(PC) Guzman v. Cates

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 23, 2022
• Docket: 1:21-cv-01465
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN C. GUZMAN, Case No. 1:21-cv-01465-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 13 v. ACTION 14 CATES, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 15 Defendants. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE 16 TO PROSECUTE 17 (ECF No. 5) 18 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 19 20 I. Background 21 Plaintiff Juan C. Guzman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil 22 rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 23 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 24 On January 4, 2022, the Court issued a screening order granting Plaintiff leave to file a 25 first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 5.) 26 The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would 27 result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court 28 order and for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 9.) The deadline has expired, and Plaintiff has failed 1 to file an amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the Court. 2 II. Failure to State a Claim 3 A. Screening Requirement 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 5 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 7 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 8 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 10 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 14 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 15 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 17 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 18 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 19 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 20 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 21 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 22 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Correctional Institution (“CCI”), at 24 Tehachapi, California, where the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff 25 names the following defendants: (1) B. Cates, Warden, (2) Baker, CCRA Case Records, 26 (3) Edward, Counselor, and (4) CDCR Board of Parole. 27 Plaintiff alleges as follows. 28 /// 1 I’m here in prison suffered injury in my head and blinded my right eye and been incarcerated for 23 yrs with life sentenced for the same and similar offenses and 2 range 3-6-8. The criminal procedure never implement by both parties, the court neither the District Attorney’s office never submitted report for retention in 3 CDCR central file. That violated my constitutional rights. There’s no accuracy 4 from the Parole Board and the case records, see U.S.S.G. sentencing guidelines. I’m also detected positive with Covid-19 without a proper care. 5 6 (ECF No. 1, p. 3 (unedited text).) Plaintiff further alleges:

7 I’m receiving punishment here in prison for 23 years with a mistrial deadlock, attached copies. I’m a low risk CSRA-low-1 with 33.3% and the charges range 3- 8 6-8. The warden responsibilities is to send back to the court if there’s no report 9 submitted for retention to the CDCR central file within 30 days, but never happen. CDCR also agreed Playa v. Brown, June 5, 2015 medical and mental issue will 10 receive 50% never happen. A mistrial deadlock and sent to prison never happen in the history of America and violated my Constitutional rights. 11 12 (Id. (unedited text).) 13 C. Discussion 14 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 15 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 16 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 17 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 18 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 19 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 20 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 21 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 22 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 23 at 570). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. 25 Although Plaintiff's complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. As a basic 26 matter, the complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened or who was 27 involved. Plaintiff’s allegations must be based on facts as to what happened and not conclusions. 28 The allegations are hard to follow, and it is unclear what each defendant did which Plaintiff 1 claims violated his rights. In fact, it is difficult to understand what Plaintiff claims is the 2 purported Constitutional violation. 3 2. Linkage Requirement 4 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

5 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 6 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the 7 party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 8 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 10 The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions 11 of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. 12 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, (1976). The Ninth 13 Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, 14 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 15 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 16 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 17 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to link all Defendants to potential constitutional violations. 18 Plaintiff must name individual defendants and allege what each defendant did or did not do that 19 resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged what each individual 20 defendant did or did not do that caused the asserted deprivation. 21 3. Supervisory Personnel 22 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Cates, or any other defendant, based 23 solely upon his or her supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on 24 supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of 25 respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 26 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 27 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 28 /// 1 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or 2 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 3 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. 4 Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any 5 personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 6 repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 7 Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations 8 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). 9 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate that his 10 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed 11 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane Cty. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 713 12 (9th Cir. 2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 13 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 14 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 15 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 16 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 17 1982). 18 Plaintiff has failed to allege direct participation in the alleged violations by Defendant 19 Cates. Plaintiff has failed to allege the causal link between defendant and the claimed 20 constitutional violation which must be specifically alleged. He does not make a sufficient 21 showing of any personal participation, direction, or knowledge on the defendant’s part regarding 22 any other prison officials’ actions. Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendant personally 23 participated in the alleged deprivations. 24 Plaintiff fails to allege what the specific policy is and the causal link between such 25 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation. Plaintiff also has failed to plead facts showing 26 that any policy was a moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. See Willard v. 27 Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 14-0760, 2014 WL 6901849, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014) 28 (“To premise a supervisor’s alleged liability on a policy promulgated by the supervisor, plaintiff 1 must identify a specific policy and establish a ‘direct causal link’ between that policy and the 2 alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the 3 policy itself is a repudiation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. 4 4. No Constitutional Protection for Early Parole 5 To the extent Plaintiff is seeking early parole, Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional 6 violation based on denial of early parole consideration, because Plaintiff has no protected liberty 7 interest in parole. There is no right under the U.S. Constitution to be conditionally released 8 before the expiration of a valid sentence. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011); see also 9 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (there is no federal 10 constitutional right to parole). It follows that there is no constitutional right to parole 11 consideration. Deprivation of any rights to resentencing or early parole therefore cannot be 12 vindicated here. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (only deprivation of rights secured by federal law is 13 actionable under Section 1983); see also Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) 14 (state law issue cannot be transformed into federal law issue by merely invoking due process). 15 5. Habeas Action 16 The Court notes that is unclear what relief Plaintiff seeks in the instant proceeding and 17 whether Plaintiff intends to state a habeas claim. 18 To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the validity of his conviction and his 19 incarceration, the exclusive method for asserting that challenge is by filing a petition for writ of 20 habeas corpus. It has long been established that state prisoners cannot challenge the fact or 21 duration of their confinement in a section 1983 action, and that their sole remedy lies in habeas 22 corpus relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot 23 use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. He must seek federal 24 habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”). 25 6. Privacy Act 26 It is not clear if Plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 27 § 552a. To the extent that he is, he fails to state a claim. The Privacy Act only applies to the 28 federal government, not state or local government agencies. United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 1 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2009). “The Privacy Act prohibits federal agencies from disclosing certain 2 personal records without an individual's consent, and also provides a means for an individual to 3 access his or her records maintained by a federal agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).” Jones v. 4 Jimenez, 2017 WL 85783, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017), report and recommendation adopted 5 sub nom. Jones v. Lundy, 2017 WL 915591 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017). The Ninth Circuit “has 6 held that the private right of civil action created by the Privacy Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) 7 (providing that a private individual ‘may bring a civil action against the agency’), ‘is specifically 8 limited to actions against agencies of the United States Government. The civil remedy provisions 9 of the statute do not apply against private individuals, state agencies, private entities, or state and 10 local officials.’ ” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted) 11 (quoting Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985)). As Plaintiff is only suing 12 state and local officials, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim as Plaintiff has no right of 13 action against the defendants under the Privacy Act of 1974. 14 7. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Need 15 Plaintiff alleges he tested positive for Covid and has not received proper care. Plaintiff 16 names as a defendant in the case caption, “Medical Issue-Covid-19, Injury.”1 17 “To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must prove a denial of ‘the minimal 18 civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ occurring through ‘deliberate indifference’ by prison 19 personnel or officers.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 20 The government must give medical care to incarcerated persons. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 21 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 (1976)). Failure to do 22 so can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. In order to prevail on an inadequate 23 medical care claim, a plaintiff must show “deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” 24 Id. (quotations omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two 25 parts. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “First, the plaintiff must show a 26

