JEREMIAH HANKINS, No. 2:24-cv-0150 TLN SCR P Plaintiff, v. ORDER SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al., Defendants. Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court are plaintiff’s motions to appoint counsel (ECF Nos. 14 and 15) and first amended complaint (“FAC”) for screening. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons described below, the undersigned denies plaintiff’s motions to appoint counsel and finds plaintiff’s FAC states a potentially cognizable Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim against defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe, but no other cognizable claims. Plaintiff will be given the option of proceeding immediately on his cognizable claim or filing an amended complaint. The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In performing this screening function, the court must dismiss any claim that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Plaintiff was at all relevant times a civil detainee in Sacramento County Jail. (ECF No. 16 at 2.) His FAC names as defendants (1) Sacramento County; (2) Dr. Williams, Jail Psych Services (“JPS”) psychiatrist; (3) Dr. Sokolov, JPS psychiatrist; (3) John Doe, JPS supervisor; (4) Dr. John Doe, primary care physician; (5) John Doe, mailroom supervisor; and (6) mailroom deputies, John Does 1-10. (Id. at 2-3.) The FAC’s allegations cover plaintiff’s prescription for the anti-psychotic Zyprexa and interference with his legal mail. I. Allegations Concerning Zyprexa Prescription Dr. Williams prescribed plaintiff the anti-psychotic Zyprexa around 2015. (ECF No. 16 at 4.) Zyprexa has an F.D.A. “black box” warning because it causes diabetes, prolactin-induced gynecomastia/breast enlargement in both men and women, and other side effects. (Id.) Plaintiff told Dr. Williams that he did not want to take any anti-psychotics that cause gynecomastia. (Id.) Dr. Williams told plaintiff that the only side effect was “dry mouth.” (Id. at 5.) Defendant Dr. Sokolov also met with plaintiff in 2015 before Dr. Williams did. (ECF 16 at 5.) Dr. Sokolov volunteered to place plaintiff on Zyprexa without giving him a choice of safer drugs, and would not answer plaintiff’s question of “what [are] the side effects to Zyprexa?” (Id. at 5.) Defendant Dr. Sokolov ignored the question, walked away, and never said the side effects to Zyprexa. (Id.) Because Zyprexa causes diabetes and elevated prolactin levels, the standard practice for psychiatrists is to order blood lab work quarterly. (ECF No. 16 at 5.) Over the next 4 ½ to 5 years, neither defendant Dr. Williams nor defendant Dr. Sokolov ordered any blood draw for plaintiff to monitor his prolactin or blood sugar levels. (Id. at 6.) Instead, defendants Williams and Sokolov regularly increased plaintiff’s dosage over that time. (Id.) On or about 2017, plaintiff wrote to “medical” complaining about bilateral swelling and pain in his nipples and breasts due to Zyprexa. (ECF No. 16 at 6.) Dr. John Doe, primary care physician, sent plaintiff to an outpatient hospital for a mammogram. (Id.) The test confirmed that plaintiff had developed bilateral gynecomastia consistent with the side effects of Zyprexa that neither defendant Dr. Williams nor defendant Dr. Sokolov provided when plaintiff asked. (Id.) Despite the positive mammogram and plaintiff submitting multiple medical kites complaining of constant pain in his breasts, Dr. Doe never provided any follow-up treatment. (Id.) On or about August 2019, plaintiff began to experience swelling in his legs, which is indicia of diabetes. (ECF No. 16 at 7.) Sacramento County Jail medical staff drew plaintiff’s blood, and the test indicated that plaintiff did have Type 2 Diabetes. (Id.) II. Allegations Concerning Legal Mail Plaintiff alleges that in 2021, Sacramento County Jail deputies were alerted that plaintiff was going to sue the jail by plaintiff stating more than seven times in grievances that he was going to file a lawsuit. (ECF No. 16 at 7.) Plaintiff also stated that he was in contact with an attorney regarding filing a lawsuit against Sacramento County Jail. Around November – December 2021, plaintiff was waiting on a response from an attorney and shocked to see his prior legal mail opened and read by Sacramento County Jail deputies. (Id.) Per Sacramento County Jail protocol, when any detainee gives a deputy an envelope marked with “legal mail” tag on the front, that deputy verifies that no contraband is inside and then gives it back to the detainee to seal. (ECF No. 16 at 7.) Then the deputy signs his initials on the lip of the envelope so that mailroom deputies don’t have to inspect it. (Id. at 7-8.) Also under Sacramento County Jail policy, no deputy or jail staff is authorized to open a detainee’s incoming “legal mail” outside of the detainee’s presence. That includes “return to sender” legal mail that is unopened and already been inspected when it went in the outgoing mail before with a deputy’s signature on the back lip of the envelope. (Id. at 8.) III. Claims for Relief Plaintiff’s FAC states four causes of action: (1) violation of plaintiff’s right to adequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of plaintiff’s right to access the courts under the First Amendment; (3) state law medical negligence; and (4) state law “serious emotional distress due to negligence.” (ECF No. 16 at 8-20.) The FAC is captioned as a “Complaint for Money Damages and Injunction” (see id. at 1) but does not contain a specific prayer for relief.1 I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
