2018). To 13 assess whether qualified immunity attaches, a court asks “two questions: (1) whether the facts, 14 taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that the officials’ conduct 15 violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the law at the time of the challenged conduct 16 clearly established that the conduct was unlawful.” Felarca, 891 F.3d at 815. A plaintiff must 17 prove both steps of the inquiry to establish that the defendants are not entitled to immunity. See 18 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts may “exercise their 19 sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should 20 be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. 21 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 22
23 2 Relying on Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because their actions reasonably relate to a legitimate penological 24 interest. ECF No. 20. The Ninth Circuit has held that a Turner analysis on a motion to dismiss is premature. See Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1205 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the application 25 of Turner facts at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is premature because there is an absence of adequate factual findings). There are rare exceptions when a dismissal on the pleadings is possible: if there 26 is a “common-sense connection” between a legitimate penological objective and the challenged 27 regulation or action, see Whitmire v. Arizona, 298 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002), and the court evaluates the remaining Turner factors, see Rogers v. Giurbino, 625 F. App’x 779, 783 (9th Cir. 28 2015). However, the record here does not permit such an evaluation. 1 “To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in 2 then-existing precedent,” as shown in “controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of 3 persuasive authority.” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589-90 (2018). “It is not 4 enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough 5 that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks 6 to apply.” Id. at 590. The legal standard at issue must also have a high “degree of specificity.” 7 Mullenix v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEON HAYGOOD, Case No. 2:20-cv-02272-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS BE GRANTED AND THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 14 T. LINDQUIST, et al., AMEND BE DENIED 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS 16 ECF Nos. 20, 28, & 29 17
18 19 Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his First Amendment right to free expression 20 when they refused to accept his account withdrawal form because he had signed it using a series 21 of numbers rather than with his legal name.1 Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff’s 22 allegations fail to state a First Amendment claim and, alternatively, that they are entitled to 23 qualified immunity. After defendants’ motion was fully briefed, plaintiff separately filed two 24 amended complaints, which I construe as motions to amend the complaint. I recommend that 25 defendants’ motion be granted and that plaintiff’s motions be denied. 26 27
28 1 The court previously dismissed plaintiff’s unrelated claims. ECF No. 8. 1 Background 2 The complaint alleges that on February 25, 2019, plaintiff went to the prison library to 3 obtain copies of documents and an envelope. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. To pay for these items, he filled 4 out and signed an account withdrawal form, using a signature comprised solely of numbers. Id. at 5 3. A clerk approved plaintiff’s request for copies. Id. However, after the clerk made the 6 requested copies, defendant Lindquist, a librarian, reviewed the withdrawal form and allegedly 7 told plaintiff that his signature was invalid, asking why he had changed it. Id. Plaintiff explained 8 that he had had problems with correctional staff forging his old signature and so he had switched 9 to a numerical signature. Id. Lindquist allegedly informed plaintiff that she would accept the 10 signature this time but not in the future. Id. Plaintiff asked her to provide the law or regulation 11 that prohibited him from using a signature that did not reflect his name. Id. at 4. In response, 12 Lindquist allegedly called the account office and spoke with defendant Jordan, the office 13 technician, who agreed that numbers did not constitute a valid signature. Id. In response to 14 further questioning by plaintiff, Jordan stated that the Departmental Operations Manual 15 prohibited plaintiff from using a numerical signature. Plaintiff told Lindquist that he was going to 16 check that authority and, if it did not preclude him from using his new signature, he would file a 17 grievance and a lawsuit. Id. Lindquist ordered plaintiff to leave the library without giving him an 18 envelope. Id. 19 Motion to Dismiss 20 A. Legal Standard 21 A motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, and 22 granting the motion is proper if there is no cognizable legal theory of liability or if insufficient 23 facts are alleged to support a cognizable theory. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 24 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011). A court’s review is generally limited to the operative pleading. 25 See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). A pleading is sufficient 26 under Rule 8(a)(2) if it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 27 is entitled to relief” that gives “the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 28 upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. 1 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Additionally, a court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint 2 liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), and may only dismiss 3 such a complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 4 of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 5 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014)). 6 B. Discussion 7 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s allegations do not state a First Amendment claim and that 8 qualified immunity shields them from suit.2 Because I find that defendants are entitled to 9 qualified immunity, I do not address the merits of plaintiff’s claim. 10 Qualified immunity shields government officials from money damages unless their 11 conduct violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. 12 Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018); accord Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2018). To 13 assess whether qualified immunity attaches, a court asks “two questions: (1) whether the facts, 14 taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that the officials’ conduct 15 violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the law at the time of the challenged conduct 16 clearly established that the conduct was unlawful.” Felarca, 891 F.3d at 815. A plaintiff must 17 prove both steps of the inquiry to establish that the defendants are not entitled to immunity. See 18 Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts may “exercise their 19 sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should 20 be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. 21 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 22