27 1 The “defendant” appears to be named in error and is in fact, Plaintiff’s claim regarding contracting Covid. The Clerk of the Court was instructed to terminate defendant “Medical Issue- 28 Covid-19, Injury.” (ECF No. 5.) 1 serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 2 further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citations and 3 internal quotation marks omitted). 4 “Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 5 indifferent.” Id. “Th[e] second prong . . . is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 6 respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 7 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; see Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (a plaintiff 8 must show an official knew of and disregarded a serious risk to his health). “Indifference ‘may 9 appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 10 may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care,’ ” but “an 11 ‘inadvertent [or negligent] failure to provide adequate medical care’ alone does not state a claim.” 12 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). “A difference of opinion does 13 not amount to a deliberate indifference to [a prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 14 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 15 Plaintiff has failed to link any defendant to his Eighth Amendment claim or state any 16 factual basis for any defendant’s liability under the Eighth Amendment. Even if the Court 17 accepts that Covid is a serious illness, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that each defendant 18 was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. 19 8. Parole Board 20 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against the parole board. “[P]arole board 21 officials are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages for their actions taken when 22 processing parole applications.” Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1991); 23 Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1981). 24 9. Brown v. Plata 25 Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is asking for immediate release based on the decision in 26 Brown v. Plata, the Court notes that “a remedial court order, standing alone, cannot serve as the 27 basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because such orders do not create rights, privileges or 28 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Thus, Plata by itself does 1 not provide any substantive right on which plaintiff can rely. . . .” Thomas v. Alameda County, 2 2015 WL 1201290, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks 3 omitted). See also Peyton v. Brown, 584 F. App’x 603, 604 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he decision in 4 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946–47, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011), requiring the 5 State of California to reduce prison overcrowding to improve mental health and medical services 6 to inmates, does not give [Plaintiff] cognizable claims for immediate or temporary supervised 7 release merely because he also alleges deprivations arising from prison overcrowding.”). 8 III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order 9 A. Legal Standard 10 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 11 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 12 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 13 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 14 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 15 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 16 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 17 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 18 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 19 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 20 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 21 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 22 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 23 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 24 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 25 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 B. Discussion 27 Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the 28 Court’s orders. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his 1 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 2 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a 3 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 4 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against 5 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 6 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 7 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 8 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 9 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 10 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 11 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 12 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s January 4, 2022 screening 13 order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a 14 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 15 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 5, p. 9.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal 16 could result from his noncompliance. 17 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 18 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 19 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee and is not 20 proceeding in forma pauperis in this action, in light of his incarceration it is not clear whether 21 monetary sanctions will be of any use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is likely to 22 have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. 23 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 24 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 25 district judge to this action. 26 Further, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY 27 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim 28 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a Court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to 1 prosecute this action. 2 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 3 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 4 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 5 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 6 Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 7 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 8 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 9 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

12 Dated: February 22, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13

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