1 Liberally construing the FAC, the court infers from its caption and clearly identified individual capacity claims (see ECF No. 16 at 2-3) that plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Thus, for screening purposes, the court will not dismiss the FAC for plaintiff’s failure to request specific relief. See Massey v. Banning Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that an improper request for relief is not grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “as long as the court can ascertain from the face of the complaint that some relief can be granted”) employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 585 at 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, plaintiff must show that the government “had a deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [plaintiff] suffered.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must also show that the policy or custom of the government “reflects deliberate indifference” to plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Unless the challenged policy is in writing, the municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). II. Linkage Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant's “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). ///// I. Fourteenth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim names defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, JPS supervisor, Dr. John Doe, and Sacramento County. (ECF No. 16 at 8-12.) When filed by civil detainees, claims of violations of the right to adequate medical care proceed under the Fourteenth amendment and “must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070.) The elements of a civil detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim are: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved— making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1125. “With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. “The mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Thus, the plaintiff must prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent – something akin to reckless disregard.” (Id. (internal quotation omitted).) Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects a person’s rights to be free from unjustified intrusions to the body, to refuse unwanted medical treatment and to receive sufficient information to exercise those rights intelligently.” Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In White v. Napolean, which the Ninth Circuit cited favorably in Benson, 304 F.3d at 884, the Third Circuit held that “[p]risoners have a right to such information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed [medical] treatment, as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments that can be made available in a prison setting.” 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990). The undersigned finds that plaintiff has stated cognizable Fourteenth Amendment medical care claims against defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe. Liberally construed, the FAC alleges that each defendant made intentional decisions regarding plaintiff’s care that put him at risk of gynecomastia and/or diabetes. Plaintiff has also alleged sufficient facts to support each defendant’s objective unreasonableness in not appreciating those risks. For Dr. Williams and Dr. Sokolov, the FAC alleges that both failed inform plaintiff of the side effects of Zyprexa despite his repeated requests and increased his Zyprexa dosage over the next 4 ½ to 5 years. Dr. John Doe failed to treat plaintiff’s gynecomastia despite alleged knowledge of his positive mammogram. Plaintiff, however, has not plead adequate facts to link defendant JPS Supervisor John Doe to the deprivation of his rights. Plaintiff alleges only the vague contention that defendant has an “omissive or deficient policy for ensuring that [his] subordinates are adhering to acceptable standards of medical care when prescribing and monitoring the side effects of drugs[.]” (ECF No. 16 at 11.) Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a respondeat superior theory and therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the plaintiff must show a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of JPS Supervisor John Doe in the violations of his civil rights are not sufficient. Finally, plaintiff’s policy and custom allegations are too vague and conclusory to maintain a Monell claim against defendant Sacramento County. Plaintiff alleges only that Sacramento Country violated his civil rights by “acquiescing, ratifying, or condoning a policy or custom of [County Jail] primary care physicians [and psychiatrists] providing medical treatment that is below an acceptable standard of medical care.” (ECF No. 16 at 12.) The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. “The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Plaintiff has not alleged any deliberate conduct by the County or other facts that go beyond the respondeat superior theory of liability. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that plaintiff has stated a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe only. II. First Amendment Access to the Courts Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges defendants John Doe mailroom supervisor and mailroom deputies John Does 1-10 violated his First Amendment rights by “opening and/or reading plaintiff’s legal mail in retaliat[ion] against plaintiff for exercising plaintiff’s first amendment right to access the courts.” (ECF No. 16 at 12.) Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Courts have afforded greater protection to legal mail than non-legal mail. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989). In the Ninth Circuit, prisoners have a “protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked, confidential legal mail opened only in their presence.