23 2 Relying on Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), defendants argue that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because their actions reasonably relate to a legitimate penological 24 interest. ECF No. 20. The Ninth Circuit has held that a Turner analysis on a motion to dismiss is premature. See Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1205 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the application 25 of Turner facts at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is premature because there is an absence of adequate factual findings). There are rare exceptions when a dismissal on the pleadings is possible: if there 26 is a “common-sense connection” between a legitimate penological objective and the challenged 27 regulation or action, see Whitmire v. Arizona, 298 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002), and the court evaluates the remaining Turner factors, see Rogers v. Giurbino, 625 F. App’x 779, 783 (9th Cir. 28 2015). However, the record here does not permit such an evaluation. 1 “To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in 2 then-existing precedent,” as shown in “controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of 3 persuasive authority.” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589-90 (2018). “It is not 4 enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough 5 that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks 6 to apply.” Id. at 590. The legal standard at issue must also have a high “degree of specificity.” 7 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015). Courts must not “define clearly established law at a 8 high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted 9 reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. This 10 inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 11 proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (internal quotation 12 marks omitted). A legal principle is too broad if the unlawfulness of an official’s conduct “does 13 not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Id. (quoting 14 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987)). 15 The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the rights allegedly violated by the 16 defendant were clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Houghton v. South, 17 965 F.2d 1532, 1534 (9th Cir. 1992). The defendant “then carries the burden of proving that his 18 ‘conduct was reasonable under the applicable standards even though it might have violated [the 19 plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.’” Id. (citing Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 480 (9th 20 Cir. 1988)). 21 I need not address whether plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the first prong of the qualified 22 immunity inquiry—i.e., whether plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of his First 23 Amendment rights—because plaintiff has failed to show that the rights defendants allegedly 24 violated were clearly established. Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his right to free 25 expression by refusing to accept a signature made up solely of numbers and having no apparent 26 connection to name. Plaintiff has not cited, and I have not found, any authority establishing that 27 prison officials violate the First Amendment by refusing to accept a numerical, or other signature, 28 1 that has no apparent relation to an inmate’s name.3 Accordingly, defendants are entitled to 2 qualified immunity. 3 Amended Complaint 4 Without either seeking leave to amend or obtaining defendants’ consent, plaintiff filed a 5 proposed first amended complaint on August 23, 2021, and a proposed second amended 6 complaint on October 1, 2021. ECF Nos. 28 & 29. Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 7 Procedure provides that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: 8 (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is 9 required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under 10 Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[i]n all other cases, a 11 party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s 12 leave.” Because plaintiff filed his proposed amended complaints more than twenty-one days after 13 defendants served their motion to dismiss, I construe these filing as requests for leave to amend. 14 Levy v. FCI Lender Servs., Inc., No. 3:18-CV-02725-GPC-WVG, 2019 WL 3459030, at *2 (S.D. 15 Cal. July 31, 2019) (“District courts have liberally construed an amended complaint, that was 16 filed without leave of court, as a motion for leave to amend the complaint.”). 17 While leave to amend should ordinarily be freely given to pro se litigants, see Flowers v. 18 First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002), a court can deny a motion to leave to 19 amend if the amendment would be futile or subject to dismissal, Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 20 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, plaintiff’s first proposed amended complaint is nearly 21 identical to the complaint. I recommend denying it as futile because I am recommending granting 22 defendants’ motion to dismiss. As for the second proposed amended complaint, I also 23 recommend denying it. It includes claims that plaintiff previously chose to dismiss, ECF No. 9, 24 and unrelated claims, ECF No. 29. Plaintiff cannot resurrect previously dismissed claims, see 25 Sunde v. Haley, No. 3:12-CV-00416-RCJ, 2013 WL 5973815, at *6 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2013), and 26 3 There is authority establishing an inmate’s right to use his religious name. See Malik v. 27 Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that an inmate has the First Amendment right to use his religious name in conjunction with his committed name). Plaintiff, however, does not 28 allege a religious basis for his claimed numerical signature. 1 | the new claims do not have a reasonable relationship to the complaint, see George v. Smith, 507 2 | F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 3 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk of Court assign a United States 4 | District Judge to this case. 5 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that: 6 1. defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 20, be granted; 7 2. plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without leave to amend; 8 3. plaintiffs motions for leave to amend the complaint, ECF Nos. 28 & 29, be denied; 9 | and 10 4. the Clerk of Court be directed to close the case. 11 I submit these findings and recommendations to the district judge under 12 | 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States 13 | District Court, Eastern District of California. The parties may, within 14 days of the service of 14 | these findings and recommendations, file written objections with the court. Such objections 15 | should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The 16 | district judge will review the findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. 8 636(b)(1)(C). 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 ( q Sty — Dated: _ March 1, 2022 q_-—_— 20 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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