1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY THOMAS HARDIN, JR., No. 2:23-cv-1902 DAD AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 PATRICK COVELLO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state inmate who filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 18 without a lawyer. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint after the 19 original complaint was screened and found to not state any claims for relief (ECF No. 9), and he 20 has now filed a first amended complaint (ECF No. 14). 21 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 23 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A 24 claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 25 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on 26 an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. 27 at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an 28 arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 2 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 3 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 4 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 5 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 6 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 7 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 8 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 9 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 10 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 11 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 12 II. Factual Allegations of the First Amended Complaint 13 The amended complaint names thirty defendants at four different institutions, as well as 14 Doe defendants 1-20, and generally alleges that they have denied plaintiff treatment for a mite 15 infestation due to his sexual orientation. ECF No. 14. 16 III. Failure to State a Claim 17 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the 18 complaint does not state a valid claim for relief pursuant to the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments 19 against any defendant. As in the original complaint, plaintiff fails to make any specific 20 allegations against any defendant and therefore fails to state any claims for relief against them. 21 He further fails to allege any facts to support the conclusory claim that he is being denied medical 22 treatment due to his sexual orientation. Because of these defects, the court will not order the 23 complaint to be served on defendants. 24 Plaintiff will be given one final opportunity to try to fix these problems by filing an 25 amended complaint. In deciding whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is provided with 26 the relevant legal standards governing his potential claims for relief which are attached to this 27 order. See Attachment A. 28 //// 1 IV. Legal Standards Governing Amended Complaints 2 If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 3 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 4 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named 5 defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 6 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 7 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 8 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 9 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 10 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 11 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 12 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 13 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 14 amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 15 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 16 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 17 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 18 V. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer 19 Your complaint will not be served because the facts alleged are not enough to state a 20 claim. You are being given a chance to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. If 21 you file an amended complaint, pay particular attention to the legal standards attached to this 22 order. Be sure to provide facts that show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights. 23 Any claims and information not in the amended complaint will not be considered. 24 CONCLUSION 25 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 26 1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 27 granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 28 //// ] 2. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 2 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 3 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 4 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” 5 3. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 6 || recommendation that this action be dismissed. 7 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 8 | form used in this district.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY THOMAS HARDIN, JR., No. 2:23-cv-1902 DAD AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 PATRICK COVELLO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state inmate who filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 18 without a lawyer. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint after the 19 original complaint was screened and found to not state any claims for relief (ECF No. 9), and he 20 has now filed a first amended complaint (ECF No. 14). 21 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 23 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A 24 claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 25 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on 26 an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. 27 at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an 28 arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 2 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 3 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 4 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 5 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 6 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 7 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 8 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 9 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 10 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 11 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 12 II. Factual Allegations of the First Amended Complaint 13 The amended complaint names thirty defendants at four different institutions, as well as 14 Doe defendants 1-20, and generally alleges that they have denied plaintiff treatment for a mite 15 infestation due to his sexual orientation. ECF No. 14. 16 III. Failure to State a Claim 17 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the 18 complaint does not state a valid claim for relief pursuant to the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments 19 against any defendant. As in the original complaint, plaintiff fails to make any specific 20 allegations against any defendant and therefore fails to state any claims for relief against them. 21 He further fails to allege any facts to support the conclusory claim that he is being denied medical 22 treatment due to his sexual orientation. Because of these defects, the court will not order the 23 complaint to be served on defendants. 24 Plaintiff will be given one final opportunity to try to fix these problems by filing an 25 amended complaint. In deciding whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is provided with 26 the relevant legal standards governing his potential claims for relief which are attached to this 27 order. See Attachment A. 28 //// 1 IV. Legal Standards Governing Amended Complaints 2 If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 3 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 4 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named 5 defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 6 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 7 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 8 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 9 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 10 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 11 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 12 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 13 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 14 amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 15 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 16 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 17 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 18 V. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer 19 Your complaint will not be served because the facts alleged are not enough to state a 20 claim. You are being given a chance to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. If 21 you file an amended complaint, pay particular attention to the legal standards attached to this 22 order. Be sure to provide facts that show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights. 23 Any claims and information not in the amended complaint will not be considered. 24 CONCLUSION 25 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 26 1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 27 granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 28 //// ] 2. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 2 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 3 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 4 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” 5 3. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 6 || recommendation that this action be dismissed. 7 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 8 | form used in this district. 9 | DATED: November 20, 2024 10 thin Chane ALLISON CLAIRE 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 Attachment A 2 This Attachment provides, for informational purposes only, the legal standards that may 3 apply to your claims for relief. Pay particular attention to these standards if you choose to file an 4 amended complaint. 5 A. Personal Involvement 6 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 7 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 8 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 9 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 10 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 11 in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 12 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 13 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 14 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 15 plaintiff's federal rights. 16 B. Supervisory Liability 17 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 18 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 19 (“In a § 1983 suit . . . the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 20 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 21 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 22 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a 23 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or 24 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act 25 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 26 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Supervisory 27 liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so 28 deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force 1 of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 2 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. 3 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-38 (1970). 4 C. Deliberate Indifference 5 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 6 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 7 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 8 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 9 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 10 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 11 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 12 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 13 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 14 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 15 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 16 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 17 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 18 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 19 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 20 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 21 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 22 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 23 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 24 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 25 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 26 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 27 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 28 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 1 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 2 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 3 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 4 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 5 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 6 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 7 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 8 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 9 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 10 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 11 D. Equal Protection 12 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 13 similarly situated people equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 14 (1985) (citation omitted). “To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a 15 plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him 16 based upon his membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th 17 Cir. 2003) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Alternatively, a 18 plaintiff may state an equal protection claim if he shows similarly situated individuals were 19 intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate government 20 purpose. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted). 21 E. Doe Defendants 22 Although the use of Doe defendants is acceptable to withstand dismissal at the initial 23 screening stage, service of process for these defendants will not be ordered until such time as 24 plaintiff has: 1) identified them by their real names through discovery; and, 2) filed a motion to 25 amend the complaint to substitute their real names. See Mosier v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 26 2012 WL 2577524, at *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92286, at * 8-9 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2012), 27 Robinett v. Correctional Training Facility, 2010 WL 2867696, at *4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28 76327, at * 12-13 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). Additionally, to state a claim against Doe 1 defendants, plaintiff must allege conduct by each specific Doe defendant to establish liability 2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This means that plaintiff should identify each Doe defendant separately 3 (e.g., Doe 1, Doe 2, etc.) and explain what each individual did to violate his rights. 4 F. Proper Joinder 5 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant in a civil action. 6 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where 7 “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to 8 or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and 9 “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 20(a)(2). However, unrelated claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate 11 lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only 12 to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to 13 ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 14 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 15 required fees.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28