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017). However, only mail from plaintiff’s lawyer or prospective lawyer is protected. See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing the right at issue as the right to be free from “prison officials reading mail between a prisoner and his lawyer”); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996) (“mail from the courts, as contrasted with mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail”). As to communication with counsel, a plaintiff need not “‘show any actual injury beyond the free speech violation itself to state a constitutional claim.’” Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008)). A prison’s interference with legal mail may also violate an inmate’s right of access to the courts, which is protected by the First Amendment’s right to petition the government and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290-291 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the courts). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015). To state a claim for the denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). Plaintiff’s FAC lacks adequate linkage to state a cognizable First Amendment claim. Plaintiff alleges that John Doe mailroom supervisor and John Does 1-10 are responsible for “inspecting and distributing mail at [Sacramento County Jail]” (ECF No. 16 at 3) but states no facts connecting them to the opening or reading of his own mail. “Whether a defendant is named or has been designated as a ‘John Doe,’ Plaintiff must tie that defendant’s actions to the specific harms alleged to have been caused to Plaintiff.” Zepeda v. Sullivan, No. 1:06-cv-1391 AWI GSA PC, 2009 WL 1288235, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2009). To the extent plaintiff’s claim is premised on a denial of access to the courts, plaintiff has not stated an actual injury with respect to any planned or existing litigation (e.g., missing a filing deadline). The court will give plaintiff the option of amending to explain the Doe defendants’ alleged involvement in the opening and reading of his legal mail. To adequately link the Doe defendants to his mail access claim, “Plaintiff shall either name the defendants involved or list the Doe defendants involved and describe what each did to violate his rights. If Plaintiff can only list these defendants as John Doe, Plaintiff should allege specific acts that each Doe defendant did, such as ‘John Doe 1 did X’ and ‘John Doe 2 and 3 did Y.’” Alexander v. Tilton, 2009 WL 464486, *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009). III. State Law Claims Plaintiff’s FAC asserts state law claims for medical negligence and “serious emotional distress due to negligence” against defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe only. (ECF No. 16 at 13-20.) Under the California Government Claims Act, the presentation of a tort claim to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board is a condition precedent to suit against a public entity or its employees. Mangold v. California Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). “The [Act] applies to state law claims wherever those claims are brought, and the requirement that a plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance…applies in federal court.” Cardenas v. Cnty. of Tehama, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Butler v. Los Angeles Cty., 617 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2008)). Here, plaintiff does not allege his compliance with the California Government Claims Act as to either state law claim. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the FAC does not state any cognizable state law claims. The court will grant plaintiff leave to amend to sufficiently plead his compliance with the Government Claims Act. III. Options From Which Plaintiff Must Choose After conducting the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court finds plaintiff has stated a potentially cognizable Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim against defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe (primary care physician). However, plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to state a Fourteenth amendment claim against Sacramento County or JPS supervisor John Doe. Further, plaintiff did not state a First Amendment claim because he did not plead the Doe defendants’ personal involvement in the opening and reading of his legal mail. Finally, plaintiff did not state any state law claims for relief because he did not plead compliance with the California Government Claims Act. It appears to the court that plaintiff may be able to allege facts to fix these problems. Therefore, plaintiff has the option of proceeding on his cognizable claim or filing an amended complaint that addresses the issue the court identified above. After selecting an option from the two options listed below, plaintiff must return the attached Notice of Election form to the court within 21 days from the date of this order. Option No. 1: The first option available to plaintiff is to proceed immediately against defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe on the Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim. By choosing this option, plaintiff will be agreeing to voluntarily dismiss defendants Sacramento County; John Doe, JPS supervisor; John Doe, mailroom supervisor; and mailroom deputies, John Does 1-10. The court will proceed to immediately serve the FAC and order a response from defendants Dr. Williams and Dr. Sokolov. Plaintiff is advised that the court cannot order service of Dr. John Doe until plaintiff identifies Dr. John Doe through discovery and files a motion to amend the complaint to include his real name. See Mosier v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2012 WL 2577524, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2012). Option No. 2: The second option available to plaintiff is to file an amended complaint to fix the problems described above. If plaintiff chooses this option, the court will set a deadline in a subsequent order to give plaintiff time to file an amended complaint. Before the court as plaintiff’s two motions to appoint counsel. (ECF Nos. 14 and 15.) Plaintiff filed the first motion on December 30, 2024, and cites his in forma pauperis status, the substantial amount of investigation and discovery the case will require, and placement at Napa State Hospital as grounds to grant the motion. (ECF No. 14 at 1-2.) Plaintiff also states that the complex issues in the case “extend far beyond plaintiff’s abilities to understand due to his severe mental disability” and that his involuntary medications impair his cognitive abilities. (Id. at 2-3.) In his second motion filed on January 6, 2025, plaintiff reiterates that he is not competent to handle his case alone. (ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff subsequently submitted medical records in support of his motions. (See ECF No. 18.) District courts lack authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the court may request that an attorney voluntarily represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). The test for exceptional circumstances requires the court to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that would warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. Wood, 900 F.2d at 1335; Riley v. Franke, 340 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787 (E.D. Wis. 2018). Beyond § 1915(e)(1), other sources of law may implicate a request for counsel. For example, appointed counsel may be required in a civil proceeding as an accommodation for a litigant who is disabled. See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-cv-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492, at *3-*9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (granting summary judgment to class of mentally disabled individuals in civil immigration proceedings on their request for appointed representatives under the Rehabilitation Act). Due process may also require appointment of counsel in certain proceedings. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444-45 (2011) (analyzing request for appointment of counsel in civil proceeding under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), procedural due process framework). The court will deny plaintiff’s motions. Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the amount of investigation and discovery that the case will require are common to most prisoners and do not constitute exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. Further, these concerns are premature considering the case is still in the screening stage and no defendants have appeared. Plaintiff’s argument that his mental disability and involuntary medications impair his ability to litigate this case is well taken, but the court similarly finds them premature at this early stage of the case. However, the undersigned will deny plaitniff’s motions without prejudice, meaning plaintiff can request the appointment of counsel later in the case. If plaintiff seeks counsel as an accommodation for his mental disability, plaintiff shall carefully explain, to the best of his ability, why the appointment of counsel in necessary for him to “meaningfully participate” in his case. See Franco-Gonzalez, 2013 WL 3674492 at *7. In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff’s motions to appoint counsel (ECF Nos. 14 and 15) are denied without prejudice. 2. Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim against Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe but no other cognizable claims. 3. Plaintiff has the option to proceed immediately on his cognizable Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim against defendants Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe as set forth above, or to file an amended complaint. 4. Within 21 days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete and return the attached Notice of Election form notifying the court whether he wants to proceed on the screened complaint or whether he wants to file an amended complaint. 5. If plaintiff does not return the form, the court will assume that he is choosing to proceed on the complaint as screened and will recommend dismissal without prejudice of his First Amendment mail access and state law claims, as well as defendants Sacramento County; John Doe, JPS supervisor; John Doe, mailroom supervisor; and mailroom deputies, John Does 1-10. DATED: April 17, 2025
"2 SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13
JEREMIAH HANKINS, No. 2:24-cv-0150 TLN SCR P Plaintiff, v. NOTICE OF ELECTION Defendants. Check One: _____ Plaintiff elects to proceed immediately against Dr. Williams, Dr. Sokolov, and Dr. John Doe on the Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim. By choosing this option, plaintiff will be agreeing to voluntarily dismiss Sacramento County; John Doe, JPS supervisor; John Doe, mailroom supervisor; and mailroom deputies, John Does 1-10. The court will proceed to serve the FAC and order a response from defendants Dr. Williams and Dr. Sokolov. The court cannot order service of Dr. John Doe until plaintiff identifies him through discovery and files a motion to amend the complaint to include his real name. _____ Plaintiff wants time to file an amended complaint. DATED:_______________________
Jeremiah Hankins, Plaintiff pro se